Climate Change and Human Mobility in the Pacific Region: Plans, Policies and Lessons Learned

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Preface

The two working papers in this volume are part of a series of KNOMAD publications that review empirical evidence on the linkages between environmental change and human mobility. These papers focus on small island states in the Pacific Ocean—a part of the world that is likely to see the greatest impacts of climate change. As the IPCC Working Group on Impacts, Assessments and Vulnerability reported:

*Many small island states—especially the atoll nations of the Pacific and Indian Oceans—are among the most vulnerable to climate change, seasonal-to-interannual climate variability, and sea-level rise. Much of their critical infrastructure and many socioeconomic activities tend to be located along the coastline—in many cases at or close to present sea level.... Coastal erosion, saline intrusion, sea flooding, and land-based pollution already are serious problems in many of these islands. Among these factors, sea-level rise will pose a serious threat to the ecosystems, economy, and, in some cases, existence of many small island states.*

Together, the papers examine ways in which these islands are trying to adapt to the medium and longer-term impacts of climate change through strategic use of migration. They provide a critical review of current and planned efforts at planned relocation and labor migration within and across borders. They spell out successes and failures in implementing these strategies and provide recommendations to enhance the use of migration for adaptation to the effects of climate change.

In “The Future Role of Labor Mobility Mechanisms in the Context of Environmental Degradation: Building or Crumbling Adaptation Strategies?,” Elisa Fornale focuses on cross border movements. She discusses bilateral and regional labor migration programs as vehicles for climate change adaptation. Among the programs reviewed are temporary mobility schemes through which New Zealand, Australia, and the United States have offered admission to migrants from the Pacific region. The paper also examines the use of trade policies in the region to manage labor mobility, including the Temporary Movement of Natural Persons (TMNP) provisions in the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) and the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER Plus) between the Pacific countries and Australia and New Zealand. Fornale concludes that these various strategies show promise but they would need to be scaled up to meet potential demand. Moreover, these schemes do not sufficiently protect the rights of the most vulnerable populations, whether they are mobile or left behind in their home countries.

Sophia Kagan focuses primarily on internal relocation and migration in her paper entitled “Institutional Frameworks for Addressing Human Mobility in the Context of Environmental Change in the Pacific.” Like Fornale, Kagan examines existing and proposed frameworks on climate change, and the way in which mobility has been conceptualized. After mapping out climate change policies and laws in 15 Pacific island countries, Kagan focuses on the policies which consider mobility as an adaptation strategy for those affected by climate change; in particular, particular policies in Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and Tuvalu. Kagan goes beyond the policies themselves to consider actual implementation of strategies on mobility in the context of climate change. In particular, she considers cases of planned relocation (including from the Carteret Islands and Manam Island in Papua New Guinea, and villages in Solomon Islands and Fiji facing

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coastal erosion), as well as voluntary migration by individuals, who are up-skilled to facilitate their ‘economic’ migration (particularly the case of Kiribati’s Australia Nursing Initiative). She concludes that a number of factors are critical to ensure rights-based mobility, particularly in the case of planned relocations, including adequate and consistent financing; secured access to land; and provided culturally appropriate compensation for both hosts and migrants, access to income opportunities, and health, educational, and other services.

These two papers offer important lessons as small islands in the Pacific, as well as potential receiving countries such as New Zealand and Australia, develop national and regional strategies for addressing migration and relocation in the context of climate change. Their starting points are the large number of existing initiatives underway in the region. The recommendations will help policymakers to hone these programs to make them more effective, especially in protecting the rights of those who will have little choice other than to relocate or migrate in search of new homes and livelihoods.
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The Future Role of Labor Mobility Mechanisms in the Context of Environmental Degradation: Building or Crumbling Adaptation Strategies?*

Elisa Fornale †

Abstract

Although a clearer picture is emerging of the diverse factors that link environmental drivers and human mobility, few studies so far have looked at the potential to harness existing migratory instruments within the settings affected by climate change. This paper explores how labor mobility mechanisms can either increase or compromise the adaptive capacity of environmentally vulnerable populations. To this end the analysis explores the emerging links between labor migration strategies and environmental changes in the Pacific. Diverse tools adopted at the bilateral level (for example, New Zealand’s Recognized Seasonal Employer scheme), or regional level (for example, temporary movement of natural persons [TMNP]) are evaluated as vehicles of the “migration-as-adaptation” narrative. This paper considers how the persisting challenges in using existing or emerging forms of labor mobility to address the effects of environmental crises can result in tools with only a limited ability to absorb the human rights implications for those who are marginalized. Acknowledging the limits of the current labor mobility framework for securing climate justice, the analysis invites readers to reconsider who has the task of framing normative responses to global environmental change.

Key Words: Environmental change, Adaptation, Labour mobility

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1. Introduction

Whereas the first generation of literature on environmental change–induced migration mainly addressed issues of causation and the need to identify new legal instruments, the starting point of this analysis is that changes in the environment (together with other factors) may influence human behavior and movement patterns (AGCCHM 2015). The relation between migration, either across international borders or within a state, and environmental change is by no means new in the history of humanity, and it has been characterized as a “natural human adaptation strategy” (McAdam and others 2016, 20).

The recent findings of the Nansen Initiative highlight that human mobility as a consequence of slow-onset environmental changes, such as rising sea level, will increase, even if though global estimates for these movements are not available (Nansen Initiative 2015; McAdam and others 2016).

The reality of the impacts of climate extremes such and its consequences—floods, droughts, increased salinization, desertification, and soil and coastal erosion (Castles 2002; Kaelin and Schrepfer 2012)—will affect rich and poor countries, although least-developed countries will be the most exposed to climate impacts because of their preexisting vulnerabilities. Hence, recognized impacts of climate change are becoming increasingly relevant for those nation states and populations that “are least responsible for the crisis to date” (Burkett 2009, 510). This has been identified as “the world’s biggest regressive tax” because vulnerable populations will have to pay for the “emissions-intensive behaviour of the rich” (Burkett 2009, 514).

In this scenario, climate change will “disproportionately affect human mobility” (AGCCHM 2016, 5) in developing countries, and the extent of their displacement will be directly linked to the ability of governments and communities to develop adaptation strategies (AGCCHM 2016).

In the past decade in the legal and political arena, the link between environmental change and human mobility has been advanced as a way to establish adaptation measures. The most significant attempt has occurred in the international arena. Paragraph 14(f) of the 2010 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Cancun Adaptation Framework attracted attention to the impacts of climate change on human mobility by enhancing the adoption of voluntary “measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change-induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels” (UNFCCC 2010, paragraph 14(f)).

The Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015, even if it avoided introducing binding responses, initiated the creation of a Task Force on Displacement to “develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change” (Conference of the Parties 2015, paragraph 50).² For the next two years, the UNFCCC process will explore and suggest measures with which developing countries can adapt to the impacts of climate

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² The COP requested the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism “to establish, according to its procedures and mandate, a task force to complement, draw upon the work of and involve, as appropriate, existing bodies and expert groups under the Convention including the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Convention, to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change” (COP, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, paragraph 50).
change. According to the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, to be effective, migration measures have to be conceived as flexible options that can offer environmental migrants diverse “entry points” (such as temporary, circular, or permanent stays) to best meet their needs and values (AGCCHM 2015). In fact, although it is a global problem, the impact of climate change on human mobility will not be uniform even within countries (Martin and Warner 2012).

Taking into account the current international framework, the “climate regime” lacks a comprehensive approach to generating mobility adaptation strategies, and requires links with existing migratory measures to be identified if it is to respond to increasing challenges, including moral and justice concerns, faced in vulnerable nations.

There is a growing body of literature that reconceptualizes human migration as a strategy of adaptation to environmental degradation (Stojanov and Duzi 2014; Gemenne and Blocher 2017). As argued by Mayer, if recognized as a potential adaptation strategy “migration is not forced, but voluntary; it is not reactive, but preventive; it is not precipitated, but anticipated,” and policies oriented to facilitate migration are apt to increase long-term resilience to environmental change (Mayer 2011, 6). This positive form of adaptation looks in particular at the potential role of labor mobility schemes, such as circular and temporary mobility, as vehicles for climate adaptation (Fornalé, Guelat and Piguet 2016).

The focus of the present analysis is on how small island states in the Pacific have progressively challenged the global climate change debate. As argued by Burkett (2011, 4) “with their relative lack of responsibility for climate change and their relative poverty, Pacific climate migrants and their home states have a special moral, and perhaps legal, claim on wealthier and higher-polluting industrialized countries.” Following from this, the present paper attempts to broaden the framework of its analysis to capture the potential to refer not only to migration-related measures but also to non-migration-related ones, such as trade measures. The potential role of trade liberalization and free trade agreements (FTAs) as an avenue for inducing paradigm shifts in the governance of migration is often neglected by immigration policy makers despite offering “in fact, a version of temporary labour migration” (Sassen 2005, 40).

These agreements, through their “strengthening of cross-border flows of capital, services and information play an increasing role in facilitating the cross-border circulation of professional workers,” even though FTAs make a clear distinction between the movement of natural persons and immigration mechanisms (Sassen 2005, 36). As argued by Panizzon (forthcoming), negotiators created this somewhat “artificial distinction between foreign and domestic employment, to avoid equating the service supply through natural persons to labour migration. Foreign employment forms part of ‘trade’ in services under the General Agreement on Trade and Services, while domestic employment is qualified as ‘labour migration’ remaining so far, under the sovereignty of national immigration authorities” (Panizzon, forthcoming). And yet it appears that trade ministries use FTAs as a way to fill skills gaps and labor shortages without falling under the constraints imposed by immigration law. On this basis, the paper discusses whether the progressive liberalization of temporary movement of natural persons can benefit nations affected by climate change and be used to attract human skills and resources.

This approach paves the way for including specific factors that are seldom examined in the current debate on environmental migration governance, such as economic internationalization and employer-driven schemes (Sassen 2007), both as potential drivers and intervening obstacles that affect individual migration
decisions (Martin 2012). In this vein, this paper seeks to make a contribution to the literature by answering the following questions:

- Can existing migratory measures be identified as adequate adaptation mechanisms?
- What are the achievements of the labor mobility schemes in the Pacific region and what are their limitations?

The next part of the paper provides a timely synthesis of literature available on this specific topic to assess how and to what extent the issue of environmental migration has entered legal and political processes at different levels. This contribution discusses the current adequacy and effectiveness of existing mechanisms for dealing with the climate crisis, including their ability to address justice concerns.

The subsequent part, drawing on practical examples from the small Pacific island countries, further develops the assessment of migratory measures by underlining how markets, in particular labor markets, constitute a key element in the transformations that occur in the context of environmental degradation, with human mobility at the regional level as the principal focus.

2. Identifying Existing Legal Mechanisms to Link Environmental Change, Human Mobility, and Adaptation

2.1 Migration as Adaptation

Cross-border mobility has been increasingly identified as a “legitimate” option for responding to slow-onset environmental degradation and for increasing the ability of migrants to survive by generating alternative income sources (Nansen Initiative 2015). As described by Gemenne and Blocher (2017), migration can be “part of the positive adaptation strategies” to anticipate future shocks and changes.

The term “adaptation” needs to be clarified in this specific context. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change defines adaptation as follows: “The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities” (IPCC 2014, 40). According to the IPCC “Migration can also be an effective adaptation strategy” (IPCC 2014, 20).

The emerging approach describes migration measures as “adaptation measures” allowing the progressive introduction of a positive understanding of human mobility. “Adaptation” implies measures that allow environmentally vulnerable and potentially environmentally vulnerable people to protect their lives from the impact of environmental degradation. This interpretation of migration as adaptation will no longer identify migrants as victims of environmental degradation but as “agents of self-help” (Methmann and Oels 2015, 59).

At the international and national levels, environmental migrants can enter host countries through existing admission categories (Martin and Warner 2012; Nansen Initiative 2015). Typically, labor market needs are a necessary prerequisite for being considered in a labour migration program. As noted by Dauvergne and Marsden (2014, 528), the labor market is “a fundamental determinant of the structure of migrant workers

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3 The scope of this paper is limited to measures and initiatives that address cross-border mobility.
programs.” Methmann and Oels (2015, 60) have argued that “the labour market—not a state actor—is proposed as the facility capable of offering a new livelihood for those affected by climate change.”

More recently, this evolution of the debate has been questioned by Bettini, Gioli, and Nash (2016), who draw attention to the risk of a complete dissociation of the emerging narrative of migration as adaptation from the debate on climate justice and inherent rights. They discuss the concrete risks that the increasing focus on the entrepreneurial aptitude of migrants as a crucial element to reinforce their resilience in the face of environmental transformation will imply delegating responsibility to the labor market and moving away from an approach based on rights and responsibilities. In this emerging scenario “rather than States being (formally) compelled to reduce inequalities because of their responsibility to intervene to repair a wrong and protect against its impact, post-interventionism means that people, including potential climate migrants, are not seen as exposed to structural changes, and instead are expected to be able to secure themselves against the odds they are facing” (Bettini, Nash, and Gioli 2016). The Foresight report states clearly that not all vulnerable individuals are able to engage in migratory movements and “migration (especially international migration) is selective by economic status” (Foresight 2011, 13).

In addressing the issue of environmentally induced migration, advancing a holistic approach that includes climate justice, human rights, and development is increasingly desirable to develop adequate measures to protect people affected by or at risk of being affected by the impact of climate changes (Mary Robinson Foundation 2016). The main challenge to identifying cross-border mobility as an adaptation strategy is how to link this option to binding obligations, such as bilateral or regional agreements, by incorporating moral and justice responsibilities to improve the lives of affected populations and allowing for full respect for the human rights of vulnerable populations.

The increasing use of the migration-as-adaptation framework allows greater flexibility of migratory measures adopted in different legal systems, but at the same time applying this register can deter developed countries from adequately engaging in a concrete effort to face justice and moral concerns.

### 2.2 Mapping Existing and Emerging Legal Frameworks to Regulate Cross-Border Movement

The issue of environmental degradation as a determinant of human mobility is part of various legal regimes that the international legal community has so far been treating with an unconnected logic, for example, international law related to displacement, human rights, environmental protection, and international development. These regimes are ill-equipped to deal with this phenomenon because of the lack of appropriate institutions on different normative levels (McAdam 2009). The contemporary “complex, layered and interlinked regime” (Burkett 2011, 6) risks creating a high degree of legal uncertainty and nonlinearity (Geddes 2012).

Environmental migration governance can be located within the broader context of multilevel migration governance to assess the extent to which legal frameworks affect and interact with migratory movements at different levels. On the same basis, the reason that environmental migration governance currently operates in a multilevel context is that the international consensus on migration issues lacks the strength and cohesion required to create and underpin a powerful global organization equipped with all the necessary resources. As Castles (2004, 870) argues, “the crisis of national migration policies is exacerbated
by the relative absence of global governance with regard to international migration, which contrasts with the development of global rules and institutions in other areas of economic and political relations."

It is possible to introduce different levels, namely, bilateral, regional, and multilateral in this context. The multilateral approach represents the thin level within which there are no international instruments dealing exclusively with environmental migration. Prieur (2016), together with other researchers from the University of Limoges, undertook the original effort to develop the first convention to protect the status of environmentally displaced persons. This convention aims to recognize the need to protect the human rights of affected populations, without differentiating between internal and international movements, and it represents a significant innovation by including the right of environmentally displaced individuals to “free choice of the region or receiving countries” (Prieur 2016, 7). Its objective is to guarantee the right of free choice of place and to establish the duty of states to receive the displaced, in the application of the principle of solidarity.

So far, this draft convention is the most elaborate effort to fill the widely recognized legal gap, but several scholars have raised specific concerns about whether a new universal treaty is necessary. In particular, a new treaty may not be the most appropriate solution for addressing the concerns of vulnerable communities for several reasons: first, from a pragmatic point of view, it seems increasingly difficult to gain the political will to negotiate a new binding international instrument; second, dealing with slow-onset movement is a specific challenge, as is agreeing to a kind of open-ended instrument that provides protection for those who will be displaced as a result of environmental degradation (McAdam 2012).

Multilateralism with respect to migration management continues to be predominantly informal, a system described by Betts (2011, 13) as “facilitative multilateralism”. Facilitative multilateralism is exemplified by the recently concluded Nansen Initiative, an intergovernmental process, and the newly launched follow-up Platform on Displacement. These intergovernmental processes represent one of the most promising attempts to address cross-border environmental migration and offer a venue for an open cooperation approach (Gemenne and Brucker 2015).

While keeping possible the option for a new multilateral instrument covering the nexus between international migration and environmental vulnerability as a “backstop rather than a top priority” (Wyman 2013, 338), regional economic migration opportunities or bilateral schemes could help affected countries (Nansen Initiative 2015). Regionalism reflects the increasing number of intra-regional mobility regimes adopted—in Europe, South America, and West Africa—and it is becoming increasingly expedient to try to understand how these schemes could potentially absorb environmental migration (Blocher, Gharbaoui, and Vigil 2015). In this respect, Popp (2013–2014, 16) notes that “regional policy and cooperation on environmental migration have often remained at the level of informal, non-binding dialogue (such those held in the context of RCPs [Regional Consultative Processes]), have in some instances translated into ‘soft’ regional policy (including in broader policy frameworks advanced by more formalized regional institutions and regional economic communities), and in a few cases have acquired legal force (the main example being the Kampala Convention).”

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4 The draft of this convention is available at www.cidce.org.
Given the absence of a global regime, a bilateral approach offers states the advantage of fostering “multilateral coordination leading to common policies and practices” (Panizzon, forthcoming). As argued by Panizzon, such approaches take some kind of intermediary position, “they do not go so far as regional integration does to harmonize issue areas, but they go beyond immigration domestic law, engaging the sending country into cooperation, even if the sending country has not much leverage to influence the outcome” (Panizzon, forthcoming).

In this context, scholars have advanced the use of bilateral schemes to increase the resilience of vulnerable communities and to facilitate their adaptation to a changing environment. In particular, the Colombia Temporary and Circular Labour Migration plan has been cited by the International Organization for Migration as an example of how a migration model can be used by Colombians facing recurring environmental disasters to temporarily migrate overseas (IOM 2009a; Ionesco, Mokhnacheva, and Gemenne 2016). Launched in 2000 by the Unió de Pagesos and the Fundació de Pagesos Solidaris (IOM 2009b), this program was extended to vulnerable communities affected by natural changes to provide them an alternative by offering temporary work in Spain, through public and private cofunding and international cooperation (IOM 2009a). As described by de Moor (2011, 4), “through this innovative migration model, Colombians facing recurring natural disasters are offered a livelihood alternative through temporary work abroad, while affected regions can recuperate.” Implementation of this program has been facilitated by the existence of a solid bilateral legal framework allowing temporary labor mobility of low-skilled migrants between Spain and Colombia, and its replication in other countries may be supported if the legal and institutional conditions are in place (de Moor 2011).

At domestic level, the mechanisms in place are showing a tendency to develop without a coherent logic, as a reactive framework, typically framed as “temporary humanitarian assistance” or “protection responses” (McAdam 2009). For instance, states have identified temporary protection measures (as in the case of Finland and the United States) that allow foreign nationals who are “temporarily unable to safely return to their home country because of ongoing armed conflict, an environmental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary conditions” to remain (Martin and Warner 2012).

In line with this dynamic, after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the government of Brazil began developing a new legislative measure to include “calamities” as one of the reasons for granting humanitarian visas (Piacentini 2015; Nansen Initiative 2015).

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5 In 2007, 162 women had been included in specific training activities to strengthen their abilities as agents of development (IOM 2009b).
6 In Finland, the section 88a (Humanitarian Protection) of the Aliens Act (as amended by Act. N. 323/2009) states that “an alien residing in Finland is issued a residence permit on the basis of humanitarian protection if there are no grounds under section 87 or 88 for granting asylum or providing subsidiary protection, but he or she cannot return to his or her country of origin or country of former habitual residence as a result of an environmental catastrophe or a bad security situation which may be due to an international or internal armed conflict or a poor human rights situation.”
8 8 U.S. Code § 1254a - Temporary protected status, section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
9 See Articles 33 and 24 of the draft law on migration and promotion of migrants’ rights.
This short analysis shows how complex this area is, because, as argued by Warner (2010, 412), “both established modes of governance and new modes of governance are needed to improve society’s ability to manage environmental-induced migration. This challenges the notion of what needs to be controlled and what needs to be governed flexibly.” The main challenge is to devise flexible measures that will not facilitate a shift of responsibility from the sovereign states to the labor market, which would carry the risks of depriving cross-border migrants of their rights (Betts 2015b). The next section seeks to move the debate in this direction.

3. The Evolution of Mobility Strategies in the Pacific Region and Their Potential to Address the Environmental Crisis

The Pacific region has gained increasing attention in the media, academic research, and climate change debates because of its environmental vulnerability to the physical impacts of the rise in sea level and the direct negative consequences for human mobility either as temporary or permanent flows (Fornalé, Guelat, and Piguet 2016; Storr 2016). Because of their low-lying elevation, these states face the “real prospect” (McAdam et al. 2016) of environmental changes, but, as argued by Gesing, Herbeck, and Klepp (2014, 54), they can be also “the pioneer of innovative and maybe more emancipatory adaptation concepts and practices.”

Migration has had a relevant role throughout the history of the Pacific region. This region was an “open-access region” without national borders and having full freedom of movement, and only the arrival of colonial powers introduced formal restrictions to the movement of inhabitants of the island states (Gesing, Herbeck, and Klepp 2014, 55).

Contemporary cross-border migration patterns are regulated by a multiplicity of mobility schemes that offer diverse opportunities for work, either temporary or long term, and their potential to become adaptive responses to natural disasters is recognized by the Pacific islands countries. McAdam (2016, 283) summed up the situation as follows: “although the media has often portrayed this as requiring the mass relocation of whole populations, it is more likely that people will move gradually, and through regular migration channels where possible.”

Even if the current legal framework does not include any migratory instrument specifically aimed at facilitating “cross-border movement in response to natural disasters or in anticipation of future ones linked to climate change” (Burson and Bedford 2016, 1), the improvement of migration management has been progressively addressed by national migration policies, in particular to increase labor migration channels, as the most concrete option for adapting to environmental changes in particular at the regional level (ILO 2015a, 2015b).

The potential for labor mobility schemes to increase access to decent work opportunities is not new to the Pacific region, and the need to rely on migration as an adaptation strategy to face the risk of decreasing domestic employment opportunities as a direct impact of climate change has been recently emphasized in the Kiribati and Tuvalu National Labour Migration Policy Reports (ILO 2015a, 2015b).

The government of Kiribati recognizes “the important role of international labour migration in addressing a deficit of employment opportunities on our islands, and promoting economic and social development. It is also a critical component in the concept of Migration with Dignity, which articulates the importance
of training I-Kiribati to take up skilled labour migration opportunities in response to climate change threats to livelihoods at home” (ILO 2015a, 2). Also, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment and Labour for Tuvalu recalled how “the importance of labour migration as an option for our people is likely to increase further still as climate change continues to batter at our shore and wreak havoc on rain patterns, groundwater and ocean, impacting on subsistence agriculture and other livelihoods options” (ILO 2015b, iii).

This unilateral engagement is confirmed by the recently published Compendium of Legislation and Institutional Arrangements for Labour Migration in the Pacific Island Countries (Bedford, Burson, and Bedford 2015), which identifies different legal frameworks for increasing opportunities to move through employment, as a concrete way for migrants to sustain themselves and to generate remittances to be used for in situ adaptation (Burson and Bedford 2016). In fact, in parallel to the need to increase migration opportunities, national governments recognize the need to sustain remittances flows by increasing access for their populations to vocational training (ILO 2015b; Cater, 2017).

The entry point of this working paper into the current debate is based on two different kinds of labor mobility schemes: temporary measures, with a focus on government-organized initiatives to address specific shortages in the labor market, and FTAs in the Pacific region.

### 3.1 Temporary Labor Mobility Initiatives and Challenges for Environmentally Induced Mobility

Seasonal and temporary mobility schemes are adopted as measures for promoting economic development and increasing labor mobility in the Pacific region. These schemes are conceived as measures mainly to support businesses in the destination countries, to employ workers from abroad, and to satisfy seasonal demand. To this end, the destination-country governments have had a high degree of discretion to cap, or even exclude, the recruitment of specific categories of migrant workers.

The best-known temporary mobility schemes are those of New Zealand and Australia. Up to now, these schemes have offered preferential immigration conditions for the recruitment of low-skilled migrants from the Pacific region (Wyman 2013).

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10 See the literature review conducted by Underhill-Sem and Marsters (2017).

11 In 2007, New Zealand started the Recognized Seasonal Employer Program (RSE) that allowed the temporary entry of up to 8,000 persons annually to work in seasonal agriculture jobs for 7 months over an 11-month period. According to Underhill-Sem and Marsters (2017, 12), 52,265,00 workers have participated in this scheme. In addition, the World Bank states that “more than half of workers returned at least once, and 23 percent of workers have participated in all seasons” (World Bank 2014, 21). Workers participating in the scheme earn approximately $NZ 12,000 in 6 months, more than the income of those not participating in the scheme (for instance, $NZ 1,400 in Tonga and $NZ 2,500 in Vanuatu) (World Bank 2014, 21).

12 On July 1, 2012, Australia introduced the Seasonal Worker Program (SWP) for low-skilled workers in the horticultural sector for a period of 14 weeks to six months. This scheme was adopted after the expiry of the Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS), introduced in 2008. The number of workers recruited during the PSWPS was small. Only 1,623 workers were employed, almost 65 percent of the total cap, which was set at 2,500 (Doyle and Howes 2015).

13 In addition, since 2011, also the United States has provided a range of entry measures for workers from selected small Pacific islands to fill temporary or seasonal jobs. Two types of visas (H-2A for agricultural workers and H-2B for non-agricultural workers) are available for the citizens of designated Pacific island states (Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu). The migrant workers who are selected can be employed
For these schemes to be considered as potentially realistic options in the context of environmental degradation, some specific challenges need to be addressed. In fact, scholars have highlighted that the problems with and limited implementation of these schemes can restrict their potential role as voluntary adaptive strategies.

Criteria for eligibility under these schemes vary widely, and the number of workers engaged remains small. These schemes cover specific sectors: New Zealand’s RSE admits workers to the orchards and vineyards sector, and pilot projects have been launched in the construction and fisheries sectors (OCTA; 2016, 75); Australia’s SWP has been extended to the entire agriculture sector, and to the tourism and accommodation sectors in specific locations (OCTA, 2016, 75).

Eligibility to participate in New Zealand’s RSE is available for selected Pacific countries. The share of workers from the Pacific recruited under this scheme increased from 74 percent in 2009–10 to 85 percent in 2014–15 (Curtain et al. 2016).

Participation in Australia’s SWP still raises concerns. In 2012–13, 2,000 places were offered of which only 1,473 were filled, and in 2013–14 the number of workers recruited was 2,014 against a cap of 2,500 (Doyle and Howes 2015).

A White Paper was adopted by the government of Australia (Commonwealth of Australia 2015). This instrument builds on the government’s announced reforms to expand Australia’s SWP. The White Paper also proposes the establishment of a five-year pilot program for 250 workers from Pacific microstates (in particular, Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu (about 50 per year) (Commonwealth of Australia 2015). As stated by Sophia Kagan of the International Labour Organization and the 2011 Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, these three countries need special treatment in relation to labor mobility because the unemployment challenges they face are becoming increasingly urgent owing to climate change (Kagan 2015). This five-year pilot program will introduce a multiyear work visa to work in non-seasonal industries and occupations in Northern Australia (Cater, 2017).

Several challenges have been identified with respect to effective participation in these seasonal schemes:

First, as highlighted by the Pacific islands’ Chief Trade Negotiator, Dr. Edwini Kessie, the Pacific islands made specific demands to extend these schemes to other occupations (for example, care of the elderly, trade occupations, mining, seafaring, tourism). New Zealand has indicated that its RSE is resource-

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intensive and costly and that it would not be easy to extend it to other sectors. However, the government of Australia has positively addressed this concern with the adoption of the White Paper mentioned above, which will also expand the scheme to other sectors, not only horticultural agriculture, but the broader agriculture sector for the whole country, the accommodation sector in selected locations, and the tourism industry in Northern Australia. As described in the White Paper, “the programme will strengthen Australian’s foreign policy objectives in the Pacific, including by encouraging enduring links with the region. The programme will also support Pacific microstates’ interests in expanding employment opportunities for their citizens, and provide an opportunity for individuals to gain skills and experience not available in their home countries” (Commonwealth of Australia 2015, 114). Following from this, on May 6, 2016, a tourism pilot scheme under the SWP, specifically for Northern Australia, was started.

Second, according to Burson and Bedford (2013, 42), employers are the key stakeholders in these schemes as “admission gatekeepers.” A potential Pacific worker does not have the opportunity to apply independently under any of these schemes, and as suggested by Burson it could be useful to factor the “vulnerability to natural disasters” into the selection process to raise awareness of these circumstances among employers (McKenzie, Garcia Martinez, and Winters 2008). This would help overcome the increasing difficulties faced by citizens of specific small islands, such as Kiribati or Tuvalu, in entering into contracts with employers and being selected (ILO 2014). As recognized by the government of Tuvalu there is a complete “lack of familiarity of employers with Tuvaluan workers,” which makes their effective participation increasingly difficult. The same constraint has been acknowledged by the government of Kiribati (ILO 2015a, 2015b).

Third, several financial barriers (for example, housing, remittances costs) persist. For example, the high costs of transportation from specific islands such as Tuvalu or Kiribati affect the degree to which their citizens could fully benefit from these schemes (ILO 2015a, 2015b). And employers are increasingly reluctant “to contribute to airfares for workers from such remote countries” (Kagan 2015).

Finally, another particular concern is the protection of migrant workers; in fact, the risk of recruitment malpractice has been linked with the scarce capacity for regulating recruitment practices in origin countries. Origin countries have to recognize as key priorities the need for protection of all migrant workers abroad and their access to decent work, and therefore must ensure a strong domestic regulatory framework in line with international standards. The governments of Tuvalu and Kiribati are devoting significant attention to these issues. For instance, the government of Tuvalu clearly acknowledges as key areas for normative intervention the safe recruitment of migrant workers; their support abroad by strengthened consular liaison services; and their predeparture preparation to ensure their access to all necessary information to see that their rights are respected, in particular during their stay as seasonal workers in New Zealand and Australia (ILO 2015b).

What emerges is the impression that environmentally vulnerable people in the Pacific region encounter persisting challenges when trying to gain access to international labor migration opportunities and to secure job opportunities. The current temporary labor mobility regime does not appear to be a completely suitable tool for responding to the environmental crisis. Scholars increasingly point out the need for governments to consider introducing and expanding quotas for workers from the Pacific islands, to provide opportunities to shift from temporary to permanent residency, and to advance a new mobility
regime with the establishment of an open access agreement with Australia and New Zealand (Kagan 2015; Curtain et al., 2016).

Curtain et al. (2016) perceptively remarked how the present environmental crisis provides “a new moral imperative” for helping the Pacific governments to identify new mobility opportunities abroad. “This is especially so given the contribution developed countries around the Pacific Rim have made to greenhouse gases and the disproportionate effects experienced by the Pacific Islands countries” (Curtain et al. 2016, 30).

3.2 Trade Policies and the Impact on Human Mobility

The brief analysis of temporary mobility schemes above highlights how destination countries may have little incentive beyond their labor markets’ needs to cooperate with countries of origin. Migrant workers often gain access to the labor market through organized recruitment mechanisms within the frameworks of government-supported initiatives by employers. The bargaining power of the countries of origin is very limited and they generally have little option but to accept whatever they are offered by the destination countries. Additional labor mobility opportunities that could make more significant contributions to meeting the combined needs in the Pacific region and those of the labor market in the destination countries need to be explored (Fornalé, Guelat, and Piguet 2016).

For this reason, the paper benefits from links with issues in areas that are not directly related to migration including: education, development, investment, and trade. The hierarchical level at which specific issue areas, particularly investment and trade, are regulated is often not the same as the level at which migration regulation occurs.17

Even if no links have been made between labor mobility and environmental degradation, such mobility schemes may represent a first step in the response to environmentally-induced mobility in the Pacific region, eventually broadening their scope to cover intraregional mobility.

Since 1981, Pacific countries have been involved in trade negotiations at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels.18 More recently the issue of labor mobility has gained prominence in these negotiations. In fact, some countries within the Pacific are trying to increase their citizens’ mobility options by including a specific chapter on “temporary movement of natural persons” in a variety of trade agreements under negotiation.

The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG)19 was established to promote intra-MSG trade and to strengthen cooperation among MSG member states. Within this framework they adopted the Skills Movement

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17 Such asymmetries explain the trend toward what Panizzon (forthcoming) identifies as the “tradeification” of migration, in her view “the advantage of tradeification is that the issue linkage between migration and trade takes place in one single agreement at one single layer of governance, rather than cutting across layers.”

18 In 1981 the Pacific countries (Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Niue) concluded a regional trade agreement with Australia and New Zealand, the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryGroupingDetails/1#ialInnerMenu, last visited March 2017).

19 The Melanesian Spearhead Group originated in 1986 among Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (at the informal meeting also a a representative of the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front (*FLNKS) was present), and in 1988, they adopted the Agreed Principles of Cooperation among Independent States of Melanesia. Today,
Scheme (SMS) Memorandum of Understanding in 2012, which covers labor mobility of skilled workers. This scheme can be amended between the SMS parties at any time and is to be reviewed every three years from the date of its signing.

Among the main objectives of the SMS Scheme, as described by the Office of the Chief Trade Adviser (OCTA) are to

- Formalize the movement of MSG nationals that is already occurring;
- Create a precedent for future labor mobility initiatives in the region;
- Meet skills shortages and utilize surplus labor in the MSG countries.

This instrument allows 400 skilled workers per country to enter into another member’s territory, usually for three years. It is based on job offers and employment contracts. The scheme provides a specific template to be used for the employment contract, including specific clauses for ensuring the protection of migrant workers’ rights and the observance of the principle of non-discrimination.

This initiative has been recognized as the first intraregional mobility scheme (ACP 2013). Although its relevance in the region has been defined as more symbolic than substantive because of its low impact, it can be used as a frame of reference to improve the architecture of labor mobility at an interregional level and to meet skills shortages. In August 2011, the Pacific Forum Island Countries started developing the Temporary Movement of Natural Persons (TMNP) scheme in the framework of the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) to increase labor movement and skills transfer in the region as a key part of the trade in services arrangement (PIDC 2010). The proposed TMNP scheme covers the temporary mobility of professional workers (Tier 1), as well as semi-skilled and trade professional workers (Tier 2) subject to a quota mechanism with temporary employment for up to three years. Countries involved in the negotiations have at their disposal labor market assessments prepared by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat identifying the specific skilled and semi-skilled professions for which opportunities may exist in both destination and origin countries.

According to the secretariat, this regulatory framework has the potential to develop South-South labor mobility and to stimulate skills transfer and development in the region by addressing critical regional labor shortages.

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20 For instance, in 2013 the following skills shortages priorities were identified: nurses, doctors, urban and regional planners, engineers, seafarers, surveyors, and ship repairers for Fiji; engineers, financial professionals, architects, hospitality and health professionals, aviation, and mining for Solomon Islands; health and teaching professionals, business, legal and administration professionals, science and engineering professionals for Vanuatu; service and production managers, agriculture, fishing, mining, construction, hospitality managers, health and teaching professionals, marine biologists, environmental scientists, and tradesmen for Papua New Guinea (see for additional details http://www.msgsec.info/images/PDF/msgsmsinformationsheet_annexure%201.pdf).

21 The main provisions of the memorandum of understanding include the following: clause 9.11 calls for the observance of the principle of non-discrimination; clauses 12.1–2 require each party to apply international human rights and labor protection standards. See ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013, 24.

22 The drafting framework of the PICTA Trade in Services (TIS) Protocol was endorsed in 2012.

23 Tier 1 covers professionals who have a bachelor’s degree and appropriate working experience, and Tier 2 covers semi-skilled professionals who have a diploma or certificate (ACP 2013).

24 Except Niue and Cook Islands.
market shortages and developing the labor-exporting potential of Pacific islands states. In particular, special attention will be paid to removing barriers that inhibit the circular movement of migrant workers and to exploring labor market needs so as to increase the opportunities available for workers (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2014; VituLink Consultancy and ECORM International, 2012).

Migration patterns will be affected both by the use of this agreement to reduce barriers to intra-regional mobility and by turning vulnerable populations into agents of development in their area of origin (ACP 2013). If such an instrument is implemented, it could assist in reducing vulnerability and enhancing the adaptive capacity of those faced with environmental degradation.

Nevertheless, the TMNP scheme does not provide a comprehensive response to the protection gaps opened up by environmentally induced migration (ACP 2013). First, it requires both the country of origin and the country of destination to play active roles, and in some cases countries of origin lack adequate domestic provisions to deal with mobility of skilled labor (Fornalé et al., 2016). Second, the TMNP scheme could be developed to cover social security issues, but this would require efforts to be made at the bilateral level to design and put into practice acceptable social security systems.

Finally, and of great relevance, was the negotiation process for the adoption of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER Plus) between the Pacific countries and Australia and New Zealand, where labor mobility was identified as a key priority (OCTA, 2016, 69). During the negotiation process it was stated that “due to the economic differences between the parties and the fact that FICs [Forum Island Countries] stood to gain very little, if at all, from their liberalization commitments in trade in goods, services and investment, PACER Plus had to contain substantive commitments on labour mobility and development assistance” (OCTA 2014, 35). However, what is being contemplated are non-binding commitments to be contained in an arrangement as opposed to an agreement (OCTA, 2016, 70). As noted by the OCTA, including commitments on labor mobility in the PACER Plus negotiations could create a precedent that would encourage other countries, such as China, India, and Indonesia, to demand similar treatment in their negotiations with Australia and New Zealand.

Early discussions under the PACER Plus framework were very ambitious. The Pacific countries aimed at having an agreement on labor mobility that would facilitate the entry and employment of all categories of labor—unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled—among the parties. There were also discussions on a PACER Plus travel card and the harmonization of immigration procedures, but these proposals appear to have been dropped. As recognized by OCTA (2014), the main attraction for the PICs Pacific countries was that the “treaty-level obligation” on Australia and New Zealand will provide stronger assurance of the

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permanence of these agreements (Oxfam, 2009). For this reason, other alternatives have been discussed, including having a side agreement on labor mobility (OCTA, 2014).

The debate was then more oriented toward preserving Australia’s and New Zealand’s seasonal workers’ programs for unskilled workers and pursuing greater commitments on semi-skilled and skilled occupations within the framework of the chapter on TMNP.27 Australia and New Zealand have also undertaken enhancements of their technical assistance programs to assist the small island states to strengthen their supply capacities.

It would appear unlikely that the dual approach being pursued by the Pacific countries28 in the PACER Plus negotiations will result in a fundamental change of the policies of the host countries. In particular, the chapter on TMNP covers the temporary mobility of persons according to the Schedule of commitments of the member states which identify the category of workers involved (see Annex 8-A)29.

4. Conclusion

Environmentally induced migration suffers the same global action problems encountered in other areas of migration governance, specifically the lack of global institutions and instruments able to intervene and to adopt specific rules in this area. The Task Force on Displacement, created in 2015, has the opportunity to review existing mechanisms and to provide clarity within the UNFCCC process. Even if this framework does not address the formulation of migratory measures at the national level, this international arena could become a valuable vehicle for attracting “creative” attention and for navigating the contemporary debate through the complex and uncoordinated legal landscape.

In the absence of a specific legal framework, this paper has tried to extend the current debate and to highlight some of the normative implications of the ongoing processes mentioned above, with a specific focus on their translation into migration policies. Nevertheless, legal analysis and knowledge of the potential for linking migration, trade, and development in response to slow-onset events is still scarce.

Focusing on the current experiences of small island states, the paper highlights the potential to refer to existing migratory measures as an emerging legal framework for developing appropriate structures for environmental migration governance. The analysis focuses on identifying the current architecture of migration programs to determine whether the existing migratory channels and policies, even if not specifically structured to deal with environmental migration, can be expanded and improved to accommodate such migration. The analysis attempts to show the role played by labor markets, with a focus on the employment relationship and the role of states in “constructing the labor market” through various regulatory measures.

28 The Pacific countries involved in the negotiations were Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
What is emerging is that governments think in terms of joint processes, rather than a strict exercise of state sovereignty, as an intermediate step toward expanding human mobility and toward including the multiple actors (for example, employers, diaspora networks, and migrants) that have a relevant role in the contemporary migration-environment nexus. In this scenario, mechanisms for the formal recruitment of migrant workers, such as temporary mobility schemes, can also function as “more generalized migration channels” (Sassen 2007, 71).

Temporary admission schemes would increase climate adaptation efforts, but they need to be expanded to potentially increase available opportunities. Their potential to deal with environmental degradation and migration is directly linked to the opportunity to shift from temporary to permanent mobility, and to establish an open access mobility regime with Australia and New Zealand. In addition, pursuit of different migratory strategies seems increasingly relevant to allow both skilled and unskilled migrants to participate in the workforce of the destination countries. In particular, as argued by Kagan (2015), many environmental migrants from small island states lack the training to migrate as skilled labor.

Situating environmentally induced migration within the broader scenario of global migration governance may call into question the way in which migration schemes are designed and implemented at all levels to ensure protection of the human rights of climate-vulnerable populations. The paper suggests building or retooling existing migratory mechanisms in such a way as to secure protection and assistance and to reorient the political choices and related priorities to ensure that the needs and concerns of affected populations make it onto the current international agenda, which is mainly in line with the interests of affluent countries.
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Institutional Frameworks for Addressing Human Mobility in the Context of Environmental Change in the Pacific*

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Abstract
This paper provides a critical review of how migration as a method of adaptation to disasters and environmental change, including the impacts of climate change, is integrated into national institutional frameworks in the Pacific. The paper considers how different types of mobility—including planned relocation and “individual” migration by persons and households in the Pacific—have been addressed in the academic literature. The paper reviews references to mobility in national frameworks through a mapping of national policy documents, including climate change policies and legislation (such as national adaptation plans, national action plans covering disaster risk management or climate change adaptation, and climate change policies and legislation). An analysis of these policies shows that while some create a process for identifying communities that are particularly vulnerable to displacement, only a small number reference migration and planned relocation as potential strategies for the adaptation of individuals and communities. The paper considers implementation of three instruments that articulate different aspects of mobility in relation to environmental change: the Solomon Islands Climate Change Policy, Kiribati’s Joint Implementation Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management, and the Tuvalu National Strategic Action Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management. The paper goes on to consider recent projects and interventions relating to relocation or migration influenced by environmental change, then analyzes some of the lessons learned that can be applied to future policy making and implementation in the region. The paper concludes with suggestions on how countries can corral funding and technical expertise to ensure that future migration and planned relocation initiatives are undertaken in a way that complies with principles of good practice.

Key words: Migration, Adaptation, Climate change, Pacific, Relocation, Disaster risk reduction

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1. Introduction

Managing internal and international migration in the context of environmental change is one of the most pressing issues facing Pacific Island countries. While the risk of displacement from atoll countries has raised well-publicized issues of forced international relocation and threats to the continued self-determination of these countries (for example, McAdam 2011; Kiribati Government, n.d.; Wyett 2015), many other countries in the Pacific are struggling to deal with well-managed relocation of communities within state boundaries (Haines and McGuire 2014; IOM 2015). Recent planned relocations—from the inhabitants of the Carteret Islands in Papua New Guinea, to more recent movement of the residents of the village of Vunidogoloa in Fiji, and the planned movement of Choiseul township in the Solomon Islands—underscore the relevance of migration and relocation of people and communities in the Pacific.

In Fiji, senior government officials estimate that more than 600 villages across the country have been identified as threatened by rising sea levels and more than 40 settlements are expected to be relocated within the next 10 years (Piazza 2014). Similarly, people in Tarawa (the capital of Kiribati) and Funafuti (the capital of Tuvalu) are likely to become threatened with displacement and will need options for mobility. The issue of mobility and environmental change has also been tackled at a regional level through such forums as the Nansen Initiative Regional Consultation (on cross-border displacement) in 2013 (Nansen Initiative 2013), a follow-up workshop for civil society (Nansen Initiative 2014), and the Migrating with Dignity Regional Conference in Tarawa in 2015.

The increasing attention paid to human mobility in the context of “disasters and environmental change”—defined in this paper as disasters and the impacts of environmental change including the effects of climate change (Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, and UNHCR 2015)—makes a review of policies and implementation timely (Martin 2015), particularly because it is not always clear that political dialogue in this area makes its way into national policies, legislation, and strategies, and where it does, how mobility is conceptualized. In particular, it is important to review whether countries are making plans for the medium- and long-term impacts of environmental change on mobility, such as permanent displacement, particularly from some coastal areas and atolls, or for improving the skills of vulnerable populations to enable at least some of them to meet the immigration requirements of other countries in which they could settle.

Discussion of mobility is not new in the Pacific and has been noted in the context of urbanization and job creation at both the national and regional levels, particularly through the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus negotiations on trade between Pacific Island countries and their larger neighbors Australia and New Zealand. How this discussion of migration and mobility fits within the newer focus of migration and environmental change is yet again something that needs to be explored.

The analysis in this paper is based on multiple sources, including the following:

- A literature review of national policy documents related to climate change adaptation and disaster risk management across 15 Pacific Island countries and territories
- Secondary literature consisting of academic articles, reports, and where necessary, data from recent population censuses and national surveys in Pacific Island countries
The paper also draws on experience from the European Union–funded project to Strengthen the Capacity of Pacific Island Countries to Manage the Impacts of Climate Change on Migration, implemented by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific, with collaboration from the UN Development Programme. The author was involved in this project.

2. Analysis of Literature on Human Mobility in the Context of Disasters and Environmental Change in the Pacific

Adaptation measures in the context of climate change generally refer to measures that enable communities to cope with, and where possible benefit from, the effects of global warming. While many of these measures are implemented in situ to enable people to remain where they are (particularly through physical infrastructure such as the building of sea walls, or other types of disaster risk reduction), the potent mix of population growth and ongoing (or mounting) environmental impact may lead to the erosion of the ability of these adaptation measures to ensure access to land and livelihoods for all residents. This lack of access, in turn, may put pressure on some people (who have contacts and ability) to migrate.

2.1 Definitions

In some cases, movement within or across borders may be necessary, as a group or at an individual or household level. In the analysis of migration, differing definitions of such movement proliferate. At the broadest level, the term “human mobility” is generally conceptualized to include “displacement,” “migration,” and “planned relocation” (UNHCR et al. 2015). The following definitions are used in this paper:

- **“Displacement”** is defined as the forced movement of people, both within and outside of state boundaries, in the context of disaster, environmental change, or both.
- **“Migration”** is defined as the voluntary movement of individuals and households, both within and outside of state boundaries (and in the case of the latter, both regular and irregular migration), that is not in the context of a planned relocation.
- **“Planned relocation”** is defined as “a planned process in which persons or groups of persons move or are assisted to move away from their homes or places of temporary residence, are settled in a new location, and provided with the conditions for rebuilding their lives.” This definition is taken from the “Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocation” (Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, and UNHCR 2015) and is limited to relocations carried out under the authority of the state that takes place within national borders for the purpose of protecting people from risks and impacts related to disasters and environmental change, including the effects of climate change.¹

Although commonly used in other papers, the term “resettlement” is not used in this paper to avoid confusion with other strands of social science literature, including resettlement of persons in the context

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¹ Planned relocation in this context may be carried out at the individual, household, or community levels, and may occur both before and after disaster or environmental change (or a combination of disaster and environmental change).
of development projects (for example, the World Bank’s *Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement* to the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*), and in international refugee law.²

### 2.2 Issues of Displacement, Migration, and Planned Relocation in the Pacific

The Pacific region comprises 22 countries and territories, the majority of which are developing small island countries.³ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 2012 report on extreme events highlighted the danger that small island countries face as a result of climate change, noting that “the small land area and often low elevation of small island states makes them particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels and impacts such as inundation, shoreline change and saltwater intrusion into underground aquifers” (IPCC 2012, 185). Papua New Guinea—the Pacific’s most populated and largest country—also faces a number of natural hazards thought to be exacerbated by climate change, including both slow-onset processes such as drought, frost, salinization, coastal erosion, and sea-level rise, and rapid-onset events including cyclones, earthquakes, flooding, landslides, tsunamis, and storm surges (IOM 2015).

Displacement and relocation of populations have been recurring issues throughout the Pacific region’s history because of both natural hazards and environmental degradation caused by mining. Temporary displacement in the wake of natural hazards is common, though it has not been systematically researched and recorded (IDMC 2013). Instead, research on mobility and environmental change has more commonly focused on relocation, both within national boundaries and the rare cases of cross-border movement. Analysis of internal relocation has largely been limited to Papua New Guinea, where the planned relocations of the Carteret Islanders, displaced by overpopulation and sea-level rise (and sometimes erroneously referred to as the world’s first climate refugees), and the Manam Islanders, displaced by volcanic eruptions, have been given particular prominence (IOM 2015). Analysis of cross-border relocations has focused on four historical situations: the relocation of Banabans (now Kiribati) from Ocean Island to Rabi, Fiji; the relocation of some Vaitupuans (Tuvaluans) to Kioa, Fiji; the relocation of some Gilbertese (now Kiribati) to the Solomon Islands; and the proposed (but rejected) relocation of Nauruans to Australia (McAdam 2014).

Another related branch of the academic literature has increasingly focused on the concept that individual or household migration can be a way of adapting to climate change. Under the term “migration as adaptation,” a burgeoning body of literature has examined how household decisions to migrate (whether as a household, or sending one household member) could be perceived as a “rational component of creative adaptation to environmental risk” and form part of an adaptation response to climate change impacts on natural resource conditions and environmental hazards (Bardsley and Hugo 2010, 238). Rather than focusing on community relocation, this literature stream has looked at decision making at a household level, particularly in the context of slow-onset environmental change, to test the hypothesis

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² This is the approach used by Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, and UNHCR 2015. Other authors have referred to resettlement as the establishment of a community in a new location including reconstruction of houses and community buildings and the restoration of livelihoods, while distinguishing this from the mere movement of people encapsulated in the term relocation (Edwards 2013).

³ The countries and territories of the Pacific are American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna.
that sending an individual to seek work benefits the household by reducing the number of people to support, diversifying income through remittances, and establishing a channel through which more family members can migrate in the future (Black et al. 2011; McLeman and Smit 2006; McLeman and Hunter 2010; Mortreux and Barnett 2009). At a community level, this form of migration can also have benefits by reducing the risk of overpopulation, particularly if environmental change has a negative impact on limited resources.

3. Current Institutional Frameworks Relating to Human Mobility in the Pacific

The increasing impacts of disasters and environmental change on Pacific Island countries has led to a plethora of policy documents on various aspects of disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. To understand how human mobility features in these complex frameworks, this section undertakes a mapping across 15 countries and territories in the Pacific, outlining the ways in which human mobility is countenanced and the specific implementation mechanisms set out. To place this discussion in the context of other migration-related policies and legislation, the section first outlines the broader context of migration at a national policy level.

3.1 Overview of Policies Dealing with Mobility in the Pacific

Human mobility has a variety of implications in different policy contexts: immigration of foreigners can affect the domestic labor market; urbanization can lead to economic development but also strain housing and public service provision; emigration of citizens can lead to remittances and jobs but also brain drain. This subsection briefly presents the overall landscape of policies that deal with migration of people both within and outside a country (emigration), before homing in on policies that deal specifically with environmental change.

Mobility in the context of urbanization is an important policy priority in the Pacific, one that has growing significance. In 2003 no Pacific Island country had an urbanization policy, yet a decade later each of five countries had developed such a policy (Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, and the Solomon Islands). Supported by UN-Habitat, the policies have focused on minimizing such negative impacts of urbanization as strain on infrastructure, increased security concerns, and rising urban poverty (UN-Habitat 2015). Urbanization has also been addressed from a labor market perspective through country documents called Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCPs), which are developed by national governments (Departments of Labor), employers, and union representatives and supported by the International Labour Organization. There are six DWCPs across the region, five of which mention rural-urban migration (Deshingkar, Sward, and Estruch-Puertas 2012). In each case, this migration is largely referenced as a problem that needs to be better managed because of its negative side effects.

Internal mobility is also referenced in national policies relating to displacement of people due to development projects, particularly infrastructure work. For example, the Kiribati Adaptation Programme’s Lands Acquisition and Resettlement Policy Framework (2005) sets out a policy for relocating people displaced by development projects.

International emigration of people is far less commonly addressed in national policy. Although several Pacific Island countries participate in seasonal worker programs to Australia and New Zealand, these programs are not referenced in national policy documents, and all arrangements are guided by bilateral
labor agreements between the countries and either Australia or New Zealand. However, in the second half of 2015, three countries had developed national labor migration policies with technical support from the ILO (Kiribati and Tuvalu) and the World Bank (Samoa). Only one country in the Pacific, Vanuatu, has legislation dealing with labor migration (Vanuatu’s Seasonal Employment Act 2007).

The final branch of national policies to be considered, and the focus of this chapter, consists of documents dealing with disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. Because these documents are not specifically focused on mobility, they only sometimes deal specifically with this topic. The documents can be categorized into National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs); National Action Plans on Disaster Risk Management; Joint National Action Plans on Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation (JNAPs); other national policies relating to disaster risk, climate change, or resource management; and legislation (typically on disaster management). These are briefly explained in turn.

NAPAs were developed as an outcome of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations to enable Least Developed Countries to communicate their priority activities relating to urgent and immediate needs for adaptation to climate change impacts (UNFCCC 2009). The development of NAPAs was undertaken through national consultative processes funded by the Global Environment Facility, and almost all NAPAs were completed by 2012. Additionally, funding was made available to 75 NAPA-identified initiatives from 44 countries. In the Pacific, five Least Developed Countries developed NAPAs (Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu) between 2005 and 2008. The NAPA process was succeeded by the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) process, established under the Cancun Adaptation Framework.

National Action Plans on Disaster Risk Management as well as the JNAPs were established under the process of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters—the first global plan to explain, describe, and detail the work that is required from all different sectors and actors to reduce disaster losses. The Hyogo Framework (since succeeded by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030), implemented by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, was embodied at the Pacific regional level by the Pacific Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Management Framework 2006–2015. However, given the linkages between disaster risk management and climate change adaptation, some Pacific Island countries chose to develop JNAPs, which addressed both thematic areas. Six countries in the Pacific developed National Action Plans on Disaster Risk Management or JNAPs (Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Vanuatu), while others are currently developing these plans.

Other national laws, policies, and strategies have been developed depending on countries’ specific needs and priorities. Although a significant number of Pacific Island countries have disaster risk plans and legislation, there is only one legislative act on climate change in the Pacific—the 2014 Climate Change Act in the Federated States of Micronesia.

A number of other plans are currently under development, including the following:

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With the exception of temporary evacuations, which are commonly considered in the context of disaster risk reduction but do not fall within this paper’s definition of either migration or planned relocation.
• Solomon Islands JNAP
• Samoa’s Climate Change Policy
• Nauru’s Climate Change and Health Action Plan and JNAP
• Tonga’s Climate Change Act

3.2 Mapping of Mobility in Climate Change and Disaster Risk Policies and Legislation

The mapping undertaken in this research builds and expands on the analysis of laws, policies, and plans relating to displacement undertaken by the International Displacement Monitoring Centre in 2013 (IDMC 2013) and the Nansen Initiative (Gero 2014). Table 1 shows the complete list of relevant policies and instruments considered in the 15 countries and territories (as known to the author), with those making reference to human mobility (other than in the limited context of evacuation) highlighted in red.

Table 1 National Plans, Laws, and Policies in the Pacific Relating to Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (those referring to mobility in red and italic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National action plans and frameworks</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kiribati</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NAPA (2007)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Disaster Management Plan (2010)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Framework on Climate Change and Climate Change Adaptation (2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management: 2014–2023</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kiribati National Labour Migration Policy (2015)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Disaster Management Act 1993</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Samoa</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NAPA (2005)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Policy on Combating Climate Change (2007)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Samoa National Labour Migration Policy (2015)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disaster and Emergency Management Act 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Solomon Islands</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NAPA (2008)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Climate Change Policy: 2012–2017</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Disaster Risk Management Plan (2009)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tuvalu</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NAPA (2007)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuvalu National Strategic Action Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management: 2012–2016</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuvalu National Labour Migration Policy (2015)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Climate Change and Disaster Survival Fund Act 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Vanuatu</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NAPA (2007)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Land-Based Resources: 2012–2022</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Climate Change Disaster Risk Reduction Policy 2016-2030</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meteorology, Geological Hazards and Climate Change Act 2016</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: JNAP = Joint National Action Plan on Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation; NAPA = National Adaptation Plan of Action.

Several regional documents are relevant, including the Outcome Report of the Nansen Initiative’s Pacific Islands Consultation in the Cook Islands in 2013, which contains conclusions on managing cross-border mobility in the context of natural disasters and climate change. The Pacific Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Management Framework, which is also under discussion, should be considered if endorsed by the Pacific Island countries.

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5 These recommendations were developed during a technical workshop with participants from 10 Pacific Island countries and endorsed by a government panel.
Overview of Human Mobility Considerations

Table 1 shows that reference to human mobility, other than evacuations in the context of disaster, is limited to a relatively small number of documents. Although most of the plans and legislation relating to disaster risk management across the Pacific make passing reference to evacuation, the provisions contained in the documents focus on the immediate and temporary logistical measures required to deal with this type of displacement (IDMC 2013). Only a small number of policies, particularly in Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, and the Solomon Islands, make any significant reference to other aspects of human mobility, such as longer-term displacement and relocation of communities. This may be surprising given the call by 10 Pacific Island countries at the Nansen Initiative Regional Consultation to “integrate voluntary migration, forced displacement, and planned relocation within national laws and policies, such as National Adaptation Plans, Joint National Action Plans, and National Disaster Management Plans” (Nansen Initiative 2013, 8). However, the completed policies are now several years old, and recent dialogue on this emerging issue may not yet have found its way into national policies.

Similarly, the traditional view of disasters under the former Hyogo Framework was more limited than it is under the Sendai Framework, adopted in 2015. Whereas the Hyogo Framework made no reference to human mobility, the Sendai Framework urges countries to “formulate public policies, where applicable, aimed at addressing the issues of prevention or relocation, where possible, of human settlements in disaster risk-prone zones, subject to national law and legal systems” (Sendai Framework section 27(k)).

Some of the national documents make broader reference to human mobility. How mobility is conceptualized by these plans varies, particularly where internal relocation is or is not an option. For example,

- In the case of atoll countries, including Tuvalu and Kiribati, it may make less sense to discuss planned relocation (within national boundaries) given that most of the islands face largely identical threats from climate change (including sea level rise, salinization due to storm surges, and droughts). These two countries’ national plans make specific reference to cross-border movement, as well as expanding channels for international labor migration.

- Other countries that are able to relocate vulnerable populations internally make reference to relocation in this context, particularly relocation of people living on atolls or in coastal areas. For example, the Tonga JNAP and the Tonga Climate Change Policy note that relocation of people and houses from coastal areas to inner land may be a possible adaptation option, similar to the Vanuatu NAPA. The Cook Islands Climate Change and Disaster Compatible Development Policy advocates a “stay and adapt” approach in the medium and short terms but recognizes the need for a longer-term planning approach to address potential displacement, migration, and relocation, which may include “mov[ing] off our coral atolls and away from coastal areas.”

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6 It should be noted that Kiribati does have one island, Kiritimati, that is significantly higher ground than Kiribati’s other outer islands, though relocation to this island poses challenges because of limited fresh water supply. Nonetheless, since 2005, the government of Kiribati has been promoting some migration to Kiritimati, especially from South Tarawa.
Countries such as Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, which have had ongoing issues with planned relocations, go further to establish mechanisms for identifying and relocating vulnerable communities. For example, the Solomon Islands Climate Change Policy (discussed below) provides for the development of relocation guidelines and assessment tools, building capacity, and relocating communities as adaptation actions where and when necessary. Papua New Guinea’s Strategic Program for Climate Resilience stresses that extreme weather events and sea level rise will lead to displacement of coastal communities, and that certain communities, particularly on low-lying islands, will need to be relocated. This document includes a project component to provide assistance to encourage vulnerable communities to create community adaptation plans that may include relocating, and establishes a trust fund to provide timely financing for these initiatives (IOM 2015).

3.3 Implementation of Selected National Policies

When considering the national institutional and legislative framework, it is important to look beyond the documents themselves to regard actual implementation because in some cases comprehensive policies do not get implemented (such as the Tuvalu National Strategic Action Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management); in other cases human mobility is absent from key policies, but is nonetheless high on the government’s agenda and planning (as in Fiji; see McNamara and Jacot Des Combs 2015). This section discusses three policy documents—one dealing primarily with planned relocation and two others relating to international migration—and highlights the challenges of implementation, particularly with regard to human mobility.

**Solomon Islands Climate Change Policy: 2012–2017**

The Solomon Islands’ NAPA makes reference to the need to identify vulnerable communities that may need to be supported to adapt to the impacts of climate change. The Climate Change Policy (hereafter Climate Policy) further explains how vulnerable communities can be identified and the types of measures that may need to be considered, including “relocating communities as a last resort.” Developing a methodology to carry out vulnerability and adaptation and disaster risk reduction assessments for different sectors and geographic areas is an important area that most other Pacific Island policies do not enumerate; the Climate Policy, however, does make reference to these assessments, including the need to use data on extreme events, vulnerability, and adaptation to ensure that all features of risk are assessed. This need for data is connected with the strategy of developing a coordinated and georeferenced national information system covering livelihood assets—natural, human, financial, social, and physical capital—that can be used to identify sensitivities to climate change, adaptive capacity, and key strategies covering vulnerable groups, natural resources, and environmental management and disaster risk reduction and management.

Based on the vulnerability and adaptation assessments, ministries, provincial governments, and civil society organizations, including faith-based and private sector organizations, are expected to review and revise their corporate plans, sector programs, and strategies to include measures to assess the vulnerability of sectors and identify and implement adaptation and disaster risk reduction strategies and actions. The policy also notes the importance of undertaking gender analysis and integrating gender considerations into vulnerability and disaster risk assessments as well as into adaptation actions.
A number of climate change vulnerability assessments have now been completed, including for Honiara (UNDP and UN-Habitat 2014) and Ontong Java Atoll (SPREP 2014), as part of a pilot project under the Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change program funded by the Global Environment Facility and the Australian government. The vulnerability assessments make several references to community relocation when discussing community responses. For example, the Ontong Java Assessment notes that 100 percent of surveyed respondents favored the opportunity to be relocated (if government assistance were to be made available), and thus recommends “encourag[ing] voluntary migration through practical means such as the provision of scholarship for young people to relocate for study”; as well as “commenc[ing] studies and planning for relocation of communities” (SPREP 2014, vi).

As of 2015, relocation guidelines and assessment tools (as set out in the Climate Change Policy) have not been developed.

**Tuvalu National Strategic Action Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management: 2012–2016**

Unlike the Solomon Islands Climate Change Policy, the Tuvalu National Strategic Action Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (Action Plan) makes reference to both international migration and planned relocation. The Action Plan contains two sets of strategies relevant to human mobility—one relating to migration to New Zealand under a labor migration visa titled Pacific Access Category (which enables up to 75 Tuvaluans per year to permanently migrate to New Zealand), and another relating to the development of migration and relocation plans for each island in view of a worst case scenario for climate change impacts.

Because it is an Action Plan, the document outlines specific strategies to be undertaken, largely by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment, and Labour. For labor migration, the Action Plan requires implementation of activities such as establishing professional training programs in key identified occupations to allow for employment in neighboring countries if climate change migration is necessary. With regard to forced migration and relocation, the Action Plan requires several ministries to do the following:

- Determine the point of forced migration or relocation through sound scientific and socioeconomic assessments including any relevant studies.
- Conduct a feasibility study on the costs of relocation made necessary by climate change impacts, taking into consideration the findings from the first bullet point.
- In view of potential climate change impacts, develop a migration or relocation plan (in consultation with possible host nations, if appropriate) for each island, taking into consideration efforts to maintain Tuvalu’s identity and the integrity of its traditions and customs in its most vulnerable communities.
- The government of Tuvalu is to solicit support from the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and the UNFCCC on the issue of forced migration (climate-displaced people).
- Develop relevant material and programs to build public and community awareness of the outcomes of above.

Despite the specificity of these measures, little progress had been made toward any of the above activities until recently. The Action Plan was developed under Prime Minister Willy Telavi, who was succeeded by the Hon. Enele Sopoaga in 2013. Soon after his appointment, Sopoaga stated that
relocating Tuvaluans to avoid the impact of sea level rise “should never be an option because it is self defeating in itself. For Tuvalu I think we really need to mobilise public opinion in the Pacific as well as in the [rest of the] world to really talk to their lawmakers to please have some sort of moral obligation and things like that to do the right thing” (Radio New Zealand, September 3, 2013). However, the Sopoaga government has recently shown more interest in future planning, including through the development of a new national labor migration policy that outlines the government’s priorities in training people for migration opportunities.

**Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan on Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management: 2014–2023**

The Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (KJIP) makes specific reference to the need to increase the skills of I-Kiribati youth to enable them to take up employment opportunities abroad (the so-called migration with dignity concept, which refers to the need to ensure that I-Kiribati are “sought after by the countries to which they wish to relocate” ([www.climate.gov.ki](http://www.climate.gov.ki)).

Several provisions of the KJIP concern increasing the number of vocational graduates with internationally recognized qualifications, analyzing skill gaps in international markets, and conducting promotional visits abroad to increase opportunities for I-Kiribati to legally migrate to other countries.

Given that the KJIP was only approved in 2014, there has been little time to witness implementation. The plan itself indicates that it is to be implemented through existing funds and activities. Although monitoring and coordination is to be carried out by the Office of the President, there was no concrete plan for this as of June 2015 (personal communication with the Office of the President, June 2015). Thus, implementation is largely left to relevant ministries without systematic oversight from an overarching government body (a National Expert Group provides advice, but does not oversee implementation). Nor is there specific funding allocated to the ministries to undertake the actions identified in the policy.

More concrete implementation relating to these activities is contained in a National Labour Migration Policy, which was developed with support from the European Union Pacific Climate Change and Migration Project (in which the author is involved); this policy was adopted by the Kiribati cabinet in October 2015.

**4. Implementation of Recent Mobility Interventions in the Context of Environmental Change**

Alongside the development and implementation of national policies relating to environmental change and mobility are specific government and nongovernment interventions that demonstrate the situation on the ground. An analysis of the successes and failures of these case studies can provide important lessons for current and future policies. Although useful studies of historical cases of relocation and migration have been conducted (McAdam 2014), current relocation and migration interventions and projects, or ones completed during or after 2014, have received little attention, a gap that this short summary aims to partly fill.

**4.1 Summary of Recent Interventions**

Five specific projects and interventions have been identified and are summarized in table 2, four relating to planned relocations and one looking at international migration. The types of interventions vary
significantly with regard to the periods in which they have been undertaken, the implementing agencies, and the number of people and the costs involved.

Table 2  Ongoing or Recently Completed Interventions Regarding Mobility Related to Environmental Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type or name of intervention</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Current situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Carteret Integrated Relocation Project</td>
<td>Project developed and facilitated by the local nongovernmental organization Tuele Peisa, which was founded by the Council of Elders of the Carteret Islands in 2012 to coordinate voluntary relocation of 1,700 Carteret Islanders to Bougainville Island, 100 kilometers to the northeast on land donated by the Roman Catholic Church.</td>
<td>Households are in the process of being relocated; however, progress is slow because of lack of necessary funds (estimated US$5.3 million) for the relocation, including building the necessary infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Manam Relocation</td>
<td>The national government set up the Manam Resettlement Authority in 2006 for Manam Islanders displaced by volcanic eruptions between 2004 and 2005. By 2010 the body was no longer functional and was replaced by the Manam Resettlement Task Force. However, no Manam Islanders have yet been officially resettled (they continue to live in care centers in Madang or have returned to Manam Island).</td>
<td>Largely considered to be ineffectual at enabling sustainable relocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Relocation of Choiseul Province capital</td>
<td>Project by an Australian-based private consulting company (BMT WBM), in collaboration with the Australian government’s Pacific-Australia Climate Change Science and Adaptation Planning program, the government of the Solomon Islands, and Choiseul provincial government. The project aims to research and plan for the relocation of the capital of Choiseul Province from low-lying Taro Island to a new location. Subject to available funding, it is expected that most provincial services and infrastructure will be progressively relocated between 2015 and 2030, along with the population of Taro Island (estimated to be 900 or more).</td>
<td>No households yet relocated, but comprehensive program of work developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Relocation of village of Vunidogoloa</td>
<td>Government project to relocate the 130 residents of Vunidogoloa 1 kilometer inland in late 2014, following extensive coastal erosion and increased flooding. The government contributed to the cost of construction of the 30 houses, fish ponds, and a copra dryer, farms, and other projects set up in the new village site.</td>
<td>One village (130 people) successfully relocated and resettled at a total cost of about US$23,000.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative program was funded by the Australian government, in part in recognition of the need to facilitate the concept of migration with dignity. The program was completed in September 2014 and educated 84 young I-Kiribati women and men in nursing at Griffith University in Brisbane. As of February 2015, 78 had graduated but only 46 were able to get visas to work in Australia. Some 46 I-Kiribati were able to get temporary entry to work in Australia; however, the cost was considered very high by an independent evaluation.

Relocation of people from the Carteret Islands (part of the Atolls District of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea) has been discussed for at least 40 years. In the late 1960s islanders noted dwindling natural resources and that more severe storms were causing coastal erosion and affecting agricultural systems (Connell 1990; IOM 2015). Despite the link made to climate change by some researchers (Edwards 2013), others suggest that the Carteret Islands are “in all likelihood sinking for geological reasons associated with their volcanic origins,” though some of these impacts may be exacerbated by climate change (IOM 2015, 34).

Although the Atolls Resettlement Committee was established in the 1980s, little progress to find suitable land for the islanders has been made. Out of frustration at perceived government inaction, the Council of Elders of the Carteret Islands finally decided to set up their own nongovernmental organization (NGO), and in 2009 the first group of islanders began to relocate to land donated by the Catholic church. The NGO, Tulele Peisa (http://www.tulele-peisa.org/), has been working closely with host communities to minimize tension, helping to upgrade the health facilities and schools. However, recent analysis shows that Tulele Peisa has struggled with managing land and livelihoods for the islanders because the land is insufficient to provide housing and food gardens for all relocating families (IOM 2015). Raising the funds to enable relocation has also been challenging. A task force committee developed a 14-step plan for relocation of 50 percent of the island’s population by 2020, ensuring sufficient land for housing and gardens (Ferris 2011). It was calculated that a sum of US$5.3 million would be required for the period 2009 to 2019, but only US$800,000 was provided by the Papua New Guinea government, leaving the rest to be raised by the NGO through international donors (Huntebrinker 2014). Another issue is the referendum for Bougainville’s independence, which the national government is required to hold between 2015 and 2020 (Radio New Zealand). Depending on the results of the referendum, land ownership in Bougainville may change, in turn affecting the relocation negotiations.

In contrast to the Carteret Islander relocation, about 9,000 Manam Islanders (displaced by volcanic eruptions between 2004 and 2005) are not represented by an NGO and have largely relied on the government’s Manam Resettlement Task Force (and previous committees). The task force has largely been perceived to be ineffectual and no islanders have been able to relocate except into government run care centers where there are few livelihood opportunities and little access to public services. As a result, some have chosen to return to Manam despite the risk of future volcanic eruptions (IOM 2015). A very different planned relocation project is being implemented in the Solomon Islands to relocate the provincial capital of Choiseul Province, which is on a low-lying island. The project, funded by the Australian government, is being implemented by an engineering consultancy firm in collaboration with
national and provincial governments. The main output is an integrated climate change risk and adaptation plan to guide settlement planning for Choiseul Province (Haines and McGuire 2014). The plan takes an innovative approach to planned relocation by combining “climate change science, engineering, town planning, community engagement and local indigenous knowledge, to develop a risk assessment (to 2090),” interim risk mitigation measures, and a plan for future community relocation that outlines specific work required to ensure that the new site can accommodate those relocating (Haines and McGuire 2014, 153). The logistics outlined in the plan deal with power, water, waste management, and access to health, vocational, and educational services. Although the actual relocation may take several decades and require further funding and technical support, the intervention does provide a useful model for future assessment and relocations, though it is unclear whether it could be applied to larger numbers of people (the population initially to be relocated is just 900 people) (Haines and McGuire 2014).

In Fiji, the first planned relocation was completed in late 2014, and planning further relocations is thought to be high on the government’s agenda, though there is no mention of relocations in the country’s National Climate Change Policy (McNamara and Jacot Des Combs 2015). Thus far, the scale of planned relocation has been small—just 130 people and the village were moved 1 kilometer away. Media reports suggest that the relocation has so far been successful (Piazza 2015), though later evaluations will need to be carried out. One potentially facilitating factor for the relocation was that the villagers were moving to another part of their own land. A more recent relocation was undertaken in 2017 when the residents of Tukaraki moved 10km from their former village, destroyed by Cyclone Winston in 2016. The project was funded by the European Union and cost approximately $400,000 (Asia Pacific Report, 2017).

The final intervention discussed relates to international labor migration. As noted above, skilled migration has been identified by the Kiribati government as an adaption to the impacts of climate change, and the project was designed to enable a small number of I-Kiribati young people to receive training to enable them to migrate to Australia, which could support both minor impacts in chain migration and transfers of remittances to those remaining in Kiribati. The Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI) was designed to help more young people gain international qualifications to access employment and training opportunities at home and abroad, as a critical aspect of the adaptation strategy that addresses climate change imperatives by encouraging migration with dignity” (Shaw, Edwards, and Rimon 2014). Although 46 people who participated in KANI went on to work in Australia, the project was assessed to be a relatively poor value for money, given that the cost of training each student was in excess of US$200,000 (largely because of a high failure rate and the need to repeat subjects, as well as the high costs of training students in Australia), and some graduates gained only temporary migration opportunities. Of course, this intervention raises very different issues from the ones relating to relocation because it requires a long-term investment in the human capital of individuals— with no guarantee that this investment will result in people being able to migrate, given the competitiveness of the international labor market and the difficulties of migration for all but skilled workers. However, the indirect benefits of the project also need to be taken into account: even if graduates do not migrate, the intervention increases the pool of skilled workers in the Kiribati. Furthermore, the ability to migrate is heavily dependent on immigration systems and employers’ recruitment practices, which may change with time. Thus, programs that educate and train workers may not immediately result in migration, but may do so in the medium or long...
term, depending on the immigration requirements of potential destination countries or employers’ interest in recruiting workers from that origin country.\(^7\)

### 4.2 Assessment of Interventions as Measured against International Good Practices

Following the previous section’s description of recent projects relating to mobility in the context of environmental change, this section reviews how they may be assessed in relation to good practices. Despite the lack of a single definitive international document on good practices in relocating populations that are forced to move because of environmental change, numerous documents offer guidance at a global level (Doberstein and Tadgell 2015) for relocation:\(^8\)

- **Nansen Principles (Norwegian Refugee Council 2011):** Ten principles to guide responses to displacement in the context of climate change and other environmental hazards, developed at the Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century convened by the Norwegian government in June 2011 and attended by academic experts; humanitarian and development practitioners; and representatives of governments, international agencies, and civil society.


- **Protection and Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change (Ferris 2012):** Commissioned by the UNHCR and written under the auspices of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement.

- **The Peninsula Principles on Climate Displacement within States (Displacement Solutions 2013):** Developed through a consultative process organized by the NGO “Displacement Solutions” and involving lawyers, jurists, law professors, UNHCR, UN University, and other NGOs.

- **Nansen Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (2015):** A document endorsed by 110 states in October 2015, which sets out practices to address the possible protection needs of people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and climate change.

Practical tools—“how-to” and technical guides—and action plans to assist national and local authorities and actors are still being developed. For example, the Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, and the UNHCR (2015) have developed “Draft Guidelines on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocations.” The guidelines will be accompanied by a set of operational guidelines to be released in 2017 that will include specific measures and examples.

From the perspective of voluntary migration in the context of environmental change, there is almost no international guidance on policy implementation, although principles on well-managed migration can be found in the ILO’s Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, including the need to ensure that

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\(^7\) A more recent intervention by Kiribati to facilitate migration is through the Australian micro-states visa. Further information at Voigt-Graf and Kagan, 2017.

\(^8\) There have also been attempts to analyze relocation from a human rights approach, starting with core human rights principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This approach might include assessing the specific vulnerable human rights of relocated people, the rights of populations in receiving areas, cultural rights, and compensation (Gromilova 2014).
migrant workers’ rights to information, labor rights, and rights to social protection are secured (ILO 2006).

Given the number of principles and guidelines that can be used to assess the interventions in the previous section, as well as the nature of the interventions, it is not possible in this report to provide a comprehensive assessment. Instead, this section briefly reviews the interventions in comparison with an abridged list of overarching “good principles” for planned relocation (as outlined in Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, and UNHCR [2015]), which consolidates many of the principles found in the other listed documents. These thematically grouped principles relate to planned relocations but are adapted here to also take into account principles for migration (such as the KANI project). The principles suggest that interventions should ensure the following:

- **Respect for rights:** Interventions should be undertaken for the benefit of relocated persons and in a manner that respects and protects their rights and dignity, recognizing that states bear the primary responsibility under international law to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of people within their territory or subject to their jurisdiction. Planned relocations should be carried out within a rights-based framework that safeguards both individual and collective civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights and protects family unity and kinship ties.

- **Reasonable justification:** States should have compelling reasons, robust evidence, and a sound legal basis for undertaking planned relocations, and relocation should be a measure of last resort.

- **Financing:** States should have sufficient and sustainable funds for planned relocation.

- **Agency:** Relocated persons and other affected persons should be informed, consulted, and enabled to participate in decisions on whether to move; and the agency, resilience, and empowerment of relocated persons should be recognized, promoted, and enhanced. Furthermore, the specific needs, circumstances, and vulnerabilities of relocated persons and other affected persons, as applicable, should be taken into consideration and addressed in all phases of a planned relocation.

- **Living standards:** Planned relocation should (1) provide opportunities and conditions to enable relocated persons to improve or restore their living standards; (2) enable host populations to maintain their existing living standards or attain the same living standards as relocated persons, whichever is higher; and (3) mitigate adverse impacts on persons who live close to the relocated persons.

**Respect for rights**

From the perspective of interventions that have ostensibly achieved the goal of allowing people to migrate without apparent breaches of rights of either the migrants or host communities, it would seem that the relocation in Fiji and the KANI program have been successful. Although the Choiseul relocation project has not yet relocated anyone, its design has included the comprehensive involvement of the community and so far appears to address most of their priorities. In contrast, the intervention in Manam cannot be judged to be a success according to this criterion, given that migrants continue to live in care centers without access to land, services, or livelihoods (IOM 2015).
Reasonable justification

In all five of the cases discussed there was arguably reasonable justification for the relocation or migration initiative, given the potential for displacement, or displacement already having taken place. Of course, the risk of displacement from Kiribati is perhaps a long-term risk, but given that the intervention was voluntary and did not require permanent migration (focused as it was on education), it arguably need not meet this particular criterion.

Financing

This was perhaps one of the thorniest issues in the above interventions. The KANI program and Choiseul were primarily funded by international donors, and the others theoretically by the national or provincial governments, but those interventions funded by governments were generally delayed as they waited for access to funds.

Agency

Based on limited available information, it would appear that the Choiseul and Vunidogoloa relocations were developed based on close collaboration with the community (McNamara and Jacot Des Combs 2015). In the case of the Carteret Islands, however, the Atolls Resettlement Committee was thought not to adequately represent the views of the community, leading the community to develop its own NGO (IOM 2015).

Living standards

Ensuring that both the relocated community and the host community are better off (or at least no worse off) after the intervention is critically important for smooth integration and to avoid conflict. In particular, access to job opportunities and livelihoods is an important factor. For example, in Vunidogoloa, the Department of Fisheries provided fish ponds because the community could no longer easily access the ocean for their own subsistence needs and to sell ocean fish produce. The ILO provided pineapple tops and banana shoots and constructed a copra dryer as in-kind support to the crop rehabilitation and livelihood program. In the Manam relocation, however, the relocated community found it very difficult to adjust because they had received no support in developing the commercial skills required for selling cash crops (Edwards 2013).

4.3 Key Factors behind Successful Interventions

The reasons for the divergence in outcomes may of course come down to different context-specific factors. Nonetheless, some shared issues can be briefly analyzed.

Perhaps the most significant factor, though certainly not the only one, in ensuring a successful relocation in the above examples has been secure access to land. Where relocation is within a community’s customary land (as in Vunidogoloa and Choiseul) no host communities must be managed. However, when movement is to land not owned by the community, whether to state- or customary-owned land, integration can become much more complex. Because most land in Pacific Island countries is customarily owned, moving to land not owned by the relocating community requires agreement by the host community (Fitzpatrick 2014). Even in cases of state-owned land, a host community may still be residing on the land and could be affected by a planned relocation. Fitzpatrick (2014) notes that the prospects of
reaching a resettlement agreement with a customary landholding group will increase if it takes the form of development packages that include such things as water and sanitation, infrastructure, and health and education services (Fitzpatrick 2014). For example, as part of the initiative to move the Carteret Islanders to Tinputz, host families were offered about US$1,700 in compensation (Edwards 2013).

Given the protracted nature of land negotiations, the risks of conflict with a host community are likely to increase in circumstances of sudden displacement because there is less time for consultation and agreement (Fitzpatrick 2014; Ferris 2013, 34). However, time for planning is important even if a community has ownership of the land it plans to move to. One reason is that it takes time to raise funds for the relocation (to build houses and infrastructure). For example, although it involved just 130 people, discussion of the relocation of Vunidogoloa commenced nearly seven years before the actual relocation, when in 2007 the community approached the Fiji government (first through the local government offices) for financial assistance to relocate. The relocation of Choiseul is estimated to take until 2030. In contrast, the forced migration of the Manam Islanders was unplanned and happened in the wake of a sudden disaster, thus increasing the risk of conflict with the host community because there was less time to consult, come to an agreement, and prepare for the relocation (Fitzpatrick 2014).

Finally, the number of people who need to be resettled is, of course, an important consideration: the small number of villagers in Vunidogoloa (130) can be compared with the more than 9,000 displaced Manam Islanders. Ensuring that relocation is well managed and can address the needs of a large number of people is not only a question of good policies that comply with international guidelines, it also requires access to adequate and sustained funding to pay for technical expertise, community consultations, access to land, and provision of services to migrants and host communities (in the case of internal migration).

5. Conclusion

While human mobility is slowly making its way into the dialogue on disaster risk management and climate change adaptation, a significant paradigm shift is needed in the way Pacific Island governments view and address this issue. For now, migration and planned relocation are still addressed on the periphery of climate change adaptation and disaster risk plans and strategies. While the issue finds mention in other national policies, such as urbanization policies and national labor migration policies, it is still far from clear that governments in the Pacific see the value of proactive measures to enable movement of populations vulnerable to climate change.

A growing number of regional initiatives now urge countries to take a more holistic approach to human mobility in the context of climate change. A civil society workshop in the Pacific organized by the Nansen Initiative advocated the “development of laws, policies and guidelines that require a limited degree of bureaucratic procedures, and which encourage positive attitudes toward addressing the challenges of human mobility within the context of disasters and climate change; as well as building a common understanding within relevant national government ministries to support initiatives that facilitate voluntary adaptive migration for those most exposed to disasters and the effects of climate change” (Nansen Initiative 2014, 10). Other high-level dialogue on this nexus between migration and climate change included a public discussion between Mary Robinson (United Nations Special Envoy for Climate
Change) and Pacific Island leaders at the Pacific Island Development Forum Summit, which took place in 2015 in Fiji.

Planned relocation programs in the Pacific have a rocky history and evoke memories of the colonial era. It is clear that any relocation effort needs to take notice of and avoid mistakes made in previous interventions and carefully consider a number of sensitive factors, including culturally appropriate compensation for both hosts and migrants; access to income opportunities; and health, educational, and other services. These are inevitably time-consuming processes that require commitment and long-term planning from national and provincial governments.

The issue of implementing mobility and migration policies in the context of environmental change is as critical as having policies in place. When discussing implementation, particularly in the context of Least Developed Countries, it is critical that funding be clearly addressed. Demands on official development assistance regularly exceed the amount actually available; however, the pool of funds to be allocated for climate change mitigation and adaptation, particularly through the Green Climate Fund, is growing. Can this funding be used to ensure that migration and relocation are undertaken in a way that addresses the good practice guidelines? This is an issue yet to be explored, though the initial set of projects funded by the Green Climate Fund mainly covers adaptation through infrastructure.

The Green Climate Fund is not the only source of potential funding for migration and planned relocation. The 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework developed in the 16th session of the Conference of the Parties states that states can “enhance action on adaptation” by “measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels.” This opens the door for states to use funding under such mechanisms as the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund, and the Adaptation Fund (under the Kyoto Protocol) (McAdam 2014).

Despite the apparent availability of funding for migration through climate financing, and several projects in the Pacific having been funded through these mechanisms, most projects have focused on in situ adaptation, including building sea walls and other physical infrastructure. Although the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu NAPAs did outline projects relating to relocation (including carrying out community vulnerability assessments in the Solomon Islands) these projects do not seem to have been implemented through climate funding.

Funding of migration opportunities using climate financing has not even been proposed as a possible area of interventions, perhaps because it is not immediately clear what kinds of interventions could effectively increase the number of people able to migrate from vulnerable areas given the number of variables to consider (such as the ability to meet immigration requirements from other countries and to develop internationally recognized skills sought after by international employers). The fact that climate financing is largely handled by Ministries of Environment or Climate Change, while increasing migration channels is firmly within the ambit of Ministries or Departments of Labour and perhaps Ministries of Foreign Affairs, may also be partly responsible.
While planned relocations have often been challenging in the past, there is hope that new, creative initiatives that partner community development organizations and the private sector with government can lead to a more positive future.
Bibliography


Pacific Climate Change and Migration Project. 2015. “Studies of Attitudes to Climate Change and Migration in Kiribati, Tuvalu and Nauru.” Unpublished.


Annex I: List of Reviewed Documents

Government of the Cook Islands
• Climate and Disaster Compatible Development Policy 2013–2016

Government of the Federated States of Micronesia
• National Climate Change Strategy 2009
• Climate Change Act 2014

Government of Fiji
National Climate Change Policy (2012)

Government of Kiribati
• National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) (January 2007)
• Kiribati Population Policy 2004
• National Youth Policy 2011–2015
• Kiribati Development Plan 2012–2015
• Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (KJIP) 2014–2023
• Kiribati Adaptation Programme’s Lands Acquisition and Resettlement Policy Framework

Republic of the Marshall Islands

Government of Nauru
• Disaster Risk Management Act 2008 Act No. 15 of 2008

Government of Niue
• Niue’s Joint National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change (April 2012)

Government of Papua New Guinea
• Papua New Guinea’s Strategic Program for Climate Resilience (2012)

Government of Samoa
• National Adaptation Programme of Action, Samoa (Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment and Meteorology, 2005)
• National Policy of Combatting Climate Change (2007)
• Samoa National Labour Migration Policy

Government of the Solomon Islands
• Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Meteorology, Solomon Islands, National Adaptation Programmes of Action, November 2008
• Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment Honiara (UNDP, UN-Habitat 2014)
• Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment Ontong Java Atoll (SPREP 2014)

The Kingdom of Tonga
• Tonga Climate Change Policy : A Resilient Tonga by 2035 (2016)

Government of Tuvalu
• Tuvalu’s National Adaptation Programme of Action (Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment, Agriculture and Lands, Department of Environment, May 2007)
• Tuvalu National Strategic Action Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management 2012–2016
• National Labour Migration Policy (2015)
• Climate Change and Disaster Survival Fund Act 2015

Government of Vanuatu
• Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Land-Based Resources 2012–2022
• Meteorology, Geological Hazards and Climate Change Act 2016

Republic of Palau
• National Disaster Risk Management Framework 2010 (October 2010)
• National Advisory Committee on Climate Change, National Adaptation Programme for Action (December 2007)
• Palau Climate Change Policy (2015)

Other
