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Strengthening the Migration-Development Nexus through Improved Policy and Institutional Coherence

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Strengthening the Migration-Development Nexus through Improved Policy and Institutional Coherence*

Amy Hong[†] and Anna Knoll[†]

Abstract

The research community has thus far given the topic of policy and institutional coherence for migration and development (PICMD) little attention. Responding to this gap, this paper aims to provide a conceptual framework for PICMD. Beginning with a broad overview of policy coherence for development (PCD) and its evolution since the 1990s, this paper proposes a three-part working definition of PICMD. It defines policies coherent for migration and development as those that (1) pursue synergies to advance shared objectives, (2) actively seek to minimize the negative side effects of policies, and (3) prevent policies from undermining each other or the achievement of agreed-upon development goals.

The paper outlines the levels at which PICMD should be pursued—intragovernmental, intergovernmental, multilateral, and multi-stakeholder. Moreover, it defines three broad categories of policies that are relevant to the migration-development nexus—migration policies (narrowly conceived); sectoral policies not specific to migration, yet which nonetheless affect or are affected by migration; and migration-related development policies—and explores potential synergies, incoherencies, and solutions in each of these groupings. The paper concludes by identifying significant types of research gaps in the area of PICMD. These include gaps related to data collection and analysis, policy formulation and implementation, and the impact and coherence of policies.

By presenting a conceptual framework for PICMD, the paper helps define the scope and priorities of the field and seeks to bring the broader community of migration and development practitioners and experts closer to defining, measuring, and promoting PICMD.

Keywords: migration, policy coherence, migration management, Sustainable Development Goals, refugees, trade and migration, labor migration, high-skilled migration, low-skilled migration, bilateral labor agreements

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Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States
AIDS	Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASRC	Asylum Seeker Resource Centre
AVP	African Networking Platform
AVRR	Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration
BMZ	Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
CIM	Centre for International Migration and Development
CGD	Centre for Global Development
COMPAS	Centre on Migration, Policy and Society at the University of Oxford
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DIE	Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik
EADI	European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ERD	European Report on Development
EU	European Union
GAATW	Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GDP	Gross domestic product
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GmbH
GMG	Global Migration Group
HIV	Human immunodeficiency virus
ICEI	Complutense Institute for International Studies
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IZA	Institute for the Study of Labor
JMDI	Joint Migration and Development Initiative
KNOMAD	Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development
LDCs	Least developed countries
M&D	migration and development
MDP	Municipal Development Partnership for Eastern and Southern Africa
NAPAs	National adaptation programs of action
ODA	Official development assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PCD	Policy coherence for development
PICMD	Policy and institutional coherence for migration and development
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

SAR	Special Administrative Region
TWG	Thematic working group
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHDR	United Nations Human Development Report
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSG	Secretary-General of the United Nations
US	United States of America

Executive Summary

Substantial research has shown that migration processes interact with development, as do development policies and dynamics with migration flows. Meanwhile, the recognition that policies affecting the migration-development nexus can work at cross purposes and render development objectives less attainable has given rise to the need for policy and institutional coherence for migration and development (PICMD). Despite the attention that the area of PICMD has garnered among policy makers and international organizations, it has received limited attention from the academic community.

This paper aims to strengthen the conceptual basis of PICMD. In particular, it seeks to situate the concept within the field of policy coherence for development (PCD), as well as in the notion of human development.

The paper proposes the following **three-part working definition of PICMD**. PICMD comprises policies relevant for migration and development insofar as they

- Pursue synergies to advance shared objectives
- Actively seek to minimize or eliminate negative side effects of policies
- Prevent policies from detracting from one another or from the achievement of agreed-upon development goals.

This definition of PICMD, which aims to be relevant for developed and developing origin and destination countries, can be applied at the following four levels:

- Across the different policy domains relevant for migration and development within a government, both vertically and horizontally (intragovernmental coherence)
- Between countries (intergovernmental coherence)
- Between different multilateral agencies and organizations (multilateral coherence)
- Within and between the policies and actions of other relevant stakeholders, such as civil society organizations, migrant associations, and the private sector (multistakeholder coherence).

Furthermore, the policy groupings relevant to PICMD include the following:

- Migration policies narrowly conceived, in particular policies that seek to regulate migration flows and promote the integration or reintegration of migrants
- Migration-related development policies, that is, policies in both origin and destination countries that seek to harness the migration-development nexus
- Sectoral policies not specific to migration, but that nonetheless affect and are affected by migration.

PICMD emerged from the broader concept of policy coherence for development (PCD), which was first adopted by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Member States in the late 1990s (OECD 1996). Originally, PCD was used to highlight and address discrepancies between international development aid commitments on the one hand and domestic policy agendas on the other. Today, PCD “is defined as an approach and policy tool—relevant to all countries—to integrate the economic, social, environmental and governance dimensions of sustainable development at all stages” (OECD 2015, 40–41). In recent years, the “building blocks” of PCD have been identified and refined by

the OECD and other organizations like European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). These building blocks include

- Explicit political and policy commitments
- Policies that collectively support inclusive sustainable development and growth
- Institutional mechanisms, processes, and tools
- Evidence-based analysis and reliable data and indicators
- Multistakeholder dialogue.

In the last decade, the donor-centric concept of PCD has evolved in two important ways. First, PCD has come to be seen as an approach whose adoption—in the global pursuit to tackle common challenges—is equally important for developing and developed countries. Second, PCD has begun to be applied to numerous diverse policy realms, including water security, climate change, food security, agriculture, and last but not least, migration.

Achieving PICMD is important for several reasons. While there have been few efforts to quantify the costs of incoherence, there are compelling reasons to suppose that incoherence generates undesirable outcomes. First, incoherence, particularly in the form of policies working at cross-purposes, can make certain policy objectives unattainable and result in financial costs and wasted resources. Second, incoherence can produce negative spillover effects. For example, protectionist trade policies in one country may negatively affect the livelihoods of individuals in another country and consequently pressure them to adopt alternative livelihood strategies, such as migrating to the first country. If the first country simultaneously strengthens its border enforcement, the resulting incoherence between its trade policies on the one hand, and its migration policies and international development commitments on the other, can generate human, financial, and political costs.

Meanwhile, the potential benefits of PICMD appear significant. Not only can improved coherence help alleviate some of the costs named above, but coherent policies can promote mutual benefits and the achievement of broader development objectives, and help navigate trade-offs in a way that is sensitive to the needs and well-being of all stakeholders. The ideal outcome of PICMD is captured in the idea of “triple wins,” that is, policies that benefit origin countries, destination countries, and migrants alike.

PICMD is inherently political, and perfect policy coherence is not a realistic outcome. PICMD requires spelling out divergent interests and competing objectives that exist among diverse stakeholders and between policy domains. In addition, it requires that policy makers manage policy trade-offs by making conscious decisions about who benefits from which policies, when (in the short, medium, and long terms), and for what reasons.

Another challenge related to PICMD revolves around measurement. Measuring institutional coherence—that is, the existence of institutional and procedural mechanisms designed to improve coherence—appears to be a feasible and more straightforward task. However, measuring PICMD and the costs and benefits associated with its implementation is a more complex undertaking. Its measurement is more difficult because of the widespread absence of policy evaluations and impact assessments that illuminate the interactions between policies, outcomes, and impacts related to migration and development.

One of the first steps in achieving PICMD is ensuring institutional coherence by establishing focal points and organizational responsibilities for the implementation of policies and programs related to migration and development. Meanwhile, eliminating incoherences and defining possible policy synergies require deep understanding of how migration policies interact with the development of sending countries, receiving countries, and migrants and their families. Enhancing knowledge of these links is important for recognizing trade-offs, clarifying policy options, and harnessing synergies, and requires further research in the areas of data collection and analysis, policy formulation and implementation, and PICMD measurement. These three core areas can serve as a guide for prioritizing and orienting future research in the area of PICMD.

1. Introduction

Recent years have seen an increased focus on harnessing the migration-development nexus for advancing human development.¹ During the 2013 High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2013) stressed the need to work together to maximize the positive impact of migration and ensure that the human rights of migrants are respected and protected. Similarly, Peter Sutherland (2013), the Secretary-General's Special Representative for International Migration and Development, has stressed the instrumental role of international cooperation in achieving "triple wins," that is, positive outcomes for origin and destination countries as well as migrants themselves.

Current M&D discussions have highlighted these goals as a collective responsibility on whose fulfillment the welfare of "millions of women, men and children" depends (Ban 2013). This paper sets out to examine how policy and institutional coherence, in the form of mutually supportive policies and aligned institutional frameworks at different levels, can support the realization of the objectives above.

The paper uses the terms "migration" to refer to various kinds of short- and long-term international human movements, and "migrants" to describe individuals who participate in these movements. While migrants should be viewed first and foremost as human beings with full agency and rights, certain types of migrants, such as victims of labor exploitation, trafficking, and human rights violations, clearly do not make the "choice" to migrate in ideal or desirable conditions.² Finally, the paper uses "development" to refer to the broader concept of "human development," which refers to the process of "enlarging people's choices and enhancing human capabilities," including "social freedoms that cannot be exercised without political and civic guarantees" (UNDP 2009, 60; UNDP 2013).

The definition of PICMD that this paper presents focuses on three aspects of this concept, namely its aim to (1) advance shared objectives through synergies, (2) minimize negative side effects, and (3) prevent policies from working at cross purposes (see section 2.3.2 for full definition).

While this definition and its components may seem straightforward, implementing PICMD in reality is a formidable challenge, for two reasons in particular. First, PICMD is an inherently political project that aims to reconcile the divergent yet legitimate interests that exist across societies and find expression in democratic systems. These multilayered systems, in which political coalitions are formed and legislation and policies must be adopted, are loci where the priorities of different stakeholders, from migrants and trade unionists to business owners and philanthropists, inevitably compete and confront one another. Bearing this in mind helps to ground the concept of PICMD—along with its implementation—in the

1. The migration-development nexus refers to two sets of interactions: how migration interacts with development outcomes at all levels (individual, household, local, and national), and how development dynamics and the policies that shape them (for example, in the areas of trade, agriculture, and natural resource extraction) affect migration (GFMD 2008). Some have taken issue with the term "migration-development nexus," suggesting that it postulates certain assumptions that merit questioning. For further reading, see Bakewell (2012).

2. The authors refer to different types of migrants throughout the document, including economic migrants, family reunification migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and trafficking victims. However, it is not within the scope of the paper to discuss coherence specifically in relation to the policies that target these different types of migrants.

complex political economy context in which it must be negotiated. Second, PICMD is difficult to implement given the widespread lack of evidence on the costs and benefits of coherence and its impact. The costs associated with implementing coherence, whether as a one-off or a periodic, “as needed,” exercise, are also widely unknown.

Despite these challenges, the concept of PICMD is becoming increasingly relevant as the concept of development itself evolves. This is especially the case given that post-2015 discussions have focused on the need to adopt a broader, more inclusive approach to development by striking a balance between the traditional development focus on poverty eradication on the one hand, and the emergence of a more comprehensive sustainable development agenda on the other, as reflected in the forthcoming Sustainable Development Goals. Within this context, the pursuit of policy and institutional coherence, as a practical approach to reconciling divergent interests, becomes all the more urgent.

Against this background, this paper seeks to explore the emerging area of PICMD. Section 2 of the paper provides a broad overview of the origins and definition of policy coherence for development (PCD), and goes on to analyze the concept of PCD in the context of migration and development. After highlighting why coherence matters, this section describes the four levels at which PICMD can be applied and outlines some of the essential tools and mechanisms for promoting coherence. The section also discusses challenges related to PICMD, including those related to measurement. Section 3 focuses on three policy groupings relevant for PICMD: migration policies narrowly conceived, migration-related development policies, and nonmigration sectoral policies with an impact on and affected by migration. It explores the incoherences that can emerge within and between these policy categories and identifies possible synergies.³ Section 4 concludes by outlining the significant knowledge gaps that pose obstacles to achieving PICMD and proposing a number of guiding questions and criteria for prioritizing these gaps.

2. Concept, Definitions, and Rationale

2.1 Situating PCD in the Changing Development Landscape

Originating in an OECD context in the 1990s, policy coherence for development (PCD) has been described as “different policy communities working together...looking for synergies and complementarities and filling gaps...so as to meet common and shared [development] objectives” (OECD 2002, 34). As a concept, PCD has been primarily used to highlight potential discrepancies between international development aid commitments on the one hand and domestic policy agendas on the other.

To understand how the concept of PCD is evolving, an overview of how the development landscape is changing is essential. This landscape and the global political order are undergoing significant changes, as illustrated by the “rise of the South” and the growing role of the Group of Twenty (G20) as a major

3. “Synergy,” or the promotion thereof, has become a widespread concept among the international development community. However, the term is rarely explicitly defined and can often be used vaguely. This paper draws upon the following definition of the term: “[s]ynergy, as a concept, is content-free. It indicates a stronger effect (or outcome) resulting from the interaction of different entities (or inputs) than could be achieved by the entities individually” (Graves et al. 2008).

player in global economic governance (Heinbecker 2011). New development actors and methods have emerged, including greater private sector involvement, private philanthropy, and increased South-South cooperation. The level and relevance of official development assistance (ODA) compared with other sources of development financing is declining. Meanwhile, countries at different stages of development are increasingly facing shared challenges, including widening income and wealth inequalities, environmental degradation, the effects of climate change and the incidence of natural disasters, and the demand for skills and labor (Mawdsley 2012). Together, these evolving trends have created the impetus for a universal development agenda that is relevant to the needs of all countries (UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda 2012).

In addition to expanding the geographic coverage of the forthcoming development agenda, post-2015 discussions are also extending the substantive scope of development to be reflected in a new set of goals. Building on the existing human development concept, post-2015 discussions continue to focus on poverty reduction and social development indicators, such as health and education, but also emphasize the importance of human rights and governance as vehicles through which individuals can exercise agency and participate in development processes. Furthermore, against the background of increased concerns about climate change and countries' resilience to shocks, conflicts, and disasters, the concept of sustainable development has introduced another criterion by which to evaluate progress, namely, respect for planetary boundaries and intergenerational justice.

The more comprehensive the understanding of development becomes, the more critical it is to ensure policy coherence for development and a minimum degree of cooperation and coordination around shared objectives (OECD 2013c). While common frameworks—such as the Millennium Development Goals, the forthcoming post-2015 development agenda, and national development plans—have been designed to promote such cooperation at different levels, they invariably face the challenge of reconciling different, and at times competing, objectives and priorities that various stakeholders bring to the table.

For national governments, policy coherence requires finding the right policy mix to balance different interests and objectives, such as achieving economic growth while reducing inequality and the economy's carbon footprint. The ability of countries to carry out such political arbitrage at the national level is limited by the existence of governance arrangements and supranational norms found in international treaties. Developing countries in particular tend to be concerned about what they see as their limited influence over these international governance structures and the lack of policy space they leave for determining national priorities and policy choices.⁴ To ensure the legitimacy of such agreements, procedures for arriving at them must be fair, inclusive, and transparent.⁵

4. A stark example of this was seen at the Warsaw Climate Change Conference in November 2013, when a bloc of 132 poor countries stormed out of negotiations after Australia, the European Union (EU), and the United States maintained that the issue of who should provide compensation for extreme climate events should only be taken up after 2015 (Vidal 2013).

5. A useful starting point for ensuring fair procedures is the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, which spells out criteria for how coherence can be pursued among different stakeholders (Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 2011).

Despite political impediments, PCD as a normative concept—expressing an “ought” rather than an “is”—is critical because certain objectives can *only* be realized through some degree of policy coherence within and across countries. It is now evident, for example, that the success of climate change adaptation efforts in certain parts of the world crucially depends on climate change mitigation measures in other parts (Morgan 2012). As such, some degree of PCD is indispensable to the provision of global public goods.

2.2 Conceptualizations of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)

While there is no uniform definition of “policy coherence” in today’s academic and development literature, there is nonetheless general consensus that policy coherence is concerned with the relationship between the intended effects of policies, their interactions, and observed outcomes (Hoebink 2005; Hydén 1999). One useful definition of policy coherence is provided by Hoebink (2005, 13), who describes it as “the non-occurrence of effects of policy that are contrary to the intended results or aims of policy.”

Whereas policy coherence mainly connotes “the absence of contradictions within and between individual policies,” policy coherence *for* development (PCD) takes this concept further, referring also to the “synergic and systematic support [of policies] towards the achievement of common [development] objectives” (Keijzer and Oppewal 2012, 3).⁶ More concretely, PCD, which originated in the 1990s in an OECD context, is today defined as a “process for taking into consideration the economic, social, environmental and governance dimensions of sustainable development at all stages of national policy making and international decision making” (OECD 2013a, 1).

In practice, PCD refers to

- Ensuring that policies in and across different policy areas do not (individually or collectively) detract from agreed-upon development policy goals or negatively affect the development prospects of developing countries (Galeazzi et al. 2013)⁷
- Exploiting the positive synergies across policy areas and policies to “support sustainable development, pursuing win-win situations and mutual benefits” (OECD 2013a, 1)
- Systematically applying mutually reinforcing policies to achieve development goals (OECD 2013d)
- Increasing the capacity of governments to reconcile domestic policy objectives with each other as well as with “broader international or global objectives” (OECD 2010; OECD 2013b, 2)

6. There is some disagreement among scholars around whether “consistency” and “coherence” of policies are synonymous (Den Hertog and Stross 2013).

7. Agreed-upon development goals refer to those goals to which states have officially committed through instruments (both binding and nonbinding) such as international treaties, frameworks, and agreements. While states that sign such agreements supposedly share a horizontal, equal relationship vis-à-vis each other, there are often immense differences in power and influence among signing parties. While it is not within the scope of this paper to explore or propose solutions to this issue, this reality should be acknowledged and taken into account, where possible.

- Reducing the adverse “side-effects and impacts of policies on development” (OECD 2013a, 1; OECD 2013b).⁸

PCD can be promoted when formulating new policies and modifying existing ones, and can also be applied to instances in which nondevelopment policies generate negative externalities for development (Keijzer and Oppewal 2012; Mackie et al. 2007).⁹ Table 1 provides an overview of the essential components for promoting PCD (Concord 2013; Galeazzi et al. 2013; Keijzer 2010; Mackie et al. 2007; OECD 2008a, 2009a, 2010).

These components are interlinked and are considered the “building blocks” for achieving PCD (Galeazzi et al. 2013; OECD 2013b, 2). They are designed to help strengthen coherence and manage policy trade-offs (Keijzer and Oppewal 2012; Mackie et al. 2007).

Table 1 Components Essential to PCD

1. Explicit political and policy commitments: setting, prioritizing, and articulating objectives
2. Policies that collectively support inclusive sustainable development and growth
3. Administrative and institutional mechanisms to ensure effective policy coordination
4. Knowledge inputs, evidence-based analysis, and assessment mechanisms for analyzing and assessing impacts and improving implementation, monitoring, analysis, and reporting
5. Multistakeholder dialogue


Sources: Adapted from Galeazzi et al. 2013 and OECD 2013b.

The interaction of these different building blocks constitutes a system that is influenced by political context; how governance is conducted; and how different groups, including nonstate actors, can apply pressure and exercise influence. This system is illustrated by Figure 1 below (Galeazzi et al. 2013).

8. One question that the concept of PCD raises is whether a lack of targeted policies in a certain area can also be classified as incoherence. In the authors’ opinion, a conceptualization of PCD that requires the minimization of undesired negative side effects of policies inevitably necessitates implementing new policies to fill policy gaps.

9. For example, Article 208 of the European Union Treaty of Lisbon states that the “Union shall take account of the objectives of development co-operation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.”

Figure 1 Interlinked PCD Mechanisms and Institutional Framework



Source: Adapted from Keijzer/ECDPM for Concord Denmark, 2012.

Note: This figure illustrates the elements and mechanisms within political systems that are involved in implementing PICMD. The interactions portrayed are influenced by various factors, including political context, how governance is conducted day to day, and the influence of different stakeholders.

2.3 Applying Policy and Institutional Coherence to the Realm of Migration and Development

This section of the paper seeks to extend the scope of the concept of PCD by applying it to the realm of migration and development. It seeks to define and explore the concept of PICMD, examining the various levels at which the concept can be applied.

2.3.1 Why Does Coherence Matter?

Before attempting to define PICMD, it is important to explore why coherence in the realm of migration and development is desirable. First, policies contributing to PICMD in general promote, by definition, development, and can offer “significant pay-offs in terms of developmental outcomes” (OECD 2009a, 40). Meanwhile, incoherence can increase the likelihood of situations in which certain policy objectives become less attainable or unachievable, as well as of unfulfilled development commitments. To illustrate:

- Some developed countries have instituted policies to lower labor inflows while also putting in place protectionist agricultural policies that promote subsidies. In such cases, policies not only work at cross purposes, they work against development objectives. Ultimately, developed countries’ protectionist agricultural policies, by threatening the livelihoods of farmers in developing countries who may then face pressure to migrate to developed countries to seek

better opportunities, can partially contribute to increased labor inflows. Moreover, while subsidies may have the understandable aim of protecting domestic farmers in developed countries, they nevertheless can hurt developing countries' competitiveness and thus be seen as development unfriendly (OECD 2011).

- In many developed countries, migrants are portrayed as a drain on public services and a threat to social cohesion even if these countries' economies may rely heavily on migrant workers. In these situations, policies that reduce immigration flows may undermine receiving countries' goals of developing local business and boosting the private sector's competitiveness. Instead, policies to address public perceptions could be established.
- A number of countries have enacted policies that aim to maximize the developmental benefit of remittances by improving the infrastructure for these transfers, such as through encouraging the use of formal systems for channeling transfers. The positive effects of these policies are often undermined by other policies that do not sufficiently promote the socioeconomic integration of migrant workers and thus limit their ability to send remittances (Mendoza 2006).

Second, the phenomenon of policies working at cross purposes also results in financial costs and wasted resources.¹⁰ One example is that of policies related to the recognition of skills and qualifications that prevent migrants from working at their level of qualifications, and thus contribute to brain waste. It is estimated that Canada's economy loses US\$41.7 billion a year as a result of this problem (UNDP 2009, 52).

Third, incoherence can be associated with negative spillover effects. For example, given that low-skilled migrant workers often pay "onerous sums"—up to one-third of their earnings abroad—in recruitment costs, the observed push to regulate the practices of recruitment agencies, at first glance, seems reasonable and conducive to PICMD (Agunias 2013, 1; Martin 2013). However, such regulations have also led to strong concerns about driving recruiters and their subagents underground, or transferring extra costs to the migrant laborers themselves and their employers (Agunias 2013). Both possibilities suggest the potential negative spillover effects that can be associated with policy incoherence.

Finally, incoherence at the international level in the form of noncooperation can generate financial costs, large-scale inefficiencies, and the loss of credibility. For instance, donor countries whose stated goal is to promote sustainable development in developing countries through ODA may become less credible if they simultaneously adopt policies blocking channels that have the potential to contribute to the development of partner countries. Similarly, both developed and developing countries that have pledged to abide by frameworks protecting the rights of migrants and agreed to global development objectives may lose credibility if they enact policies that are incoherent with such goals (Ashoff 2005).

Meanwhile, the benefits of policy and institutional coherence are significant. Not only can the pursuit of coherence help prevent or alleviate some of the negative effects named above—that is, negative spillovers, human costs, political costs, financial costs, and inefficiencies—but coherence can help provide a better understanding of and balance policy trade-offs. In particular, coherence provides a

10. However, there have been limited efforts to quantify the costs of policy and institutional incoherence.

framework for navigating these trade-offs more effectively and in a way that is sensitive to the needs and well-being of all stakeholders, including migrants themselves.

The most significant potential benefits that coherence can bring include enhanced collaboration and trust between stakeholders, which can allow for the increased harnessing of synergies. While the costs generated by incoherence and noncooperation are rather evident, the benefits of “working as a team”—whether between ministries, national governments, or distinct stakeholders—are potentially substantial. Pursuing coherence may not only lead to increased efficiency, but it can foster an environment in which partners share a strengthened consensus on priorities, a more holistic understanding of certain issues, and an enhanced sense of “being in it together” and tackling the same challenges.

2.3.2 Conceptual Framework

Until now, the Global Forum on Migration and Development¹¹ is the only body that has attempted to conceptualize PICMD, defining it as follows:

The systematic development of mutually reinforcing policies and decisions across government departments and agencies, as well as the promotion of synergies between different policy areas of relevance for migration and development, with the aim to *maximise the impact on development*. (GFMD 2008, 2, emphasis added)

Apart from providing the above definition, GFMD discussions about PICMD, which started a few years ago, have largely been of a pragmatic nature, regularly highlighting the “building blocks” and procedural elements involved in policy coherence.¹² These discussions have also notably put “policy coherence” on par with “institutional coherence,” describing the latter as “the establishment of clear organisational responsibilities and focal points for promulgating and implementing migration and development policies and programs” (GFMD 2010, 3).

Using this first GFMD definition as a starting point, this section seeks to lay out a full conceptual framework for PICMD. It does so by first providing a refined definition of PICMD, and subsequently discussing this definition in detail as well as exploring the idea of institutional coherence.

This paper proposes the following tentative, three-part working definition of PICMD:

11. While the GFMD has helped advance discussions in this area, it operates on a nonbinding basis. GFMD discussions have highlighted that despite regional processes such as the Abu Dhabi Dialogue and the Colombo Process having “produc[ed] tangible results, overall progress in terms of providing building blocks and impetus for norm-setting at multilateral level remains limited” (GFMD 2012d, 3).

12. Examples of GFMD roundtables that have sought to explore coherence in the realm of M&D include “Enhancing institutional and policy coherence and promoting partnerships” (2007, 2008, 2009); “Policy and institutional coherence to address the relationship between migration and development” (2010); “Addressing irregular migration through coherent migration and development strategies” (2011); “Factoring migration into development planning” (2012); and “Operationalising mainstreaming of migration in development policy and integrating migration in the post-2015 UN Development Agenda” (2013). A number of preparatory events have also focused on this topic, such as the 2012 GFMD preparatory workshop entitled “Promoting policy coherence for development in international migration issues.”

Policies related to migration and development, across various policy domains, are coherent to the extent that they

- Pursue synergies to advance shared objectives
- Actively seek to minimize or eliminate negative side effects of policies
- Prevent policies from detracting from one another or from the achievement of agreed-upon development goals.

This definition highlights the *synergies* across policy fields relevant to migration and development that need to be promoted to maximize the fulfillment of development objectives.¹³ It also highlights the important role of PICMD in minimizing the *negative side effects* of policies.¹⁴ For instance, temporary migration policies may have unintended negative social repercussions on families and children left behind in origin countries. In such situations, PICMD would require that governments seek to reduce these adverse impacts by putting in place mitigating measures such as provisions for family reunification or health, education, and social protection programs for family members left behind.¹⁵

This definition also posits that the aim of PICMD should be the greater orientation of all policies relevant to the migration-development nexus toward shared objectives and agreed-upon development outcomes.¹⁶ Ideally, PICMD should be instrumental in helping achieve triple-win situations by providing a framework for spelling out and recognizing tensions between divergent interests.¹⁷

However, triple-win situations may rarely be possible in reality. Policy makers are constantly forced to make decisions requiring political arbitrage around who will benefit from certain policies, when, and for what reasons. Decisions about which policy objectives to prioritize are not only political, they are highly context dependent and take place in settings in which particular ethical frameworks and normative

13. Certain commitments are legally binding, while others are not. For example, European states that have signed the Treaty of Lisbon are legally mandated to check the "development friendliness" of their policies when designing them. This legal obligation is different from the softer commitment that some national policy makers have made to promote coherence between different policy sectors.

14. What constitutes a negative side effect is not always immediately evident. While policies can have unintended consequences that negatively affect people, different groups will experience these impacts differently.

15. This raises the question of who should bear the costs of these externalities.

16. The GFMD has also suggested that one of the overall goals of policy coherence is to achieve a "more effective pursuit of the objectives of *both* migration and development policy domains, by raising...awareness about competing interests and ensuring that positive synergies are identified and maximised" (GFMD 2010, 5, emphasis added). There thus appears to be confusion about whether development, as opposed to migration objectives, should be prioritized in cases in which synergies cannot be established.

17. Such triple-win situations depict ideal outcomes and are not always possible in practice. The concept of triple win is used more as a policy objective in the M&D community and lacks a clear conceptual grounding. It generally means that all parties (migrants, and origin and destination countries) benefit, but what these benefits include and whether they can be achieved through compromises remains unclear. The term "win-win" is also used in negotiation and game theory literature and refers to integrative behavior leading to "varying-sum" outcomes in which both parties can meet their objectives through exploration (McNary 2003).

commitments come to bear.¹⁸ Trade-offs, moreover, are unavoidable when simultaneously considering the interests of origin and destination countries and migrants, not to mention the interests of different stakeholders within countries (for example, employers versus workers in destination countries). There may also be trade-offs between different types of development impacts.¹⁹ For example, encouraging a certain kind of immigration that maximizes economic growth may be viewed as a threat to national identity and social cohesion (Collier 2013; Ruhs 2013b). Furthermore, increasing development aid to an origin country with the aim of limiting immigration from there may actually have the opposite effect, especially in the short term. As de Haas (2010) and others have demonstrated, the relationship between the development of origin countries and net emigration is not linear and inversely proportional, but rather like a U-curve. At least initially, social and economic development, by enabling and inspiring people to move, appears to coincide with surges in emigration.²⁰

Box 1 aims to illustrate some of the inevitable trade-offs when aiming to achieve PICMD.

Box 1 Aiming for Coherence in the Realm of Migration Policy: Example of Difficult Trade-offs

The following simplified scenario highlights some of the difficult trade-off situations that policy makers may encounter when developing migration policies.

Country A decides, because of its shortage of health workers, to enact policies targeting the recruitment of health personnel from abroad. This is less costly and time consuming than training native health workers. New visa schemes and incentives are put in place, attracting a sizable number of migrant health workers from Country B. The newly arrived migrants experience human development gains: they acquire new skill sets and earn more money, allowing them to send remittances back home and raise the incomes of families in their country of origin, as well as to invest in different business initiatives in Country B. On a broader scale, these remittances and investments seem to spur foreign currency earnings in Country B, thus potentially contributing to the long-term development of the country's economic infrastructure. Furthermore, in Country B, the prospect of finding a job abroad and earning a higher income acts as an additional incentive for more individuals to pursue studies in medicine and health.

The performance of the health sector in Country A improves as the new immigrants complement the domestic workforce and contribute to increased productivity. However, some of the migrants face xenophobia and discrimination, which diminishes their well-being.

Meanwhile, in Country B, the departure of health personnel has led to a short-term gap in the provision of health services in some areas of the country. Because the gains generated by remittances are not spread equally among the population and not

18. To read more about the different ethical questions and worldviews relevant for deciding upon potential migration-related trade-offs, see Ruhs (2013b).

19. In "Building Blocks for Policy Coherence for Development," the OECD (2009a) provides a useful table outlining the diverse impacts that migration can have on development at various levels. For example, the table states that migration can alter household income, affect the labor market and foreign exchange supply of a country, and decrease or increase the risk exposure of a household. For further reading, see OECD (2009a, 42).

20. The above considerations indicate that "perfect" coherence is rarely, if ever, possible. As such, it might be more realistic to adopt a "coherent enough" approach, based on minimum consensus, in which coherence is viewed as much as a starting point as it is an outcome.

all locals have the same means, inadequate health care may become an issue in areas affected by severe shortages of health workers.

In response, Country B establishes policies that create further incentives for entering the medical profession, aware that the potential opportunity to emigrate abroad represents a powerful incentive for many youth to pursue this career path. However, the intended benefits of these policies will only materialize in the medium to long term.

Aiming to support their country (Country B), a number of diaspora doctors offer mentoring, coaching, and free medical services, transferring valuable knowledge to hospitals and universities in Country B. Other diaspora members and returnees also sponsor better equipment and introduce new techniques benefiting the health sector. These activities raise concerns, however, that Country B will begin to abnegate its responsibility to provide access to health services.

This is a simplified example of some of the impacts that the migration policies of one country (in this case, Country A) can have on (1) its own economy, (2) its own society (marked by rising xenophobia), (3) migrants and their families, and (4) the economy and health situation of another country. As the example demonstrates, policy impacts vary for different groups and tend to shift over time. A good system of PICMD should promote policies that mitigate negative policy impacts, at both the national and bilateral levels.

The example also highlights the inevitable trade-offs in migration policy making. For example, for Country A, while enacting ethical recruitment clauses that ban visas for health workers from Country B might increase the number of available health workers there—assuming that health professionals prohibited from leaving Country B want and are able to pursue careers in health—doing so would also restrict the freedom and human development of the health workers who wish to migrate. Meanwhile, Country A would be stuck with its labor shortage in the short run, even if it starts investing more in the development of its domestic health workforce. In such a context, Countries A and B could explore developing a partnership through which they share education costs, facilitate knowledge sharing, and help ensure that access to health care does not suffer as a result of safe and legal migration. Nonetheless, given the complex ways in which policies interact, it is difficult to consider all stakeholders and accurately predict how they will be affected, and to what extent, by certain policy combinations.

2.3.3 Institutional Coherence and Implementing PICMD

When implementing institutional coherence as part of PICMD, there are two principal institutional set-ups that can be used: decentralization and centralization. These set-ups are not mutually exclusive, and how they emerge depends largely on the political and institutional culture of a government. Generally, though, under decentralization the M&D dossier is divided among different parts of government or agencies (such as different ministries and international organizations), each of which has its own specific migration-related responsibilities. Under this approach, strong coordination between government bodies collectively responsible for migration (through interministerial working groups, for example) is indispensable. Meanwhile, within the centralized set-up, one entity, such as a migration ministry, is responsible for overseeing and coordinating implementation of PICMD.

Each set-up comes with potential drawbacks and opportunities. Under decentralization, limited buy-in from any one entity, along with asymmetrical power relations and varying degrees of political clout among departments, may pose significant challenges. Meanwhile, under centralization, M&D risks being

sidelined as the domain of one entity and thus may have limited influence over other policy areas.²¹ Ideally, the two scenarios can complement each other so that there is centralized responsibility combined with a common understanding of PICMD among all institutions and partners involved.

A broad approach to pursuing PICMD, which can make use of either or both of these institutional set-ups, is that of mainstreaming. Mainstreaming refers to the integration of development objectives into migration policies on the one hand, and of migration concerns into development planning instruments and sectoral policies on the other (box 2). While mainstreaming and PICMD are closely related, they are not interchangeable. Mainstreaming, unlike PICMD, does not necessarily require actively searching for synergies across policy areas or correcting incoherences. PICMD, moreover, goes beyond mainstreaming insofar as it provides a framework for managing trade-offs (Keijzer and Oppewal 2012). Mainstreaming should thus be seen as an important means (among others) of working toward PICMD.

21. Some governments have begun to experiment with these models. For example, Ghana, taking a centralized approach—with support from the International Organization for Migration—has approved a National Migration Policy that recommends the creation of a Ghana National Commission on Migration (Government of Ghana 2015). Furthermore, in 2003 the Swiss Federal Council created the Interdepartmental Working Group in the Field of Migration and Return, whose mandate is to harness synergies between foreign policy instruments and migration policy to increase coordination between departments and develop a holistic migration strategy. The working group now includes a committee that, in addition to serving as a platform for the migration- and foreign policy-related interests of Switzerland's federal offices, encourages multilateral coherence by setting the political framework for cooperation with key countries (GFMD 2008). Other countries that have experimented with these models include Bangladesh, Jamaica, and Moldova.

Box 2 Mainstreaming as a Tool for Achieving PICMD

Mainstreaming is a *process-oriented approach* to implementing policy and institutional coherence for migration and development (PICMD).^a It is the process of both incorporating migration concerns into development planning and sectoral policies, and of integrating development objectives into migration policies.

The specific field of **mainstreaming migration into development planning**—described as “the process of assessing the implications of migration on any action (or goals) planned in a development and poverty reduction strategy” (GMG 2010, 16)—has gained significant traction in recent years. The Global Migration Group handbook on mainstreaming migration into development planning identifies 14 different sectors that share important interlinkages with migration and into which migration can be mainstreamed. These include health, trade, social protection, agriculture, education, and financial services. Mainstreaming migration into development planning consists of strengthening evidence and institutional structures that serve to systematically consider migration patterns, their impacts, and the well-being of migrants within national development planning and across policy sectors. Since 2011, the International Organization for Migration and United Nations Development Programme have used the methodology outlined in the handbook to support the implementation of migration mainstreaming processes in a number of countries.^b

a. For more information, see “Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning” (<http://gfmd.org/pfp/policy-tools/mainstreaming-migration>).

b. For more information, see “Pilot Project on Mainstreaming Migration into National Development Strategies” (<http://www.gfmd.org/pfp/calls/428>).

2.4 The Different Levels of PICMD

PICMD can be implemented at four levels (see table 2). These levels were identified by the GFMD Working Group on Policy Coherence, Data and Research,²² and correspond broadly to the OECD-identified levels of PCD.²³ While all levels of coherence are important, in practice intragovernmental coherence has earned the most attention.

22. On June 26, 2012, the GFMD Working Group on Policy Coherence, Data and Research, which was created in 2009, held a one-day expert workshop in Brussels. This workshop was divided into four sessions that examined the four different levels of coherence. For further reading, see GFMD (2012d).

23. The OECD-identified levels, however, include “internal coherence” and “developing country coherence” while leaving out “multistakeholder coherence.”

Table 2 GFMD-Identified Levels of PICMD

Intragovernmental coherence	Vertical and horizontal coherence across all the development-related policies and actions of a country, within and between different ministries and departments and at different institutional levels of government (that is, central, district, and local) ^a
Intergovernmental coherence	Coherence between policies and actions across different countries with regard to their contributions to development, which prevents these policies from unnecessarily interfering with, or failing to reinforce, other countries' policies
Multilateral coherence	Coherence between the policies and actions of bilateral donors and multilateral organizations, and ensuring that policies adopted in multilateral forums are coherent and contribute to development objectives
Multistakeholder coherence	Coherence within and between the policies and actions of other relevant stakeholders, such as civil society organizations, trade unions, and the private sector

Source: Adapted from GFMD 2012d.

a. While horizontal coherence refers to the coherence between a policy and other policies of the same political level, vertical coherence refers to coherence between different levels of government (national, regional, local) in one thematic sphere.

The following sections provide a short overview of the institutional mechanisms that can support policy formulation at each of the levels.

2.4.1 Intragovernmental Coherence

Achieving PICMD at the intragovernmental level requires strong commitment; clear M&D objectives; and clarity about the distinct roles, values, and interests across different policy fields within a government so that these may be brought together in an overarching vision (GFMD 2012d).²⁴ Moreover, intragovernmental coherence calls for a significant amount of **horizontal coordination**, consultation, and cooperation between the various institutions and actors with a stake in migration and development.²⁵ National and subnational coordination systems may vary widely between countries. In certain contexts, bodies in charge of policy coordination at a high political level and interministerial

24. Promoting this type of coherence “at home” may prove key to achieving increased coherence at the intergovernmental, international, and multilateral levels (GFMD 2012d).

25. Consultation is the process of seeking inputs from relevant stakeholders, coordination denotes the organization of different institutions toward a common objective, and cooperation refers to working together (Koser 2013). These three practices are not synonymous with, but rather support, coherence (Ashoff 2005). For example, incoherent policies do not automatically arise when coordination is absent: at times coherence can occur coincidentally.

working groups may be responsible for PICMD.²⁶ In Jamaica, for example, anchoring the M&D policy formulation process in the National Working Group on International Migration and Development—which is co-chaired by the Planning Institute of Jamaica and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade—has helped foster a whole-of-government approach to working on M&D. Similar success has been observed in Moldova, where the United Nations Country Team has established a working group dedicated to overseeing the mainstreaming process led by the State Chancellery of Moldova (GFMD 2012c).

Given the relative newness of such mechanisms, it is difficult to establish whether one single institutional model at the national level is the most effective (ECDPM and ICMPD 2013; GFMD 2012c; Koser 2013). Furthermore, there are country contexts in which different cooperation structures altogether may be needed because of the involvement of both the government and the private sector in an industry. This is the case in Bangladesh, for example, where private recruitment agencies have operated alongside the state-owned Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services Limited (BOESL) since the 1980s (Siddiqui 2005). In this country context, the issue of which particular institutional set-up should be used to regulate recruitment practices—and whether the regulatory standards for private agencies should be different from those used for BOESL—is an important question.

In numerous European countries where one ministry (for example, foreign affairs, internal affairs, or justice) is in charge of coordinating work on migration and development, the mandate of this ministry often shapes the direction of the M&D-related policies that are formulated. Shifting portfolios among government bodies, not to mention factors such as political change or upheaval, can thus result in important policy changes that either promote or inhibit coherence (ECDPM and ICMPD 2013).

Vertical coherence between the national and subnational levels is equally crucial to intragovernmental coherence, given that migration-related policies and practices must be adapted to local circumstances if they are to have a lasting impact. Local institutional set-ups should be able to handle inward and outward migration and manage its social, economic, and environmental effects—through integrating migrants and providing social services for all residents, for example—and should take into account services provided through informal structures. A study on migration and human security in East and Southern Africa has shown, for example, that the spheres in which migrants benefit the most in these regions are governed by informal, normative-traditional instruments that are not always captured in formal national policy frameworks (Ngunyi and Oucho 2013).

National governments can take numerous actions to promote vertical coherence for M&D (Riallant, Irvine, and Fabbri 2013), including the following:

- Implementing decentralization processes to give local authorities increased space and resources to tailor policy responses to local needs and realities

26. The use of interministerial working groups as a mechanism for promoting coherence is not unique to the field of migration and development. Generally, structures that facilitate coordination across government ministries and departments are an essential tool for fostering a whole-of-government approach and coherence more broadly (de Coning et al. 2009). One example among others is the Dutch government's use of interministerial coordination mechanisms to deliver more coherent interventions in fragile states (van Beijnum and van de Goor 2006).

- Involving local authorities in development planning and policy formulation and review processes
- Supporting local authorities in their efforts to address M&D linkages through training and by providing funding and technical assistance to help kick-start and implement local initiatives
- Supporting exchanges among local authorities to share knowledge on and discuss good practices
- Acting as a central point for knowledge sharing, for example, through monitoring and mapping activities.

Moreover, mainstreaming migration into national and local development planning and policy sectors that affect the migration-development nexus—with guidance from international institutions—can improve coherence between national and local authorities.

2.4.2 Intergovernmental Coherence

The goal of intergovernmental coherence is to “ensure that policies and actions in migration and development [are]... consistent across different countries in terms of their contributions to achieving development objectives” (GFMD 2012d, 3). The mechanisms for arriving at this type of coherence are usually found in bilateral and regional cooperation initiatives such as mobility partnerships, dialogue processes, and regional integration initiatives, as well as agreements in areas such as trade, investment, and development cooperation.²⁷

One of the main hurdles to achieving intergovernmental coherence is the scarce number of binding agreements in the field of migration, which can be attributed to migration-related policies being considered a cornerstone of national sovereignty. In light of this, intragovernmental coherence, strategically speaking, can serve as a better and more realistic starting point for international M&D-related negotiations and intergovernmental coherence (GFMD 2012d).

Even if countries do share agreements that affect the migration-development nexus, numerous conditions can obstruct coherence. For instance, members of civil society have long contended that the Fisheries Partnership between the EU and Senegal, agreed to in April 2014, will exacerbate the problem of overfishing in Senegal and therefore destroy the livelihoods of Senegalese fishermen, who will then be forced to search for alternatives, including migrating illegally to Europe (ActionAid 2008). This example demonstrates the extent to which vested interests in certain sectors can dominate intergovernmental dealings and potentially undermine coherence. Furthermore, it exemplifies the ubiquitous “problem” of PICMD, that is, inevitable trade-offs between different policy objectives and human development. In this case, the Senegalese government’s desire to curb illegal fishing and maintain its earnings from the fishing sector—that is, their motive for signing the agreement—is in clear conflict with the human development of Senegalese fishermen, who claim the agreement violates their rights (Ba 2014).

2.4.3 Multilateral Coherence

27. Governments are not necessarily consistent with regard to the M&D-related policies and actions they include in agreements with partner countries. For example, depending on the partner country the EU’s individually tailored Mobility Partnerships do not offer the same legal mobility to high- and low-skilled migrants, for various political and economic reasons, among others.

The global nature of migration opportunities and challenges points to the importance of PICMD at the multilateral level.²⁸ One of the most important elements required by this level of coherence is a common understanding of the migration-development nexus. If there is agreement on how migration interacts with development outcomes, multilateral action is easier to align.²⁹ However, unlike in domains such as international trade or finance, a significant governance gap in the field of M&D persists at the multilateral level (OECD 2011).³⁰ While the agency-led GMG and the state-led GFMD are important initiatives that underpin “more coherent global governance” of M&D, they remain informal arrangements, meaning there is no way to enforce follow-up on these bodies’ recommendations (UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination 2013, 25).³¹

Nevertheless, multilateral coherence can be improved by mainstreaming global M&D objectives into the strategic frameworks and policies of GMG members and other multilateral agencies, such as the World Trade Organization and its mobility provisions under GATS Mode 4 services trade.³² Furthermore, hands-on measures, like having GMG members provide technical assistance nationally and locally, can strengthen vertical coherence by helping align multilateral, regional, and national policies (GFMD 2012d). Finally, incorporating migration issues into the post-2015 development framework could help establish agreed-upon commitments that can be monitored multilaterally, regionally, and nationally (GMG 2013).

2.4.4 Multistakeholder Coherence

Multistakeholder coherence requires mechanisms for consultation and partnerships with civil society, trade unions, media, the private sector, and migrants themselves. Widespread consultations can strengthen coherence in two ways. First, they help enable cooperation among a range of actors around common objectives. Second, different stakeholders have unique insights into how certain policies affect the migration-development nexus and benefit or disadvantage migrants. Such information, if fed back

28. Promoting PCD related to migration and development can also be viewed as promoting the global public good of accessible, safe, and secure migration opportunities. (To read more on policy coherence for development and global public goods, see King et al. 2012, 17; OECD 2013a).

29. A global vision on M&D was first adopted at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. Since then, the GFMD and the successive UN High-Level Dialogues on International Migration and Development have also fostered more consensus on this topic. However, some civil society organizations in the South have been highly critical of the GFMD as well as of the UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, calling them “tool[s] for promoting labour export” and a neo-liberal model of development (APMM 2012).

30. While this governance gap is linked to incoherence, the governance of international migration should not be seen as synonymous with multilateral coherence, but rather as a mechanism with the potential to contribute to coherence.

31. However, their implementation could be improved through strengthened collaboration between the GFMD, the GMG, and the UN system as a whole (Wu 2013).

32. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) covers four modes of services delivery in cross-border trade. Mode 4 is the delivery of services through the presence of natural persons on foreign territory.

systematically into policy making, can promote coherence for better human development outcomes and act as an external accountability check for governments (GFMD 2012d).³³

Although not all stakeholders pursue the same objectives or align their interests with development goals, the peaceful contestation between stakeholders over divergent interests is a normal feature of democratic societies (Ashoff 2005). While some conflicts of interest and objectives may be irresolvable, there may still be scope for compromise-based solutions that are better than having no engagement at all.

2.5 Tools and Guidelines for PICMD Implementation

This section presents a series of practical tools and guidelines that can be used throughout the PICMD implementation process.

Criteria for Assessing Whether a Policy Helps Promote PICMD

The following criteria, which can be used by all policy makers, are designed to help assess whether a policy or activity (in M&D or other policy fields) helps promote or inhibits PICMD.

- A policy is adopted or implemented without considering international development norms, commitments, and obligations that apply.
- A policy is adopted or implemented without considering other relevant development objectives.
- A policy is adopted or implemented without considering potential synergies for development outcomes.
- A policy is adopted or implemented without considering potential negative side effects or without putting in place mitigating measures.
- A policy objective is fully at odds with another policy objective in that pursuing one renders impossible the achievement of the other.

Guidelines for Policy Makers on How to Arrive at Improved PICMD

Do as you say: Governments, and the various actors within government, should be willing and able to comply with legal obligations they have entered into and live up to policy commitments in the realm of M&D and related areas, be they at the national or international level. This requires the adoption of clear objectives and alignment between political commitments, goals, objectives, institutional capacities, and financial resources. Furthermore, it requires clear communication and feedback loops between the political and technical levels of administrations and across various levels of government around the capacities, resources, and timelines required for policy implementation.

Know what you are doing: The fragmented nature of migration as a portfolio presents the challenge of effective “left hand–right hand” coordination for governments. Consulting the evidence base, as well as other parts of government, should be an obligatory part of due process for arriving at M&D-related policy decisions. Indicators for institutional coherence could include, for example, the number of different government agencies that have provided meaningful inputs into policy formulation and

33. The critical role of civil society in promoting greater PCD has been widely recognized. For further reading, see Galeazzi et al. (2013); OECD (2009a); and OECD (2013b).

implementation as well as the number of coordination bodies that include various government agencies, civil society organizations, private sector actors, and development partners. Policy decisions in various sectors that explicitly refer to impacts related to M&D could also indicate some degree of coherence.

Understand the impacts of your actions: Governments or agencies need to establish necessary mechanisms for data collection and analysis to be able to monitor migration and development dynamics, assess the impacts of their policies, and take adaptive or corrective actions when needed. M&D-related evaluations, in which many countries have invested only very modestly, should be part of this process. Feedback loops and accountability systems that allow intended beneficiaries and other concerned stakeholders to inform this process are important to ensure the effectiveness of interventions.

Treat immigrants the same way you want your migrants to be treated by other countries: There are compelling ethical, economic, and social reasons for the governments of receiving countries to treat immigrants in the same way they wish their nationals to be treated abroad. By protecting the rights and promoting the socioeconomic integration of immigrants and their families, policy makers fulfill their commitments under international instruments related to migrants' rights, while maximizing the human development potential of immigrants. The greater their well-being, the more immigrants are able to contribute to the development of their host countries and of their origin countries.

Knowledge and Policy-Making Tools for Institutional Actors

The knowledge and policy-making tools below can support institutional actors in developing a more coherent, holistic approach.

- Traditional cost-benefit analyses and the use of modeling tools, such as the Threshold 21 Model, can help governments conduct comparative analyses of different policy options and identify the sets of policies that tend to lead to achievement of desired goals (Millennium Institute 2013).
- Institutional context analysis, a simple diagnostic tool, helps analyze issues of political economy, including the incentives and constraints of different actors in society and their ability to act on and within these. It looks at the legal, social, and political system with a view to understanding formal and informal power structures, the distribution of resources, the interests and capacities of different stakeholders, and the role of outside forces (UNDP 2012).
- UNDP has developed a set of tools for assessing and strengthening “collaborative and adaptive capacities,” a key ingredient for facilitating policy and institutional coherence. These tools are designed to support governments and other stakeholders in assessing and developing their capacities to conduct and maintain momentum in and commitment to collaborative processes through various stages, including (1) gathering and analyzing information; (2) fostering a shared vision in different areas, for example, on development priorities; (3) influencing and engaging stakeholders and building coalitions for joint action; (4) implementing reform policies and programs; and (5) adapting proactively to changes through monitoring and feedback mechanisms and prototyping and scaling responses (C20 2014).
- Poverty and social impact analysis, a method that looks at the distributional impacts of public policies, is an important tool for promoting policy coherence with a focus on the poor and most vulnerable (World Bank 2013a).

- Accountability mechanisms are a key tool for promoting PICMD. One example of such a mechanism is the OECD–Development Assistance Committee peer review system, which monitors progress on the PCD commitments of OECD countries.³⁴ Other possible accountability mechanisms include independent evaluations of national policies, institutionalized information and feedback loops, and multilateral vehicles that allow stakeholders and governments to engage in dialogue about the consequences of policy incoherence.³⁵ Monitoring and reporting are also critical accountability mechanisms, providing the necessary data and evidence base for stakeholders to assess progress and the results of their efforts.

2.6 Measuring PICMD

The issue of how to measure coherence is critical to ensuring accountability and that time and resources committed to this endeavour are meaningfully invested. To arrive at a framework for PICMD measurement, the KNOMAD Thematic Working Group on Policy and Institutional Coherence has commissioned a research paper that will present a dashboard of PICMD indicators.³⁶

In the meantime, it is useful to refer to existing indexes and standards that can serve as possible points of departure for this framework.

Within the PCD field, despite the drive toward a system for measuring coherence, little progress has been made in establishing clear targets and indicators (Galeazzi et al. 2013).³⁷ This lack of progress is in large part due to the widespread lack of data and analysis and monitoring of the costs and benefits associated with different policies (including those related to migration) that policy makers might put in place (OECD 2009a).

Nevertheless, one notable index that can be drawn upon is the Centre for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index (CDI), which aims to capture the “development friendliness” of OECD countries’ policies toward poorer countries. The CDI gives points in various policy areas, including migration, aid, trade, investment, environment, security, and technology. Although it does not specifically refer to policy coherence, it measures the extent to which different policy areas contribute

34. Every four to five years, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD carries out reviews of each committee member’s development cooperation efforts. These peer reviews assess (among other things) PCD efforts in general, and within this area tend to focus on inputs such as institutional mechanisms rather than on policy impacts.

35. While such mechanisms could potentially strengthen coherence, there are no examples of them currently (Galeazzi et al. 2013).

36. This research project, carried out by a team at the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, was completed in 2015.

37. Indicators for measuring PCD for migration exist in the EU PCD Work Programme 2010–2013, yet these cover limited sets of issues related to the migration-development nexus and fail to provide specifications about baseline data, time dimensions, and quantitative measurability. The African, Caribbean and Pacific States Observatory on Migration has also published indicators for measuring the impact of migration on human development, which provides a useful collection of existing indicators (Melde 2012). However, these indicators are not causally linked to policy interventions, and data on these linkages are crucial to assessing the coherence of policies vis-à-vis certain objectives.

to overall development outcomes (Barder and Krylova 2013). In the realm of migration, CDI indicators—despite having been subject to criticism—fulfill the useful task of assigning credit for skilled and unskilled migration using data on gross inflows of migrants from developing countries. For example, in 2013 the CDI ranked Norway first in migration because the country accepted the “most migrants for its size” and bore “the second largest share of refugee burden” (Centre for Global Development 2014; Roodman 2006; Barder and Krylova 2013).

Another framework that can be drawn upon is the one developed by King et al. (2012), who have devised indicators for measuring policy coherence in the area of food security.³⁸ Their research suggests that devising a repertoire or list of causal chains according to a logical framework can serve as a first step toward finding input, output, and outcome indicators.³⁹ One example output indicator they suggest is the level of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies in developed countries. This indicator is based on the assumption of a causal relationship between developed country subsidies that reduce the unit costs for local producers and unfair advantages over developing country exporters (King et al. 2012).

According to King et al. (2012),

- **Policy input indicators** “are useful where it may be hard to quantify or summarise the output of a policy in a single indicator” (King et al. 2012, 39). They usually monitor donor expenditure in a particular area, such as financial contributions for M&D projects. Financial contributions may be considered as a proxy for commitment to a policy area, as well as for policy outputs in cases where such outputs are difficult to measure.
- **Policy output indicators** “capture concrete changes in efforts designed to make policy more ‘development-friendly’” (King et al. 2012, 39). Examples include changes in regulations affecting remittances and the number of visas allotted for poorer countries. For this, a “clear story” and empirical justification linking the indicator to development outcomes is necessary.
- **Outcome indicators** “measure real trends that are a result of both policy and societal changes and may be only partially influenced by policy instruments” (King et al. 2012, 39). The number of irregular immigrants is one example of an outcome measurement.
- **Process indicators** measure the elements of policy processes, such as whether the process includes the substantive participation of migrants.

38. In the area of food security, there have been some advances in measuring policy coherence using indicators and conducting country-level impact assessments (Engel et al. 2013). The OECD also plans to assess in greater depth whether national policies are coherent for development using development-aimed policy actions as proxy indicators (OECD 2013b).

39. Given the occasional overlap in how the terms “inputs,” “outputs,” and “outcomes” are used, this paper views them as components of the policy process:

- **Inputs:** The processes leading up to outputs, such as consultations, nonbinding or informal statements of commitment, and the commitment or mobilization of financial resources.
- **Outputs:** Specific policy commitments and changes, as well as the establishment of new policies and formal mechanisms such as interministerial committees or centralized oversight bodies.
- **Outcomes:** The direct and indirect effects on society of government outputs. Examples include lowered remittances costs and the increased number of diaspora networks.

For areas in which quantitative indicators for PICMD might be difficult to identify or apply, qualitative indicators that are based on a framework such as a human rights–based approach to development could be useful.⁴⁰ For example, while it might be difficult to assess the exact contribution of policies to the 15,000 deaths that occurred between 1993 and 2011 due to “Fortress Europe” protectionist measures, it would nevertheless be possible to evaluate the human rights violations in this context and tie them to human development losses (OECD 2011).

3. Coherence between Migration, Development, and Sectoral Policies

Operationalizing PICMD requires a clear understanding of the linkages between various sectoral policies and M&D. In particular, it requires knowledge about

- Which thematic policy areas are relevant for the migration-development nexus
- How these policy areas interact
- How thematic policies link to policies and commitments in other countries
- Through which causal chains thematic policies affect migration and development objectives
- How these policies can reinforce each other to achieve development objectives.

This section starts by highlighting the thematic policy areas relevant to the migration-development nexus and explores what PICMD could entail within each policy grouping. It gives a nonexhaustive overview of how different sectoral policies can affect migration and development (and vice versa) and explores how to harness synergies between these sectors.⁴¹ Finally, the section explores some of the trade-offs between different development outcomes that emerge when pursuing coherence.⁴²

Box 3 Interrelations between Public Policies, Migration, and Development (IPPM)

The project “Interrelations between Public Policies, Migration and Development of Partner Countries: Case Studies and Policy Recommendations” is currently being carried out by the OECD Development Centre and is cofunded by the European Commission. The project aims to improve the understanding of the links between sectoral policies and migration. It is investigating the impact of public policies (in the area of migration and in other sectors) on migration and seeks to gain a better understanding of the impacts of policy decisions on the socioeconomic development of origin and destination countries. The project’s ultimate goal is to enhance countries’ capacity to incorporate migration into the design and implementation of their development strategies.

The three main groupings of policies relevant to the migration-development nexus for both origin and destination countries are outlined in table 3. These groups include the following:

- Migration policies (narrowly defined)

40. For further reading on a human rights–based approach to development, see OHCHR (2006).

41. For an overview of how migration affects development, see UNDP (2009) and ERD (2013).

42. Most links are still underresearched, and other links may yet be uncovered. Related to this, the 2013–16 OECD Development Centre project on the interrelations between public policies, migration, and development (IPPM) aims to uncover these links (see box 3).

- Migration-related development policies
- Nonmigration sectoral policies with an impact on and affected by migration.⁴³

3.1 Migration Policies

Achieving PICMD requires sending and receiving countries to incorporate development objectives into their migration policy making. To carry out this exercise, policy makers need to be aware of how migration policies interact with the development of their own countries, the development of partner countries from which migrants come, and the human development of migrants and their families.

These complex interactions are difficult to identify. Moreover, a number of other factors inhibit PICMD in the realm of migration policy:

First, migration policies usually embody various objectives that may not be primarily concerned with advancing development. Migration policies are usually based on short-term political considerations, while development cooperation policies and objectives may adopt a longer-term perspective. Immigration policies, for example, often serve security and economic interests such as protecting local labor from competition. In some cases, they actively counter development objectives such as when destination countries restrict the right of migrants to participate in the labor market, even in cases in which a stronger labor force is needed, or resort to negative, xenophobic discourses to appease public opinion (Constant and Bienvenue 2011; Cebolla-Boado, Ferrero-Turrión, and Lopez-Sala 2012). Restrictive immigration policies can also lead to an increase in irregular workers whose human rights are routinely unprotected (Castles 2006; Shah 2006).

Table 3 Groupings of Policies Relevant to the Migration-Development Nexus

<p>Migration policies (narrowly conceived)</p> <p>Migration policies, narrowly conceived, refer to the “laws, rules, measures and practices implemented by national states with the stated objective to influence the volume, origin and...composition of ‘migration flows’” (Czaika and de Haas 2011, 5). In addition to measures aimed at regulating flows, integration and reintegration policies can also be placed in this grouping.^a</p>
<p>Migration-related development policies</p> <p>Migration-related development policies, in both origin and destination countries, are aimed at harnessing migration to advance development outcomes. These policies seek synergies and win-win-win situations in areas such as brain drain, diaspora engagement, circular migration, remittances, and reintegration.</p> <p>These policies exist at the national level and are also found in migration and development programs administered by development ministries or agencies. Examples include Migration for Development in Africa, which is implemented by the International Organization for Migration, and the United Nations Development Programme’s Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals program.</p>

43. The lines between these policy groupings are not always clear, and various policies may fall into two or more categories.

Nonmigration sectoral policies with an impact on and affected by migration

Crossing several sectors, migration and development affect—and are affected by—a wide range of policy domains, including labor, trade, social protection, health, education, housing, justice, home affairs, security, climate change, agriculture, and science and technology (Koser 2013).

Policies in these thematic sectors, which are crucial to implementing national development strategies, can shape the migration-development nexus, at times even targeting specific aspects of it.^b In addition to these sectoral policies, this policy grouping includes development cooperation policies that have an indirect impact on the migration-development nexus.


a. It is difficult to demarcate where migration policies begin and where they end because migration affects and is affected by many other policy areas.

b. National development strategies reflect the national objectives and priorities of countries, as well as the tools needed to achieve these objectives. For example, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) outline the “macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs [of low-income countries]” that aim to promote “broad-based growth” and poverty reduction (IMF 2013). Countries also use National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) that can help them respond to urgent needs related to climate change adaptation.

Second, migration policies may have different if not opposite effects on the development outcomes of origin and destination countries, parts of their populations, and migrants themselves. These effects can also vary over time. For example, an assessment of how immigration affects the UK labor market has shown that declines in the employment and wages of UK-born workers in the short term can be offset by increased employment and wages in the long term (Ruhs and Vargas-Silva 2012). Divergent objectives between policy sectors—along with the multitude of positive and negative effects that policies can have on development outcomes over time—complicate the pursuit and assessment of PICMD from a migration policy perspective.

Figure 2 illustrates the interactions between the three policy groupings relevant to the migration-development nexus, development objectives, and the broader international policy context.

Figure 2 Locating Policy and Institutional Coherence for Migration and Development (PICMD)



Source: Adapted from Knoll et al. 2013.

3.1.1 Admission, Irregular Migration, and Border Management

Many destination countries need labor migrants to fulfill numerous important functions. OECD countries, along with emerging economies such as Russia and China, are faced with aging populations, and some have already started trying to fill skills gaps and labor shortages through immigration, in both the low- and high-skilled sectors (Gagnon 2014). Efforts to optimize economic outcomes also exist in the South. Migration toward Thailand, for example, has benefited Thailand’s economy because lower-skilled migrant laborers have contributed to GDP growth and opened up opportunities for nationals to engage in more skilled occupations (Martin 2007). Labor migration to the Gulf States is another case in point.

A significant incoherence in the area of migration policy can be observed in the admission policies of both developed and developing countries, which tend to favor high-skilled rather than low-skilled migrants, even if their labor markets demand workers of all skill levels. These policies, restricting opportunities for legal immigration, tend to have the most significant negative impact on those who have the most to gain, namely, poor and low-skilled workers (UNDP 2009). Such policies, in combination with strict border control, can also drive irregular migration and propel migrants to use dangerous

routes.⁴⁴ With the deaths of an estimated 23,000 or more migrants since 2000, it has been suggested that inadequate EU immigration and admission policies have played a role in these tragedies as well as in human rights abuses (de Haas 2013).⁴⁵

In a South-South context, India over the last decade has seen a constant flow of unauthorized migrants from Bangladesh who serve as a significant source of cheap labor, working primarily as rag pickers, domestic help, and construction workers. Apart from the irregular status of these Bangladeshis, the fact that the government of Bangladesh does not officially recognize this issue puts an increased strain on bilateral relations between the two countries. Meanwhile, India's efforts to curb irregular immigration have had little success and incurred unwanted consequences: for instance, the 2000-kilometer fence that India has started building along the Indian-Bangladeshi border has contributed more to casualties and unlawful killings than it has to the prevention of irregular migration (Adams 2011).

For sending countries, legal opportunities for their nationals to migrate can bring benefits such as increased incomes for migrants and their families as well as remittances that can have positive economic knock-on effects.⁴⁶ To encourage labor emigration and the associated benefits, some origin countries have set up government bodies that facilitate the emigration process. For example, the Philippines, which has more than 1 million of its emigrants employed as domestic workers in the Gulf States, has established the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration along with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (Wilson 2010). These institutions collaborate with each other and with the private sector and nongovernmental organizations to present predeparture orientation programs that provide migrant workers with crucial information on subjects such as health and safety, financial literacy, the laws and customs of destination countries, and the rights and responsibilities associated with work contracts (Asis and Agunias 2012).

Restrictive emigration policies—although sometimes adopted with good intentions such as to prevent brain drain or protect vulnerable migrants⁴⁷—undermine freedom of movement, tend to cement gender stereotypes, and are generally incoherent with the human development aim of enlarging individuals' choices. For example, Ratha et al. (2011) note that several African countries restrict the right of women to emigrate partly for protection-related reasons. Similarly, in 2007 India banned emigration for women under 30 years old who were seeking employment abroad as domestic help or caregivers (Wickramasekara 2011).

Bilateral readmission agreements are a tool for destination countries to return migrants (both regular and irregular) to origin or transit countries. Often accompanying these agreements are incentives and

44. To read more about the three “perverse” types of substitution effects produced by restrictive immigration policies (spatial, categorical, and intertemporal substitution) that may adversely affect development outcomes, see de Haas and Vezzoli (2011).

45. For more information, see “The Human and Financial Costs of 15 Years of Fortress Europe” (<http://www.detective.io/detective/the-migrants-files>).

46. These benefits, however, can also come with negative socioeconomic impacts.

47. While the overall number of countries blocking emigration is declining, some still limit the right to emigrate for certain groups (de Haas and Vezzoli 2011).

funding, provided by migrant-receiving countries, for origin and transit countries to improve their border management capacities. While such cooperation may have the valid objective of countering trafficking and improving security, they can be incoherent with development by exposing migrants to human rights violations in the countries they are returned to and by impeding the free circulation of individuals stipulated in regional integration initiatives.⁴⁸ These results, for example, have been the observed impact in the Economic Community of West African States of EU policies on freedom of movement (Cassarino 2009).

3.1.2 Circular Migration Policies

Policies aimed at fostering circular migration generally promote PICMD. Broadly defined as migration that allows “some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries,” in recent years circular migration, which can include both short- and long-term stays in host countries, has gained increased visibility in policy circles (European Union 2007; OECD 2011, 119).⁴⁹ Compared with more traditional schemes (that is, seasonal, temporary, and permanent migration), circular migration policies aim to maximize the benefits of migration for development and bring about triple-win situations.⁵⁰ Ideally, circular migration could lead to increased remittances and savings, more secure migration channels (for migrants who would otherwise take more dangerous irregular routes), and reduced problems of family disintegration owing to the frequency of contact with those left behind.⁵¹ Moreover, circular migration has the potential to bring about increased flows of skills and knowledge and help fill short-term labor shortages in destination countries, while reducing labor surpluses (and therefore unemployment) in origin countries (Hugo 2013; IOM 2008b; OECD 2011; Vertovec 2007).

However, circular migration has also been associated with a range of problems. Circular migrants, for example, tend to enjoy extremely scarce labor union representation and support, and are therefore more likely to suffer abuses from employers. Moreover, given circular migrants’ lack of permanent status, destination countries tend to invest less in their health, education, and integration, therefore raising the question of whether circular migration has become a cheap way for some receiving countries to fulfill their short-term labor shortages at the expense of migrants’ welfare. Meanwhile, the issue of how to turn circular migration into a real sustainable driver of development is still without a solution (OECD 2011).

48. Not all bilateral migration agreements should be seen as incoherent with development objectives, however. For example, many bilateral agreements, have “*ex post* correct[ed] the high-skill bias of their...national immigration laws.” These “corrective” second-generation agreements have “partially reversed the new points-based system and re-introduced the unpopular recruitment quotas of their precursors” (Panizzon 2010, 2).

49. It is also important to note the difference between circular migration as a policy and as a *de facto* phenomenon. For example, because of porous borders, the concrete phenomenon of circular migration is more widespread in Southern regions.

50. Circular migration programs are different from traditional temporary ones, giving migrants the opportunity to “cross the border more than once, either in a seasonal—less than one year—or temporary—more than one year—scheme” (OECD 2011, 119).

51. Some evidence suggests that circular migrants, as opposed to permanent migrants, send higher levels of remittances back home (Hugo 2013; Vertovec 2007).

To assess the extent to which circular migration promotes PICMD, it is important to consider a number of dimensions, particularly how this type of migration is managed. For example, experiences with numerous programs have demonstrated that the development impacts of circular migration schemes are enhanced when they are accompanied by an educational and training component (Khoudour-Castéras 2009). Furthermore, circular migration seems to contribute most to development when it “operates...in areas where population movements are relatively free,” that is, where voluntary circular migration—as opposed to “permission-based and time-limited temporary migration”—is the dominant model (Hugo 2013; Newland 2013; Newland, Agunias, and Terrazas 2008; Skeldon 2009). In light of this, one way to help maximize the development benefits of circulation migration would be to set up more permanent migration channels and allow for more multi-use and multi-entry visas (Hugo 2013; OECD 2008b; Skeldon 2009).⁵²

3.1.3 Integration Policies and Provision of Socioeconomic and Labor Rights

Achieving PICMD requires formulating and, where necessary, adjusting policies that foster the capacity and opportunities of migrants to thrive in destination countries. These include policies that encourage integration and respect for the rights of migrants, which play a critical role in enabling migrants to contribute to their home countries and countries of residence (World Bank 2014). Migrants who find themselves in less secure situations and are discriminated against—in the labor market and other areas—may remit less, develop fewer skills, and lose out on gaining relevant work experience, and thus contribute less to development (Knoll et al. 2013). Supporting PICMD would thus require adjusting policies that restrict immigrants’ socioeconomic rights and integration and fail to address xenophobia.

While certain rights of immigrants should be protected under all circumstances, granting them extensive socioeconomic rights may have the consequence of effectively limiting the number of immigrants admitted (Ruhs 2013b). In such situations, policy makers may weigh the benefits of migrants’ access to overseas employment (for example, increased wages and incomes) against granting migrants’ extensive socioeconomic rights comparable to those held by citizens.

Meanwhile, integration processes in developed and developing countries may look significantly different; therefore, criteria to assess integration cannot be easily transferred from Northern countries to the South, where conditions and frameworks are notably distinct. For example, the practice of legal benchmarking to measure integration is of little use in situations where migratory flows are largely temporary and legal frameworks have little impact on migrants’ welfare (Ngunyi and Oucho 2013; OECD 2011).

Right to Work

52. Although temporary migration schemes may be associated with a number of development-related benefits, the “temporary” requirement of these schemes is difficult to enforce and may also be incompatible with the long-term economic need for permanent migration (OECD 2009a).

The right to work for migrants is essential to maximizing their well-being and potential to contribute to development; it is thus an important element of PICMD. Many countries, such as receiving countries faced with aging populations, can stand to benefit from international labor migration in one way or another (Bijak, Kupiszewska, and Kupiszewski 2008; Cangiano et al. 2009).⁵³ However, some countries limit access to work for certain categories of migrants, such as asylum seekers, by using bridging visas or assigning them an unclear status. Such measures can hinder their integration and self-sufficiency, while preventing them from acquiring the training and skills needed to participate in the job market. For example, in the United Kingdom, asylum seekers have reported experiencing distress at being labeled as “scroungers” because of their dependence on state assistance and sometimes face the possibility of destitution after their benefits are cut off (Ager and Strang 2008; Gibney 2008). Meanwhile, policies limiting immigrants’ access to types of work commensurate with their qualifications can also hurt development. In the United Kingdom, the latter phenomenon has not only resulted in brain waste, but in the increased social exclusion of migrants in deprived urban areas (Phillimore and Goodson 2006).

Denying access to the labor market also carries the risk of increasing fiscal expenses because the costly nature of receiving migrants in accommodation centers and leaving them in detention facilities (Boswell and Crisp 2004). While some claim that allowing asylum seekers to work is costly for the natives against whom they compete in the job market, governments could address this issue by implementing various measures. For example, they could tackle the use of cheap migrant labor by guaranteeing a legal minimum wage, which would aim to protect natives from unfair competition against migrants in the labor market.⁵⁴ In addition, there are usually numerous factors beyond wages that make local workers more competitive, including access to social networks and language skills.⁵⁵

Work Permits

Promoting PICMD requires guaranteeing the portability of work permits for migrants. Being tethered to one employer makes it impossible for many migrants to escape unsatisfactory or hazardous working conditions, particularly so because they are often unwilling or financially unable to return home after investing in their immigration. One conflict of interest in this area may be tied to the aim of destination countries to fill particular labor shortages by steering migrant labor toward certain sectors. Against this background, one possible compromise would be to “facilitate the portability of temporary work permits *within a defined job category and after a certain period of time*” (Ruhs 2013b, 175).

53. The International Labour Organization’s Employment Policy Recommendation, 1964 (No. 122), stipulates that “[i]nternational migration of workers for employment...consistent with the economic needs of the countries of emigration and immigration...should be facilitated” (ILO 1964a). The ILO’s additional dual emphasis on “productive and *freely chosen* employment” indicates the extent to which work is recognized as both a contribution to the economy and a right (ILO 1984, emphasis added). These ILO policy recommendations accompany the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122), which obliges ratifying member states (108 of them to date) “to declare and pursue an active policy designed to promote full, productive and freely chosen employment” (ILO 1964b).

54. However, this may not solve governments’ interest in preventing the emergence of an underground economy fueled by informal labor.

55. Those who may be most directly affected by these measures are recent immigrants.

Portability of Social Benefits

In most developed destination countries, national laws allow for the payment of pensions abroad, even if special agreements to this effect do not exist. However, some origin countries subject these pensions to certain taxes and deductions unless otherwise specified in bilateral agreements. Therefore, the possibility of transferring social benefits and security payments without the risk of double taxation can be an important financial incentive for return (IOM 2008a). More broadly, policies and procedures that make it easier for migrants to take social security benefits with them promote PICMD by expanding migrants' opportunities and helping maximize the developmental benefits of migration, such as skills transfers and investments in origin countries.

Matching Qualifications and Jobs and the Recognition of Degrees

The knowledge and skills of migrants are often underutilized, a phenomenon termed "brain waste" that occurs when highly educated migrants are hired for jobs for which they are overqualified. Exemplified by "highly skilled migrants work[ing] as taxi drivers or dish washers in Western countries" (European Think Tanks Group 2010, 46), brain waste sometimes stems from migrants' degrees or diplomas from their home countries not being formally accepted or accredited in destination countries. Hidden discrimination in the labor market also plays a role in the difficulties migrants face when searching for jobs that match their skills. Responding to this issue, a number of destination countries have introduced measures that promote PICMD by overcoming some of these barriers.

These measures have included information services and programs to upgrade immigrants' skills to meet domestic standards, along with efforts to harmonize national qualification frameworks in various regions (Sumption 2013). For example, in Southeast Asia, where about 1.5 million workers leave their origin countries each year to work abroad, the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services tackles the issue of "skills and competency recognition" and includes Mutual Recognition Arrangements that "facilitate the freer movement and employment of qualified and certified personnel within the region" (ILO 2008, 74; Martinez-Fernandez and Powell 2009). The urgent need for a common framework for qualifications and skills in this region has been widely recognized, especially considering increased labor mobility due to factors such as uneven growth alongside skills gains across Southeast Asian countries, not to mention the general move from a manufacturing to a services-based economy (Martinez-Fernandez and Powell 2009).

Meanwhile, the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) is developing a Caribbean Qualifications Framework that will "creat[e] a seamless education and training system for... member states" (Da Vibes 2013). Furthermore, the Bologna Process, initiated in 1999, led to the 2010 launch of the European Higher Education Area, which aims to ensure more "comparable...and coherent systems of higher education in Europe" (European Higher Education Area 2010).⁵⁶

56. While measures that make it easier to formally recognize migrants' skills and access information about their education have been identified as tools for tackling brain waste, they do not contain the solution to eliminating it altogether (OECD 2007). For example, certain entities have been barred from joining the Bologna Process because of broader geopolitical factors. This was the case with Northern Cyprus, which was ineligible to join the Bologna

Regulation of Recruitment Agencies

Private recruitment agencies, which play an important role in migration processes, from the predeparture phase to the return home, often subject migrants to costly, exploitative, and lengthy procedures (Agunias 2013). For example, in Bangladesh—where the Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment has fixed the maximum cost of migration for low-skilled male migrants at 84,000 Bangladesh taka (Tk) and at Tk 20,000 for female workers—migrants who were interviewed nevertheless reported paying recruiters Tk 200,000 on average, indicating that the recruiter's profit can account for up to two-thirds of the total cost of migration (IOM 2011a). Promoting PICMD calls for changing policies that allow for recruitment agencies to carry out such practices. Not only would doing this reduce the up-front costs of migration, but it would also help expand opportunities for overseas employment, particularly for groups low on the socioeconomic ladder who might not otherwise have the means to migrate (GMG 2010).

Despite growing consensus around the need to regulate these agencies, there is no agreement on the scope of this regulatory intervention, especially because of concerns that introducing a ban on fees charged by legitimate agencies might lead to better conditions for illegal agencies to thrive. As such, policies promoting PICMD in this area should target underlying issues such as information asymmetry and the presence of monopolies. Because agencies operate across different jurisdictions and are governed by different policies, policy mismatches between origin and destination countries can create loopholes that actors then exploit.

Return Migration and Reintegration

Incoherences can also emerge in the area of return migration and reintegration. In recent decades, programs implemented by numerous European destination countries to create incentives for return migration, such as by providing money to return migrants or financing projects to employ them, have mostly been unsuccessful (IOM 2008a; Plaza and Ratha 2011). This helps explain the shift in the 1990s from a focus on permanent return migration to the encouragement of codevelopment and more circular migration (Plaza and Ratha 2011).

Improving PICMD in this area requires moving beyond a strong, narrow focus toward examining conditions of return. It is in the interest of home countries to capitalize on the knowledge, skills, and resources that migrants have acquired while abroad. However, return migrants sometimes find themselves “trapped in the informal market...and unable to transfer the skills they acquired as part of their migration experience” (ACP Observatory 2013, 11).

A number of factors influence return migrants' ability to thrive, including the socioeconomic conditions in their home countries and the existence of policies that facilitate reintegration. Factors related to education level and experience acquired abroad can also play a role in determining whether migrants will succeed following their return home, as was demonstrated in a study conducted with return

Process in part because it was not recognized as an independent political entity by any member of the Bologna Process except for Turkey (World Education Services 2007).

migrants from the Maghreb. Findings from this research, for example, find that while Algerian return migrants with university degrees were significantly more likely to become entrepreneurs upon return, this correlation was not found in Tunisia, where those with tertiary degrees were no more likely to engage in entrepreneurship than those with no schooling (Gubert and Nordman 2011). However, in all three Maghrebian countries, one relationship did appear consistent—the negative correlation between “forced” return and entrepreneurship, thus suggesting that those who are “ill-prepared” for return—that is, who do not return by choice—are unlikely to be “actors of change in their home country” (Gubert and Nordman 2011, 115). Enhancing PICMD in relation to return migration and reintegration thus requires policy makers to consider a range of dimensions, in particular the costs and benefits of return, the impacts of reintegration policies, and the numerous factors (socioeconomic, cultural, and so on) that influence return migrants’ human development and ability to contribute to the development of their home communities.

Public Perceptions

Migration’s impact on development depends to a large extent on how migrants are received in host societies. Discrimination against immigrants diminishes their overall well-being and economic success, which in turn limits their positive contribution to development. A study analyzing data from 13 European countries, for example, finds that the discrimination perceived by certain ethnic migrant groups served as a “consistent explanation for their lower life satisfaction level” (Safi 2010, 159). Meanwhile, another study comparing the Swiss and German contexts finds that migrant wage discrimination was more prominent in “host societies where culture is more inward-looking” (Kohler 2012, 22). In some countries, the politicization of immigrants’ ethnicities has created considerable societal tensions (Letki 2007). Such issues cannot go unaddressed in efforts to achieve PICMD.

Border controls and strict immigration laws can indirectly feed xenophobia by fueling the belief that migrants are undesirable and have no right to reside in their receiving countries (Hayter 2000). At the same time, recent developments in the United Kingdom and Switzerland have shown that backlashes against immigration can also occur against the background of relatively liberal immigration laws (Chetail 2014; Witte 2014). Regardless of the immigration laws that may exist, promoting PICMD requires that policy makers actively promote social inclusion and counter antimigrant xenophobia, including by resisting the temptation to resort to populist discourses that scapegoat migrants in times of crisis, and by acknowledging that other factors, separate from immigration, such as poverty or overall inequality, may play a greater role in undermining social cohesion (Demireva 2012; Saggat et al. 2012).

3.2 Migration-Related Development Policies

Migration-related development policies, or M&D policies, exist at the national level and within the realm of development cooperation. Aimed at creating triple wins, these policies tend to focus on brain drain, diaspora engagement, circular migration, and remittances.

Also falling into this category are donor agencies’ efforts to broadly mainstream migration into their projects. For example, the German Technical Cooperation agency (GIZ) provides migration-related policy advice to partner country governments in areas such as private sector development, employment promotion, and labor migration management. In Honduras, such assistance from GIZ has enabled the

Honduran government to establish a project that promoted community investments in local infrastructure through supporting business start-ups owned or financed by migrants (GIZ 2012).

Meanwhile, in Nepal the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation is working to enhance the government's capacity to implement its labor migration policy and protect Nepali citizens who migrate to the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The European Commission and several EU member states are also providing technical support and training to developing countries to help them establish policy frameworks that facilitate remittances. France, for example, has held workshops with the African Development Bank about improving regulatory frameworks such that the benefits for the recipients and senders of remittances can be maximized (European Commission 2011).⁵⁷

Assessing the contribution of M&D policies to PICMD requires a careful appraisal of how, and the extent to which, these policies advance various development objectives (ECDPM and ICPMD 2013). This is particularly important given that numerous M&D programs in Europe have been labeled as a “discursive façade” and said to be skewed at times toward more narrow migration interests that may not support human development. Programs that have been criticized include those that appear to instrumentalize development policies to protect domestic migration interests, such as by preferring temporary over circular migration or including Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programs in M&D portfolios. While some have defended such narrow migration interests—citing unavoidable trade-offs between development- and security-oriented migration policies—others have challenged the necessity of these trade-offs, arguing that different policy orientations can be combined in a multitude of ways to accommodate both development and security interests (Lavenex and Kunz 2008).

Examining the domain of M&D policies more closely, the next section examines PICMD in relation to remittances, brain gain and drain, and diaspora engagement.

3.2.1 Policies to Enhance the Impact of Remittances

Remittances flows play a visible role within the migration-development nexus. Exceeding ODA by a considerable amount, remittances contribute to human development in different ways: in addition to forming part of co-insurance and risk-spreading livelihood strategies used by recipient households, they can help reduce poverty (both directly and indirectly), improve well-being, and help raise GDP (Clemens and McKenzie 2014; de Haas 2007; World Bank 2013b).⁵⁸ One way to advance PICMD is thus to better facilitate remittances flows.

57. M&D programs such as these are sometimes detached from the overall work of development agencies, remaining the work of specific units, which demonstrates the difficulty of mainstreaming migration into development on a broader scale. This may be due to the fact that partner countries creating national development plans may not put M&D issues high on the agenda.

58. Private remittances—which vary enormously between countries, regions, and households—cannot act as substitutes for development projects that can take patterns of inequality into account. Furthermore, remittances may lead to exchange rate appreciation, which reduces the competitiveness of the export sector. This is the so-called Dutch disease that has affected Latin American nations and small African countries such as Cape Verde (Khoudour-Castéras 2007; Ratha et al. 2011). A second problem related to remittances is the so-called moral hazard problem, which occurs when governments are reluctant to carry out necessary economic and welfare reforms because remittances-receiving households depend less on government benefits and emigration eases

Currently, these flows are impeded by several factors. Although remittances costs have been on the decline in recent years, official remittances channels are still largely characterized by high transaction costs and fragmented delivery chains (ERD 2013; UNDP 2011).⁵⁹ Furthermore, global and national regulatory frameworks also contribute to elevated transfer fees and banks' decisions to halt services to remittances companies. For example, in 2013, complying with the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency's new regulations for money services businesses, the British bank Barclays cut ties with remittances providers in Somalia, arguing that the country "did not have the necessary systems... to spot criminal activity with the degree of confidence required by Barclays' regulatory environment" (Plaza 2014; Tran 2013).⁶⁰ This decision came after U.S. authorities had fined the bank HSBC \$1.9 billion for its own failure to adhere to international regulatory frameworks.

Barclays' decision sparked considerable debate and was criticized by some as having the potential to sever flows serving as a lifeline for about half of Somalia's population,⁶¹ thus illustrating the negative consequences that bank regulatory policies can have on remittances flows and development.⁶² PICMD in relation to remittances not only calls for correcting such regulatory policies, but for creating incentives for migrants to invest in capital accumulation projects that link remittances to financial products, such as education accounts or health insurance for households (Ratha 2013). This, however, requires robust coordination between origin countries, donor countries, international financial agencies, and other stakeholders.⁶³

3.2.2 Brain Drain, Brain Gain, and Brain Circulation

The tendency of countries to facilitate the immigration of high-skilled rather than low-skilled workers has fueled a long-standing debate around "brain drain," characterized as the depletion of highly skilled

labor market pressures (Catrinescu et al. 2009; Ratha et al. 2011). This has been observed in Nepal (Pandey, Adhikari, and Sijapati 2012). Finally, a study conducted by Clemens and McKenzie (2014) demonstrates that remittances do not seem to have a significant impact on economic growth in origin countries.

59. Since the global financial crisis, during which remittances flows proved to be relatively resilient, efforts and calls to reduce remittances costs have been on the rise (Sirkeci, Cohen, and Ratha 2012).

60. After the events of September 11, 2001, many countries issued Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism regulations related to funds transfers. The adoption of new strict regulations by the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency, which prompted the Barclays decision, was part of this trend (Plaza 2014).

61. Amid the controversy, a temporary injunction was passed in November 2013 to block Barclays from halting its banking arrangements with Dahabshiil, Somali's largest remittances company (Tran 2013). Two months later, the UK Department for International Development announced the establishment of an Action Group on Cross Border Remittances as well as of a Working Group on Safer Corridors. The latter group has been tasked with implementing a secure remittances channel to Somalia. For more information on this, see Edward Paice, "Somalia money matters – an update on the remittances saga" (blog), Africa Research Institute, January 17, 2014 (<http://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/blog/somali-money-matters-an-update-on-the-remittances-saga-by-edward-paice/>).

62. To read more on the relationship between banking charges and the benefits of remittances, see Watkins and Quattri (2014).

63. Financial agencies' sovereign credit ratings should also take remittances flows into account when assigning ratings to countries (Avendaño, Gaillard, and Nieto Parra 2009; Ratha 2013).

and educated people in poorer countries due to international migration.⁶⁴ The concept of brain drain is often used in opposition to “brain gain,” which refers to increases in stocks of highly skilled workers as a result of migration (or the prospect thereof), as well as to the circulation of knowledge of diaspora and migrants back to their origin countries. Brain drain has often been portrayed as a classical incoherence between the policies of sending and receiving countries. For origin countries, brain drain is often depicted as a costly loss of return on their investment in the education of nationals, with the health sector described as being the hardest hit (Higazi 2005; IOM 2003).⁶⁵ For example, a policy coherence study on fishing and migration in Cabo Verde highlighted what was described as a familiar incoherence in EU policy: the Union’s highly selective migration policy favoring professional and educational qualifications alongside its frequent affirmation that brain drain needs to be addressed (ASemana 2012). In policy discussions on migration and development, arguments around brain drain—and the need for more “ethical recruitment” by developed countries—persist.

However, the recent literature on the issue has contradicted commonly held concerns about brain drain.⁶⁶ For one, the phenomenon may be less pronounced than it has been thought to be. African states seem to be less affected than, for example, small island states in the Pacific. Furthermore, remittances sent back to origin countries by skilled migrants, or “brains,” often contribute “as much as the fiscal cost of their absence” (Gibson and McKenzie 2011a, 19).

Second, evidence suggests that broader development challenges and structural factors are often at the root of skills shortages, rather than skilled emigration alone (Clemens 2013). Multiple studies have also been unable to establish a causal connection between the departure of skilled migrants and negative development impacts in origin countries (Bhargava and Docquier 2008; Rogers 2008). In addition, outward migration has been demonstrated to bring one important benefit to origin countries, namely, increases in their domestic skills stocks—a domestic brain gain—which can be attributed to individuals’ greater tendency to invest more in their education when they are lured by the prospect of migrating (Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport 2001; Sriskandarajah 2005).

It is therefore unclear whether the seemingly conflicting interests of origin countries (for example, building human resources and supporting public services) and of destination countries (such as resolving skills shortages) represent a situation in which trade-offs are inevitable. It has been argued that if destination countries were to adopt policies that facilitated “brain circulation”—the dynamic movement

64. Such discussions of brain drain are not, however, only taking place in developing countries. Because of the economic crisis in Europe and the lack of job prospects, many young Europeans are leaving their countries to find work elsewhere. The case of hundreds of thousands of Spaniards having left their country, for example, has sparked debates on this issue (Alvarez 2012).

65. One policy response has been the establishment of voluntary ethical codes of conduct and standards concerning high-skilled recruitment, which have been adopted by several developed countries and regions (ECDPM and ICMPD 2013; Knoll et al. 2013).

66. David McKenzie, “Worrying Too Much about Brain Drain?” *All About Finance* (blog), World Bank, May 25, 2011 (<http://blogs.worldbank.org/allaboutfinance/worrying-too-much-about-brain-drain>).

of highly skilled labor between origin and destination countries and beyond, also known as “triangular human talent flow”—such as by encouraging knowledge flows and diaspora engagement, they could reap the benefits of skilled migration at a lower cost and with more substantial benefits for origin countries (Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport 2001; Clemens 2013; Kamau and Kimenyi 2013; Kuznetsov 2006; Tung 2008, 298). One example is in India. Even though the emigration of Indian innovators could potentially weaken local knowledge, through diaspora connections innovators remaining in India have gained access to valuable technological knowledge accumulated abroad (Agrawal et al. 2011). Moreover, engaging diaspora abroad, as explained in the next section, can help origin countries tap into further benefits.

Beyond the discussion of benefits and challenges associated with the emigration of skilled workers, there is a human and fairness dimension that is often forgotten. The call for limiting the migration of certain categories of professions in which brain drain is allegedly most strongly felt also effectively discriminates against individuals based on their chosen profession, denying them the right of movement that may be enjoyed by those in other professions (Clemens 2013).

While these complex links merit further research, they nonetheless demonstrate that promoting PICMD in relation to brain drain may not, in fact, require measures such as taxes on migrants and recruitment bans in line with ethical recruitment standards (Clemens 2013; Collyer 2011). Rather, to alleviate the perceived negative impacts of outward migration on sending countries, policy makers across governments can partially shift the costs of skilled migrants’ education to destination countries (or to aspiring migrants themselves), allow for the sharing of costs (either ex post or ex ante) through partnerships, and facilitate skills creation and flows to the benefit of all.⁶⁷

3.2.3 Diaspora Engagement Policies

Whatever success immigrants experience in their countries of residence is likely to benefit the development of their origin countries, all the more if structures facilitating engagement with their home communities are established (Dayton-Johnson and Xenogiani 2006).⁶⁸ For example, a survey conducted with 123 African migrant associations in Denmark found that over half of these associations (56.9 percent) engaged in development activities in their home countries, and that the most frequent activities included the sending of collective remittances; the development of informational campaigns; and the shipping of used materials to schools, hospitals, and orphanages, with this last activity receiving considerable support from MS ActionAid Denmark (Trans and Vammen 2011).

Therefore, policies promoting diaspora engagement—by offering incentives for diaspora entrepreneurship in the forms of tax breaks or credits, for example—are key to promoting PICMD

67. The TalentCorp partnership between the Malaysian government, the private sector, and the Malaysian diaspora overseas promotes the return of educated and highly skilled Malaysians living and working abroad (Kamau and Kimenyi 2013). Such set-ups connecting diaspora with origin countries also exist in other countries. One example is the South African Network of Skills Abroad.

68. Efforts to improve the human development outcomes of migrants and engage them in development projects in their home countries should consider their transnational identities. In practice, this requires measures such as allowing for dual citizenship and greater portability of funds, benefits, and qualifications (ERD 2013).

(Kuznetsov 2006; Ratha and Plaza 2011). Where these policies are mutually reinforcing, they can maximize the positive development impacts of emigration for origin countries, while strengthening the position of migrants and their descendants in destination countries. In the long term, diaspora engagement policies can also help build networks between sending-country institutions and diaspora groups, while leveraging diaspora talent and investment for the development of home countries. Other contributors to diaspora engagement include origin country policies that allow outward emigrants dual citizenship and voting rights, which have been shown in some cases to encourage diaspora members to frequently travel to their home countries where they can maintain roles as teachers, entrepreneurs, and investors (Naujoks 2013; Newland 2013).

However, diaspora engagement policies must be analyzed carefully to ensure that they are not abused through government loopholes (Newland and Tanaka 2010). Furthermore, policy makers need to consider the unintended negative consequences, particularly at the societal level, that can come from diaspora engagement. For example, a study on the involvement of London-based Nigerian diaspora groups in their home country discovered that in some cases remittances had the effect of entrenching traditional authority, socioeconomic inequalities, and power imbalances in Nigeria (Lampert 2012). In light of this, national and development cooperation policies that support diaspora groups must be carefully designed and evaluated.

3.3 Nonmigration Sectoral Policies with an Impact on and Affected by Migration

Sectoral policies in domains not directly related to migration—such as agriculture, health, and education—can significantly shape the interactions between migration and development and therefore have an important role to play in the pursuit of PICMD. In particular, it is important to understand how these policies interact with each other and with M&D policies and trends (OECD 2011).

3.3.1 Health Policies and Migrants' Health

The surroundings in which migrants move and settle expose them to various health risks (GMG 2010). Given that their health is a key part of their human development, implementing PICMD calls for policy measures that promote migrants' health throughout the migration cycle. In practice, this means correcting policies that deny migrants access to health care—directly, indirectly, or unevenly—such as those failing to cover migrants altogether or that require health personnel to report undocumented individuals.⁶⁹

Generally speaking, barriers to health access fall into the following categories:

- Structural and administrative barriers
- Migrants' health beliefs and behavior
- Cultural and linguistic challenges

69. Some origin countries negotiate, on behalf of their migrants, for access to health services in receiving countries, while refusing the same services to nonnationals on their own territory (Calderon, Rijks, and Agunias 2012).

Overcoming these barriers may require a range of policy actions, from improving coherence between immigration and health policies to developing educational interventions that inform migrants of the laws and policies relevant to them (Calderon, Rijks, and Agunias 2012). For example, in the Philippines, the nongovernmental organization Kakampi, in addition to conducting awareness-raising visits to rural regions to discuss reproductive health and HIV/AIDS, runs radio programs, partially financed by government programs, that target migrant workers and discuss subjects such as health and legal rights (Siddiqui, Rashid, and Zeitlyn 2008). In some cases, the structural limits of health systems, and consequent inability to provide health care for all migrants, require increased cooperation between domestic and international stakeholders. Lebanon's Syndicate of Hospitals, for example, has stated that the country's hospitals can no longer care for Syrian refugees because budgets are insufficient for treating Lebanese citizens alone (Now 2013). Bottlenecks like these can be alleviated through the better alignment of donor countries' and international agencies' humanitarian and development cooperation efforts, and should also figure in the discussion about the global sharing of responsibilities for refugees.

The impact of internal and international migration on HIV/AIDS and other pandemics should also be considered when implementing PICMD (UNAIDS 2008). Mobility has arguably been an important contributor to AIDS pandemics. In South Africa, for example, this effect seems to be due to HIV being spread by men who become infected abroad and infect their wives upon return, as well as to wives who take on additional relationships in the absence of their husbands (Lurie 2004). To respond to this elevated risk, policy responses have at times included restrictions on the entry, stay, and residence of people living with HIV. However, not only do such policies violate the rights of migrants related to privacy, nondiscrimination, and freedom of movement, they are incoherent with the demands of a global business world and can end up limiting the "uptake of HIV voluntary testing and [thus] hinder adherence to HIV treatment" (OHCHR 2008; UNAIDS 2013, 92). As such, policy makers, rather than putting in place restrictions, should focus on health policy responses that aim to prevent the transmission of HIV through nonmandatory testing and other health services for infected migrants. Moreover, they should consider the fact that migration by no means always contributes to the spread of diseases. In Asia, for instance, labor migrants are "generally young and healthier than the native population and... tend to underutilise health services at destination" (Calderon, Rijks, and Agunias 2012, 1).

One dimension that should not be ignored in aiming for PICMD in the health domain is that of mental health, be it that of arriving migrants or of those left behind. Within a PICMD framework, policy makers should aim to develop policies that can diminish migration-related negative effects on—and support—mental health, which constitutes an important part of human development (Miranda and Patel 2005). Not only can people fleeing crisis situations see their mental health undermined, but some research has shown that despite benefiting from higher incomes, households with family members who have migrated abroad can experience negative impacts on their emotional well-being (Ringold, Burke, and Glass 2005; Save the Children 2006). This is especially the case for children whose parents have migrated (Graham and Jordan 2011).

3.3.2 Education Policies

Access to education is indispensable to the human development of migrants and their children. However, in some receiving countries, the children of irregular migrants face legal or de facto barriers to education and schooling. While the implementation of PICMD would require removing these barriers, doing so might not always be possible because of capacity problems, particularly in developing countries faced with significant influxes of refugees. For example, as a result of the Syrian civil war, an estimated 2 million refugee children, Syria's so-called lost generation, are being deprived of access to schooling. Yet absorbing all refugee children in the public education system of neighboring Lebanon would be equivalent to "New York having to cope with an influx... [of] the entire school populations of Washington, D.C. and Chicago" (Watkins 2013). In cases like these, international financial assistance and strengthened cooperation and responsibility sharing may be required, both in short-term humanitarian responses and in long-term development planning.

Moreover, implementing PICMD in the area of education can mean pursuing policies that aim to counter brain drain in situations where it is a problem. In destination countries, policy makers should establish schemes aimed at replenishing the skills lost by origin countries. Such schemes could include partnerships between academic institutions (in the form of "twin" institutions, for instance), staff exchanges, and educational support from destination countries (IOM 2008b). Furthermore, developing the tertiary education sector and establishing regional academic centers of excellence in the South could also help prevent brain drain by creating quality educational opportunities in southern regions (GMG 2010). In destination countries, innovative training schemes for immigrants could also help foster diaspora entrepreneurship.

3.3.3 Trade Policies

Trade and agricultural policies, which can significantly affect the drivers and supply side of migration, can either promote or inhibit PICMD. For example, it has been argued that the North American Free Trade Agreement has caused the displacement of small farmers in Mexico and subsequently led to an immigration surge into the United States. Here, there seems to be an incoherence between the policy response of the United States—one of stricter border management—and the country's trade policies that led to the immigration surge in the first place (Public Citizen 2013).

Meanwhile, an example of trade policies promoting PICMD can be found in the World Trade Organization waiver in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that opens "ways for advanced economies to give preferential treatment to LDCs [least developed countries] in services trade" (ERD 2013,155). If LDCs could take advantage of this waiver to increase their nationals' labor mobility—made possible under GATS Mode 4—significant developmental benefits could be brought about. For example, it has been estimated that liberalizing the "temporary movement of persons to provide services under [GATS] Mode 4" could lead to greater gains than those associated with further liberalizing the trade of goods (IOM 2005, 4). However, for LDCs, using the waiver to encourage labor emigration is not simple, because national regulatory frameworks on migration scarcely refer to Mode 4 services. Moreover, immigration procedures often lack transparency, making it difficult for laborers to use existing agreements like GATS to obtain visas.

There are many more policy areas, including environmental and climate policy, security, conflict prevention, and science and technology, that bear important links to the migration-development nexus.

While it is not within the scope of this paper to review all these policy areas, efforts to arrive at improved PICMD should consider these links to the greatest extent possible.

3.3.4 Labor Market Policies

The majority of migrants today leave their home countries for employment-related purposes, highlighting the importance of the labor market in the migration-development nexus as well as within the pursuit of PICMD. Achieving PICMD requires labor market policies that promote, among other outcomes, the improvement of job search assistance, skills and vocational training, and education for prospective and return migrants. Furthermore, it calls for incorporating labor immigration and emigration trends into development strategies, while working toward coherence between migration-related policies and those related to specific aspects of the labor market, such as policies on youth employment, the informal sector, and skills development (GMG 2010).

One good example of policies that promote PICMD in the labor market can be found in China, one of the world's largest exporters of nurses to rich, industrialized countries. In 2008, it was estimated that China, a country of more than 1.3 billion people, needed 5 million more nurses to fulfill the World Health Organization's global standard of 1 nurse per 500 people. Recognizing the emigration of nurses to developed countries as a key contributor to this shortage—in developed countries, nurses can earn up to 30 to 50 times what they earn at home—in recent years the Chinese government has undertaken notable measures aimed at retaining nurses, improving their quality of life, and attracting more individuals to the profession. For example, in 2009 the government's Healthcare Reform Plan highlighted China's commitment to accelerating the training of nurses while improving their education and opportunities for professional development. Furthermore, the 2008 Nursing Act signed by Premier Wen Jiabao not only outlines provisions for rewarding outstanding nurses, but aims to protect the rights and interests of nurses in four areas, including health care, wages, benefits and social security rights, and professional development (Yun, Jie, and Anli 2010).

Incoherences related to the labor market can be found in the policies of both sending and receiving countries. For example, in its Lesotho National Development Vision 2020, which highlights the problems of declining remittances from mine laborers, brain drain, and migrant labor retrenchment, Lesotho does not suggest many solutions to these issues beyond the recommendation that jobs be created in response to the continuing decline of mine worker recruitment (Lucas 2008). Adopting a PICMD approach would entail devising and implementing labor market policy remedies—such as programs to reintegrate retrenched miners and skill partnerships with destination countries—to address some of Lesotho's other migration-related needs.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, in Ireland, a large-scale survey among employees revealed that immigrants, for example, those coming from new member states of the EU and from non-EU English-speaking countries, are significantly less likely to receive training from employers (Barrett et

70. Global skill partnerships, for example, have been proposed by Clemens (2014). These are public-private schemes that aim to link skill creation and mobility in a way that fosters triple wins. The partnerships set out the terms for who will shoulder the costs of training skilled migrants, while allowing for a portion of the economic gains generated through skill mobility to be used for skill creation in origin countries.

al. 2013). Achieving PICMD in this context calls for measures to combat such discrimination against migrants in the labor market, whether intentional or not.

4. Identifying Knowledge Gaps and Priorities: The Next Step

Achieving PICMD requires that a stronger understanding of the *causal* (and not just correlative) links between policies, as well as of the mitigating or exacerbating effects they may have on development outcomes, be developed. In particular, further research is needed in the following three broad areas.⁷¹

4.1 Data Collection and Analysis

Although literature on the migration-development nexus has contributed to an understanding of the various channels through which migration can interact with development outcomes, still missing is a systematic understanding of how certain policy outcomes counteract other development objectives, and of the net impact that policies have on development outcomes.

An important factor in these knowledge gaps is the persistence of basic data constraints, which include, for example, uncoordinated data collection methods, difficulties related to calculating numbers of unauthorized migrants, and the frequent time lag when it comes to data on the impact of migration, which can undermine policy makers' ability to adjust policies and make them more coherent (ACP 2009).⁷² The resulting data gaps—which exist across the various policy domains linked to migration and development—make it difficult to understand the qualitative interconnections between migration and development and to assess the coherence of policies with development objectives.⁷³ Furthermore, they complicate the process of mainstreaming migration into development planning and of empirically substantiating assumed causal chains between certain policies and outcomes.

4.2 Policy Formulation and Implementation

While some literature exists on the political economy of migration policy making, how political economy factors—such as interests, institutions, and ideas—affect policy outcomes has not been explored in most settings. Research in this domain should focus on stakeholders in the area of M&D and their interests, and how these interests interact and conflict with one another. Meanwhile, research on the implementation of M&D-related policies could examine issues related to financing M&D-related

71. Efforts to address research gaps should also be accompanied by the formulation of a knowledge management system that consolidates and facilitates access to the expertise and experiences of academia, research institutes, civil society, and policy makers in the North and South. Research should span different disciplines (economics, political science, sociology, and so on) and include sector- and country-specific analyses as well as studies related to the gender dimension PICMD.

72. At times, this time lag problem is a result of restrictions on access to data or limited data sharing between institutions.

73. Overcoming the lack of basic data necessary for assessing policies does not have to be costly and can be done in the short term, even if resources are limited (Santo Tomas, Summers, and Clemens 2009).

programs and to what extent (and for what reasons) migration priorities are reflected in national budgets and expenditure frameworks.

Finally, there is little research on the “systems” that facilitate coherence throughout the entire policy-making process. An analysis of these systems could consider the collective impacts of the building blocks of coherence and how they interact. Having more knowledge across these areas would be particularly useful when mainstreaming migration into development planning and trying to identify how to create and sustain triple-win situations (ECDPM and ICMPD 2013).

4.3 The Measurement of PICMD

Data that explicitly capture causal chains between policies, migration, and development outcomes is essential to measuring coherence (Galeazzi et al. 2013). However, identifying these chains is a challenge. In an increasingly globalized world, assessing the precise contribution of policies in determining certain outcomes is considerably more difficult (King et al. 2012). Furthermore, causal chains and trade-offs are constantly changing. Devising indicators for PICMD requires knowledge of which policies in various domains work, and which do not, for what reasons, for whom, and at what cost. Filling these gaps can only come through developing effective monitoring and evaluation systems as well as on-the-ground impact assessments. While some monitoring research has been done, it has been scarce.⁷⁴ Very few Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers in developing countries, for example, contain indicators or evaluation criteria for M&D-related policies (Koser 2013).

4.4 The Costs and Benefits of PICMD

Finally, there is little research that compares the benefits and costs of PICMD. Research in this area is needed to examine both the implementation and impact of PICMD and should aim to transcend sectoral divisions, while also bearing in mind that many aspects of human development (especially qualitative ones) do not easily lend themselves to measurement. Furthermore, the widespread assumption that coherence yields benefits needs to exist alongside a system for measuring the costs of pursuing coherence, whether as a one-time or periodic exercise. For example, before implementing PICMD, governments could estimate the costs of providing predeparture education to emigrants or making social security benefits transferable.

4.5 Criteria for Prioritizing Research Gaps

As this paper demonstrates, the issues related to policy and institutional coherence and migration and development are interdisciplinary, complex, and by their very nature, go in many different directions. At the workshop “Strengthening the Migration-Development Nexus through Improved Policy and Institutional Coherence”—which took place on December 4–5, 2013, in Paris—policy makers, academics, and representatives from international, multilateral, and civil society organizations gathered to identify and prioritize research gaps in the realm of PICMD. The rich discussions that participants engaged in over a day and half sought to bring KNOMAD, and the broader community of M&D practitioners and

74. The International Centre for Migration Policy Development and the IOM are currently seeking to fill knowledge gaps around how migration profiles contribute to greater policy coherence and improved M&D outcomes.

experts, closer to the objective of defining, measuring, and promoting PICMD. This paper served as a point of departure for the discussions held during the workshop. In deciding on how to prioritize research gaps, the following guiding questions were provided:

- How can policy and institutional coherence in relation to migration and development be effectively measured?
- What are the costs of incoherence?
- Can the benefits of coherence be measured?
- What information and data, more specifically, need to be organized and understood in a systematic way to support PICMD?
- Which other underresearched areas urgently demand further investigation?

5. Conclusion

This paper seeks to carefully examine the emerging concept of PICMD. Section 2 begins with a broad overview of policy coherence for development and discusses the dimensions that should be considered when applying PCD to the field of migration and development. This section also proposes a three-part working definition of PICMD, defining coherent policies in the M&D field as those that pursue synergies to advance shared objectives, actively seek to minimize the negative side effects of policies, and prevent policies from undermining each other or the achievement of agreed-upon development goals. Moreover, section 1 outlines the various levels—intragovernmental, intergovernmental, multilateral, and multistakeholder—at which PICMD should be pursued.

Section 3 outlines three broad categories of policies that are relevant to the migration-development nexus: migration policies (narrowly conceived), nonmigration sectoral policies with an impact on and affected by migration, and migration-related development policies. Upon identifying these policy groupings, section 3 sets out to explore what the broad implementation of PICMD could entail for policies in and across these categories.

Finally, section 4 sets the stage for continuing research in the realm of PICMD. It identifies three of the most significant types of research gaps. These gaps include those related to data collection and analysis, policy formulation and implementation, and the impact and coherence of policies. Given this wide range of existing gaps, the paper finishes on a pragmatic note by outlining a number of guiding questions that can be used to prioritize and orient future research in the emerging field of PICMD.

Appendix A: The Use of Migration Instruments and Their Observed Effects

Achieving PICMD requires a close examination of the numerous and often conflicting objectives of migration-related policies, some of which may largely be divorced from and fail to consider development objectives and commitments. Table A.1 aims to provide (1) a list of the main different objectives of migration-related policies and the instruments used to achieve them and (2) examples of the types of development impacts (both positive, negative, and mixed) that these instruments can have. Although it is by no means an exhaustive mapping of migration instruments and their impacts, this table should nonetheless help policy makers consider—before, during, and after the policy-making process—the various potential impacts of their migration-related interventions. While it is evident that policy makers’ decisions entail inevitable trade-offs and are based on a complex set of political, economic, sociocultural, and ethical factors, making them within the set of considerations that this table and paper provide is an important step toward improving PICMD.

Table A.1 Migration Instruments and Their Effects		
Objectives of migration policy	Instruments	Examples of use, impact, and interactions with development outcomes
Address economic needs and interests, for example, through filling labor gaps and promoting job creation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Circular migration schemes • Permanent migration schemes • Temporary and seasonal migration schemes • Visa policies 	<p>Canada’s efforts to attract immigrant investors and entrepreneurs Governments can have different reasons for offering the possibility of permanent migration, one of them being the desire to address particular labor- and market-related needs through migration. For example, in 1986, Canada created its Immigrant Investor and Entrepreneur programs, which aimed to attract affluent investors to the country, particularly from Hong Kong SAR, China. Those applying to the programs were required to have operated or owned a business before arrival, possess assets totaling at least C\$1 million, and invest more than C\$500,000 in Canadian businesses for five years (Walsh 2008). In the early 1990s, individuals enrolled in these programs made up almost 15 percent of all immigrants (Ley 2003). However, in 2014 Canada announced that it was canceling both programs because they had fallen short of their goal of promoting meaningful economic development in Canada. The country’s 2014 budget indicated that the Immigrant Investor Programme had “significantly undervalued Canadian permanent residence” and cited “little evidence that immigrant investors as a class” were “making a positive economic contribution to the country” (Government of Canada 2014).</p> <p>The positive human development effects of issuing green cards in the United States Other broader permanent residence schemes, such as the green card scheme in the United States, have been shown to be more in line with human development goals through the income gains they have generated for certain card holders. For example, research suggests that for employer-sponsored immigrants, acquiring a green card brings an approximate annual wage gain of US\$11,860 (Mukhopadhyay and Oxborrow 2012).</p> <p>New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer program and its impact on laborers from Tonga and Vanuatu Under New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) program, foreign workers are given visas allowing them to work in horticulture and viticulture for a maximum of 7 months over the span of any 11-month period. Under this program, recruitment must be carried out by employers approved by New Zealand’s labor ministry, who are responsible for covering accommodation, partially covering airfare, and offering wages at market pay rates (Gibson, McKenzie, and Rohorua 2013). A study on the RSE’s development impacts on workers from Tonga and Vanuatu (Gibson and McKenzie 2011b) finds the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In both Vanuatu and Tonga, households participating in the RSE program saw their per capita income rise by over 30 percent relative to comparison groups; for these households, savings and per capita expenditure also rose.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In both countries, RSE households were more likely to have opened a bank account, and thus to have formal savings. • In Tonga, remittances spurred an increase in school attendance rates for youths between 16 and 18 years old in RSE households. <p>This positive evaluation of New Zealand’s RSE program did not, however, consider the potentially negative social impacts of seasonal and temporary migration, such as an elevated risk of family breakdown due to separation and the disintegration of social networks (Ratha, Mohapatra, and Scheja 2011; Stark and Simon Fan 2007)—effects that have been documented in other country case studies. Some studies suggest that children left behind by one or two migrating parents are more likely to suffer from psychosocial stress, depression, and low self-esteem than their peers, though much depends on the circumstances, including whether the father or mother is absent, the age of the children at separation, their relationship with their primary caregiver, and the frequency of contact with the parent(s) abroad (Bakker, Elings-Pels, and Reis 2009; Catrinescu et al. 2011; Macours and Vakis 2010).</p>
Facilitate certain types of immigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Visa policies 	<p>Temporary-to-permanent visa schemes and their benefits</p> <p>Visa policies are a primary instrument for states to regulate immigration. Ranging from liberal to restrictive, these policies are used to fulfill states’ preferences for certain categories of migrants (for example, high-skilled workers, students, entrepreneurs) over others. The majority of labor migrants enter destination countries on temporary visas. Some states have sought to maximize the economic contribution of labor migration by offering temporary-to-permanent visa pathways that allow foreign workers to apply for permanent residence after a fixed period (generally one to six years), during which they can improve their language skills and demonstrate their ability to integrate and successfully navigate the employment market (Papademetriou and Sumption 2011). In a number of countries, the acquisition of permanent residence has been tied to improved labor market outcomes for migrants, while it is also believed that permanent migrants are more likely to make long-term investments in destination countries (Bevelander and Pendakur 2009; Pastor and Scoggins 2012). It thus seems that granting and the prospect of obtaining permanent visas can help generate positive development impacts, for both migrants and receiving countries.</p> <p>The adverse mental health impacts of holding temporary protection visas in Australia</p> <p>In some cases, however, being on a temporary visa can harm the human development of individuals. For example, in a study comparing the mental health of refugees holding temporary protection visas (TPVs) with those holding permanent protection visas (PPVs) in Australia, where PPVs are issued to a fixed quota of refugees through a special resettlement program, TPV status was shown to be the strongest predictor of depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder. For over 90 percent of TPV holders interviewed, their</p>

		<p>anxiety was rooted in worries about being repatriated, their family’s safety, and the inability to return home in case of an emergency (Momartin et al. 2006).</p>
<p>Facilitate labor emigration and protect potentially vulnerable emigrants</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emigration policies 	<p>Emigration-related instruments that can improve human development outcomes</p> <p>As of 2011, one-fourth of states had policies aimed at reducing emigration, two-thirds of states either wanted to maintain current emigration levels or did not seek to influence emigration, and the rest of states (9 percent) had policies encouraging emigration (UNDESA 2013). An analysis of emigration-related interventions points to a number of instruments that are likely to improve human development outcomes (Asis and Agunias 2012; Holzmann, Koettl, and Chernetsky 2005; ILO 2006; Naujoks 2009; Ruiz and Agunias 2008; UNDESA 2013). These instruments include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Mechanisms or bodies devoted to ensuring decent working conditions</i> and fair wages of overseas workers. • <i>Predeparture orientation programs</i>. These programs, such as the one offered in the Philippines, can equip migrant workers with information on crucial subjects such as work contracts, health and safety, challenges when working abroad, travel procedures, and the laws and customs of destination countries. • <i>Migrant welfare funds</i>. In countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, these funds aim to protect migrants by providing a range of services, including predeparture orientation programs, emergency repatriation, loans, medical and life insurance, and reintegration assistance. • <i>Agreements on the portability of social security benefits</i>. The portability of social security entitlements, such as health care benefits and pensions, allows migrants to move with these benefits between origin and destination countries. • <i>Policies allowing migrants to retain the citizenship</i> of their origin country when acquiring a second citizenship, which grant migrants more flexibility and can also facilitate return to their home countries. • <i>Consular services and labor attaches in destination countries</i>. These services and attaches, if equipped with the appropriate resources and training, can provide valuable support to their nationals who are migrant domestic workers, some of who may be at risk of becoming (or already are) victims of forced labor or trafficking. <p>Efforts to protect African women who desire to migrate</p> <p>A number of African countries have put in place policies that restrict women’s rights to emigrate. For example, in Algeria, a married woman under 18 must have her husband’s permission to travel abroad; in Libya, Sudan, Swaziland, and the Republic of Yemen, restrictions exist for both married and unmarried women (McKenzie 2005). Although these policies have had the partial goal of protecting potential migrant women, they limit women’s agency and have, in practice, rendered them more vulnerable. In particular, by reducing their opportunities to migrate legally, these restrictive policies have pushed some women to rely more on third parties and brokers, some of whom can be traffickers, and thus to use riskier and sometimes undocumented</p>

		migration channels (Napier-Moore, Bilbatua, and Ham 2010).
Facilitate the return and reintegration of migrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assisted return programs • Readmission agreements 	<p>Europe’s readmission agreements</p> <p>Readmission agreements have existed since the 1950s, though their proliferation started in the 1990s, particularly in Europe. These bilateral and multilateral agreements—which aim to contribute to more effective migration management—tend to stipulate cooperation between states around the return of migrants to third countries of which they are citizens or through which they transited. Some of the principal incentives for third countries to enter into these agreements include increased chances of EU membership and financial help (Roig and Huddleston 2007). For example, more than a decade before it officially became a member of the Schengen Area, Poland concluded a readmission agreement with Schengen countries in 1991 in exchange for visa-free entry for its citizens and financial help (Abell 1999).</p> <p>While such agreements may indeed facilitate the management of international migration, their net contribution to human development is unclear. In the case of Albania, it appears that the country’s readmission agreement with the EU has negatively affected the development of returning migrants. Studies have shown, for example, that given Albania’s high unemployment and weak economy, returnees tend to face great difficulties in not only earning a living for themselves, but for their families who in many cases were relying on the remittances they once sent home. Furthermore, Albania’s limited financial capacity largely undermines the government’s ability to provide a solid reintegration framework for returnees, many of whom decide to migrate again after their return (Kruse 2006).</p> <p>The IOM’s Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programs</p> <p>Assisted return programs, which exist in many forms, seem to have a mixed human development effect on migrants. To some extent, this reflects the inevitable tensions that arise between migration policy, which revolves around states’ rights to control their borders and who can cross them, and goals related to human development.</p> <p>One of the most widespread types of international programs is the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programs, which are usually implemented by the IOM in collaboration with partner governments. Since 1979, AVRR programs have facilitated the return of over 1.2 million migrants—assisting an average of 25,000 to 30,000 migrants per year—including asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected, irregular migrants, stranded migrants, as well as vulnerable and skilled individuals (IOM 2011b; IOM 2014). Forms of assistance include information dissemination and medical check-ups before departure, travel allowances, and reintegration assistance upon return (IOM 2011b).</p> <p>The IOM has described AVRR programs as a cornerstone of effective migration management. In contexts like the Arab Republic of Egypt—where research has shown that many Sudanese refugees consider returning to</p>

		<p>Sudan because of the widespread socioeconomic marginalization they face in Egypt, with only 2.7 percent of them believing that remaining in Egypt is a better option—the opportunities provided by AVRR appear welcome (Ahmed 2009). However, AVRR and other assisted return programs have also been criticized as having little regard for the preparedness and safety of returnees, as well as for failing to monitor their reintegration following return (Sward and Collyer 2009; Webber 2011). For example, a 2009 study finds that in a sample of 48 Sri Lankan returnees, almost all had undergone racial harassment from police, 4 had undergone serious human rights abuses, and 20 were operating businesses that provided a living at subsistence level or lower (Sward and Collyer 2009).</p> <p>Expansion of reintegration support</p> <p>Efforts to more effectively reintegrate migrants seem to be expanding, however. For example, from 2011 to 2012 alone, the number of migrants who received post-arrival and reintegration assistance from the IOM and its partners almost doubled, increasing from 23,990 to 47,220 (IOM 2012). Reintegration assistance encompasses a range of services, including educational support, counseling and information on job opportunities and employment-related issues, employment preparation courses, business skills courses, micro grants, and referrals to vocational training (IOM 2010). While the broadening of reintegration support is a positive development, the success of interventions of this type depends largely on the broader socioeconomic environment in home countries, in particular on factors such as available employment, the discrimination faced by return migrants, and policies and portability agreements in origin countries that enable return migrants to transfer their skills acquired abroad and to access their earned social security benefits.</p>
<p>Fulfill humanitarian responsibilities under international law</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political asylum 	<p>Evolving asylum policies and trends</p> <p>Many destination countries have ratified the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the international legal document that defines who refugees are, their rights, and the obligations of states toward them. While the convention constitutes the broader legal framework for refugee recognition, the granting of political asylum remains an area in which policies can vary considerably across states, and in which policy changes largely occur in response to geopolitical and socioeconomic factors (Schuster 2000). For example, after the amount of asylum claims in developed countries increased dramatically from the early 1980s to the early 1990s—rising from about 200,000 to 850,000 claims per year, with the majority of applications being lodged in Europe—many of these countries enacted measures with the goal of reducing numbers of claims received (Hatton 2009). In addition to toughening the procedures for determining refugee status, such as by requiring certain types of documentation and identification, these new policies often restricted asylum seekers’ access to welfare (Hatton 2009; Schuster 2000).</p> <p>While numbers of asylum claims have fallen dramatically in the last decade or so, research suggests that</p>

		tougher asylum procedures have accounted for only one-third of this decline, at least between 2001 and 2006 (Hatton 2009). At the same time, policy changes that have made the living conditions of asylum seekers less palatable, for example, by restricting their access to employment and assistance or detaining failed asylum seekers, negatively affect human development outcomes, including by contributing to the deprivation experienced by many asylum seekers (Hatton 2009; Maitre 2007).
Integrate and protect the rights of immigrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integration policies 	<p>Migrant integration in Sweden and the United States</p> <p>Integration policies can serve to promote a range of socioeconomic, civil, and political rights for migrants. Studies on certain indicators of integration, such as becoming naturalized and having the right to work, have demonstrated that migrants' integration tends to be correlated with improved development outcomes. For example, policies that facilitate immigrants' ability to naturalize can lead to improved labor market outcomes for the immigrants themselves, as well as better use of their human capital by their host society (Liebig 2011). A case study in Sweden, for instance, shows that the acquisition of citizenship is linked to substantial gains for certain categories of migrants (such as refugees) and to increased employment prospects for all migrants, while suggesting that the tightening of citizenship restrictions would likely have the effect of increasing social welfare costs (Bevelander and Pendakur 2009). In the United States, it is also thought that citizenship is perhaps associated with higher levels of "U.S.-specific human capital," as immigrants who acquire permanent residency may have greater incentives to make long-term investments like starting US-based businesses (Pastor and Scoggins 2012).</p>
Limit irregular migration and protect national security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Border management • Visa policies 	<p>The effectiveness and unintended consequences of stricter borders</p> <p>As border controls have risen in recent decades, migration flows have actually accelerated (with a slight slowdown occurring after the 2008 global economic crisis). This trend, along with the knowledge that migrants who manage to successfully cross borders are unlikely to go back to their origin countries for fear of never being able to return, raises questions about the effectiveness of using reinforced border controls to stem irregular migration (OECD 2011). Moreover, stricter border management does not appear to generate positive development outcomes for any group. First, given that tightening borders tends to push migrants to take more dangerous routes to reach points along borders that are less protected—a phenomenon de Haas (2011) describes as the "waterbed" effect—it may actually directly contribute to the loss of migrant lives. Second, tighter borders can lead to increased profits for smugglers. For example, between 1980 and 2002, the average price for illegally crossing the US-Mexico border increased from approximately US\$400 to US\$1,200 in real terms (Massey 2007). In light of this, one important question that emerges is whether the amount of resources spent on border management—in 2012, more than US\$10 billion was spent on customs and border protection, for example (Government Printing Office 2012)—could be better directed to programs that promote human development, especially in times of budget deficits and austerity.</p>

<p>Maximize the benefits of migration for development</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Circular migration schemes 	<p>The success of Unió de Pagesos’ circular migration scheme in Spain</p> <p>Countries like Germany, New Zealand, and Spain have set up well-functioning and development-friendly circular migration programs (Newland, Agunias, and Terrazas 2008). In Spain, the program managed by Unió de Pagesos, a Spanish farmers’ association that represents 70 percent of agricultural businesses in Catalonia, collaborates with the Ministry of Labour to recruit laborers from Colombia, Morocco, and Romania. Beginning in 1999, when the program started off by recruiting 35 Colombian workers, the scheme has grown significantly, having recruited 3,211 workers (mostly from Colombia and Morocco) in 2008. Not only has the program managed to keep its desertion level very low—as of 2007, only 6 percent of the workers recruited by Unió de Pagesos had stayed irregularly in Spain—but the scheme has succeeded in generating a triple win, bringing about positive development impacts for Spain (the destination country), the origin countries, and the migrants themselves (ILO 2013; Newland, Agunias, and Terrazas 2008; Zapata-Barrero, García, and Sánchez-Montijano 2012). For example,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The program helps Spain fulfill its temporary labor needs. • The program’s philanthropic arm, Fundació Agricultors Solidaris, aims to connect the host and home communities through development projects. One codevelopment project in Morocco, for example, has been the consolidation of a training center that supports women in productive activities. • For the migrants themselves, participating in the program can lead to improved quality of life. Remittances, for example, are used to fund primary and secondary education for children and to pay off debts. Furthermore, during the first year of participation, most workers invest in improving their living conditions, such as by remodeling their homes. <p>Yet the positive migration and development impacts generated by Unió de Pagesos’ scheme should not be associated with all circular migration programs. Circular migration is “intrinsically neither good nor bad” from a human development perspective, its development-related impacts depending largely on the specific circumstances and constraints within which it occurs (Newland 2009, 1). One example of a circular migration scheme having more mixed effects on human development is also found in Spain, in the strawberry-growing province of Huelva. Adopted as part of a broader strategy to reduce irregular migration, the program specifically targets mothers from Morocco—who are more likely to return to Morocco after the season to care for their children—while excluding the participation of male migrants likely to promote economic development in their home communities through entrepreneurial activities (Black and Castaldo 2008; Zeneidi 2013). The program thus forces family separation on all of its participants. Furthermore, the phenomenon of Moroccan women becoming circular migrants can deleteriously affect their human development by undermining their reputations and family lives back in Morocco, a country where family structures still largely tend to be traditional. For example, some of these women’s husbands may reject their wives’ seasonal work in Spain or</p>
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		<p>marry other women in their absence, while the departure of the female migrants, albeit temporary, can be perceived as a sign of “unfaithful female behavior” or of their husbands’ incompetence (González 2013, 132). Moreover, the fact that agricultural employers in Spain largely prefer Moroccan women as workers because of their traditional cultural habits, for example, their refraining from smoking, drinking, and going out (González 2013)—raises the question of whether migration programs targeting women with this profile indirectly support patriarchal norms in origin communities.</p>
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