Synthesis Report - Internal Migration and Urbanization

Rosemary Vargas-Lundius
In collaboration with
Abrar Chowdhury
Soonhwa Yi
Ganesh Seshan
Nadege Desiree Yameogo
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It is now better for me than before migration to Accra because back home in the North I was not doing any work. Even though when I started working it was not moving on as well as I had expected, I am now happily working, able to save some money and remit money to my family back in the north. ... [In addition] My child has benefited a lot from my migration to this place because I am now able to provide for all his educational needs.

Mashud, e-waste refurbisher in Ghana

Migration has been helpful to me based on the things that I told you I have gotten. And even though migration has not improved my education, through migration I have been able to continuously support the education of my brothers and sisters, nieces and nephews at home.

Hamza, market woman in Old Fadama, Ghana

Introduction

These testimonies from Ghana (in Awumbila, Owusu, and Teye 2014) indicate that the phenomenon of internal migration and urbanization is not as negative as it often has been depicted. It can be a viable strategy for overcoming poverty and promoting human development.

By definition, human migration concerns individuals moving from one place to another to settle temporarily or permanently in locations different from their place of origin. From a more exclusive household perspective, a migrant is generally defined as someone “who used to live in the household and left to go away from the village/town/city in the past 10 years, and with duration of absence, or intended absence, of at least 3 months” (Bilsborrow, Oberai, and Standing 1984, 146). IOM (2016a) defines a migrant as:

... any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.

Accordingly, behind the figures and statistics there are always personal stories to be told, explaining and illustrating a vast range of reasons for migrating. Furthermore, the reasons for and general characteristics of migration differ depending on time and place.

Traditionally there have been basically two types of migration studied by demographers—international and internal. Internal migrants have been defined as people migrating within the same country. Just as international migration, this kind of movement may be permanent, temporary, voluntary, or forced. Permanent migration is when someone moves from one place to another and has no plans to return to her/his original home. Temporary migration is limited by time, for example, seasonal employment. Forced migration involves the migrant having no choice but to move. Voluntary migration of course is the opposite of this.
To emphasize the multidisciplinary and diverse nature of internal migration and examine its effects on poverty alleviation, researchers from various areas and with different approaches came together for a conference organized by *The Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development* (KNOMAD) in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in July 2014.

This synthesis of some of the issues related to internal migration is mainly based on findings from research reports presented at the Dhaka conference and available on KNOMAD’s website (http://www.knomad.org/thematic-working-groups/internal-migration-and-urbanization). The presentation of current themes in connection with internal migration and poverty alleviation is limited in scope, concentrating on themes and information found on KNOMAD’s website, which is constantly updated with working papers dealing with various aspects of migration.

Since the Dhaka conference, internal migration has received increasing attention, indicating that even if issues raised during the meeting continue to be consequential, some updating and deepening of the presented research is necessary.¹

The purpose of this synthesis report is to highlight the importance of assessing the significance of internal migration for development and poverty alleviation. The focus is on certain geographical areas. Bangladesh, India, and China figure dominantly, since several reports presented at the conference dealt with specific aspects of internal migration in these countries. Kazakhstan is mentioned as an example of how patterns of internal migration are affected in a country undergoing transition from a centralized planned economy to a market economy. Nigeria and Colombia are presented as examples of countries where internal migration is particularly complex, since both countries are dealing with a substantial number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) The presented examples of internal migration as well as the policies and initiatives discussed are generally not unique to these countries and may thus be relevant to other countries experiencing high internal migration movements. To give a better understanding of how the perception of migratory movements has evolved over time, a short historical perspective is presented, including examples of countries where migration has had a tangible, positive impact on human and economic development.

There are at least three times more internal than international migrants in the world (IOM 2016b). In 2013 it was estimated that there were 763 million internal migrants globally, of whom more than 150 million were rural-urban migrants in China (IOM 2016b).

This report intends to (i) identify significant drivers of internal migration in different countries and regions, and assess their impacts on urbanization and poverty reduction; (ii) examine the interconnection between internal and international migration; (iii) highlight the positive contributions of internal migration; (iv) emphasize the need for generating useful data on internal migration; and (v) summarize some of KNOMAD’s findings that might encourage further research.

The following are the main arguments discussed in this report:

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¹ Skeldon (2017) presents a short summary of recent research issues.
• The drivers of internal and international migration are essentially the same, as both are based on a strategy in search of improved well-being. Migration is often based on a calculated family decision, where a household pools resources and jointly decides who among its members should migrate. Internal and international migration contribute to poverty alleviation, although to various degrees.

• Despite the obvious similarities in the causes of international and internal migration, their effects, costs, and policies differ. The two phenomena should be studied separately, although without making such an absolute distinction between them as traditionally has been the case.

• The current emphasis on the benefits gained from international migration is not reason enough for ignoring the positive effects of internal migration. Internal migration merits a more reasonable appraisal than the negative perceptions that currently dominate the debate and influence the policies of several governments.

• Negative perceptions of internal migration may partly be due to the high degree of difficulty in gathering and processing ample and useful statistics related to internal migration.

Traditionally, researchers and politicians have acknowledged a rather sharp divide between international and internal migration, where the latter concerns migration within a geopolitical entity, generally a nation. However, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain a rigid division between these two types of migration. Changing realities, like globalization and economic clusters (high tech, scientific, factor endowment, low-cost manufacturing, and knowledge services) are outdated earlier notions of migration based on the concept of “nations.” Likewise, the rural-urban paradigm is becoming increasingly blurred through the creation of mega towns and phenomena like urban agriculture and the out-localization of manufacturing to rural areas.

Recent research and planning increasingly emphasize the importance of applying a holistic approach to migration by connecting international and internal migration, as well as urbanization, to development and poverty alleviation (IOM 2015). For example, one of the background papers presented at a recent expert meeting on sustainable cities, human mobility, and international migration, which was organized by the Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, highlighted the following:

   The tendency to consider international migration separately from other forms of mobility persists and [...] human mobility is best conceived as a system that integrates internal and international migration within a single framework (Skeldon 2017, 8).

Nevertheless, in many countries, the negative effects of rural-urban migration have dominated the debate so far. The difficulties connected with rural-urban interstate movements include uncontrolled urban growth; external costs associated with overcrowding; pressure on infrastructure, such as roads and schools; pollution; and inadequate waste disposal. Poverty and crime thrive in overcrowded cities where vast areas characterized by squalor and desolation are apparent to everyone. The growing impact of migration on destination communities also raises important issues about urban congestion, productivity gains, and barriers to mobility, as well as the difficulties migrants may face in accessing public services, combined with the risks that unemployed individuals might end up in degradation and criminality. All
these problems are being dealt with locally and often at a high cost, making the authorities reluctant to acknowledge the benefits of internal migration (Tacoli, McGranahan, and Satterwaite 2014).

However, researchers generally argue that internal migration, despite its various shortcomings and problems, alleviates poverty. Almost everywhere, migrants are the big winners in the migration process and the estimated gains are large. However, this does not mean that we should abstain from addressing the perils of urbanization and internal migration (Lucas 2015).

1. Internal Migration and Urbanization

It has often been stated that humankind is a migratory species and internal migrants move for many reasons. When people assume that moving may improve their well-being, many tend to move from one place to another. Some may be searching for better paid jobs, or pursuing a particular career or education. Others move to be closer to family or friends, or aspire for a better quality of life. Women and men move in connection with marriage arrangements, or to be close to a spouse, trying to keep the family united. People also migrate due to warfare, political circumstances, or religious persecution. Young men may leave to avoid military service. Entire households may be evicted for various reasons, such as land grabbing by powerful or threatening individuals and groups, or the construction of dams, roads, and other large-scale endeavors, promoting the interests of unfamiliar stakeholders. Environmental causes may also force people to leave, like land degradation, climate change, and various forms of natural disasters/emergencies (Hanlon and Vicino 2014).

However, the main motivation for migrating is without doubt economic. Insufficient income and physical mobility have always been interrelated, although this does not necessarily mean that the most destitute make the decision to move. Lifetime migration\(^2\) intensities appear to be highest in Europe and North America and lowest in Asia. As an example, during 2006 to 2010, 12 to 13 percent of U.S. citizens moved from one place to another (Gregory 2012). In 2013, the estimated number of internal migrants was 763 million. Together with the 244 million international migrants (estimation in 2015), there are a billion migrants in the world, meaning that every seventh person in the world is a migrant (Bell and Charles-Edwards 2013; UN DESA 2015a). Despite the huge difference in the number of internal and international migrants, it is the latter that attracts the most attention. From 2000 to 2015, annual net migration to Europe, North America, and Australia averaged only 2.8 million persons per year (UN DESA 2015b).

Every move is consequential for the involved individuals, but some migration patterns have broader implications. Every historical era has witnessed several consequential migrations, not least the 20th century, when vast movements of people have reshaped culture, politics, and economic structures. Globally and nationally, no recent migration patterns have been more transformative than the move from rural areas to cities. During the 19th and 20th centuries, nations and areas composed of peasants and farmers changed into states constituted by urbanized workforces (Sassen 1999).

Globally, more people now live in cities than in rural areas, with 54 percent of the world’s population residing in urban areas in 2014. In 1950, only 30 percent of the world’s population was urban. Today, the most urbanized regions include North America, with 82 percent living in urban areas, followed by Latin

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\(^2\)“A lifetime migrant is a person whose place of birth was in a different administrative unit from his or her current residence” (definition according to UN DESA 2017).
America and the Caribbean with 80 percent, and Europe with 73 percent. In contrast, Africa and Asia remain mostly rural, with 40 and 48 percent of their respective populations living in urban areas. Close to half of the world’s urban dwellers reside in relatively small settlements of fewer than 500,000 inhabitants, while only around one in eight live in 28 megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants (UN DESA 2015b). As the world continues to urbanize, development challenges will be increasingly concentrated in cities, particularly in lower-middle-income countries, where the pace of urbanization is fastest.

Internal migration is often repudiated while pointing to an unsustainable, current model of urbanization causing environmental degradation, overpopulation, unsustainable resource management, pollution, and growing mountains of waste. Uncontrolled, spontaneous urban growth generates multiple forms of inequality, exclusion, and deprivation, creating spatial inequalities, with growing slums for the poor and gated communities for the wealthy.

In the late 1990s, 40 percent of new homes in the western, southern, and southeastern areas of the United States were in gated communities. Rising crime and inequality fuel a similar phenomenon in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa. Cities face growing difficulties in integrating migrants and refugees, who often are blocked from an equitable share of the human, social, cultural, and intellectual assets of the city, and thus end up in growing slums. Recent estimates provided by UN-Habitat show that the proportion of the urban population living in the slums of cities in developing countries has decreased from 39.4 percent in 2000 to 29.7 percent in 2014. But the slums are not shrinking, since the absolute number of people living in slums stood at 881 million in 2014, compared with 791 million in 2000 (UN-Habitat 2016, 14). From an economic perspective, the current model of urbanization is unsustainable, due to widespread unemployment, especially among youth, and the predominance of unstable, low-paying, and/or informal jobs.

Highly urbanized countries are nevertheless associated with falling levels of poverty. Urbanization tends to result in higher levels of productivity, income, and employment opportunities, as well as improved quality of life through better education and health, large-scale public investments, and access to improved infrastructure and services. For example, in East Asia, the increase in urbanization over the past three and half decades has been accompanied by a decrease in poverty. Even in poor countries, urbanization is a driving force of development. Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Metro Manila in the Philippines account for 13 and 12 percent of the population of their respective countries, but generate 85 and 47 percent of their income of the respective countries (UN-Habitat 2016, 31).

An emphasis on rural-urban migration may fail to discern the transformative power urbanization generally has on rural areas, especially through increased demand for rural goods. Other benefits from rural-urban linkages are the increased rural land/labor ratio, better rural education and social services, rural nonfarm employment, as well as urban-rural remittances. An important part of the drawbacks that internal migration has on growing cities is because the internal migration process is not harnessed and supported through policy, planning, urban design, and regulatory instruments. The main culprit for the advance of congested and dangerous cities is probably the lack of provision of sustainable space to all citizens, not just physically, but also in the civic, socioeconomic, and cultural dimensions attached to collective space.
Exclusion means that entire groups of citizens are denied social benefits and thus become enclosed within a poverty trap characterized by (i) severe job restrictions, (ii) high rates of gender disparities, (iii) deteriorated living conditions, (iv) social exclusion and marginalization, (v) lack of social interaction, and (vi) high incidence of crime (UN-Habitat 2016). The creation of an urban environment characterized by social inclusion should be complemented by a shift from the dichotomy between urban and rural areas, recognizing an urban-rural continuum. The adequate provision of infrastructure and opportunities in small and medium-size cities can promote rural transformation and urbanization and contribute to achieving balanced population distribution.

Sustainable, resilient, and inclusive cities and rural areas tend to be the outcome of good governance that encompasses effective leadership, land use planning, jurisdictional coordination, inclusive citizen participation, and efficient financing.

2. Drivers of Internal Migration

The drivers of internal migration are essentially the same as those for international migration. People search to improve their and their dependents’ well-being. The pursuit aims to satisfy a wide range of needs, like access to health care, social security, food, water, healthy nutrition, leisure, education, decision making, freedom of speech and worship, and above all employment and sufficient income.

2.1 Income Gaps

Income gaps between rural and urban areas are one of the foremost drivers of internal migration, as demonstrated by the Todaro model. Todaro (1976) established that migration decisions depend on the evaluation of the expected income of potential migrants. Two major factors determine this expected income: the current urban salary and subjective estimation of the probability of being employed in the urban sector. The larger is the gap between the present income and the expected one, the stronger is the migration propensity (Todaro 1976). The Todaro theory has become a fundamental foundation of many empirical studies on migration.

Rural-urban income gaps are the main reasons for the accelerated migration that has taken place in many developing countries. The case that has drawn the most attention is China, where migrants made up one-third of the labor force in 2012. According to Gong and Glinskaya (2014), this number would have been much higher if restrictions had not hindered workers from moving freely across the country and sectors in search of better opportunities and wages.

Despite fast urbanization and increasing migration, China remains less urbanized than could be expected. In China, 38 percent of the labor force still works in agriculture, while migrants’ wages are rising rapidly in the growing cities. Shortages of low-skilled labor suggest that fewer people than could be assumed on economic grounds choose to leave the countryside. Data for prefecture-level cities in China in 2010 show that differences between marginal productivity and real wages persist and are greatest in midsize cities, suggesting that labor mobility is less than optimal.

Wages for migrants are rising rapidly and the wage differential between migrant workers and their urban counterparts for similar work performed has fallen over time. The majority of Chinese migrant workers are male and on average better educated than the general rural labor force. Only 20 percent of these
workers bring their families and the average migrant worker stays in the city for no more than seven to nine years. However, more than 50 percent of rural-urban migrants would like to settle permanently in urban areas.

There are several explanations for the current slowdown in migration in China, but the key reason is administrative. The so-called hukou system links entitlement to public services to a citizen’s original birthplace. If administrative barriers to migration were removed, every 1 percent more migration from rural to urban areas would yield 1.2 percent more gross domestic product (GDP). At the current level of mechanization, agricultural surplus labor is estimated to be 105 million people; this would increase as China’s agricultural modernization accelerates. If China’s rural-urban migration rates had matched those of the Republic of Korea in the past, China’s economy would be nearly 25 percent larger today (Gong and Glinskaya 2014, 10). Government strategies to alleviate poverty should place more emphasis on raising the skill levels of the rural and urban population, than on restricting migration to the cities. Investment in human capital in rural and urban areas would be expected to increase productivity and well-being (Gong and Glinskaya 2014).

2.2 Access to Public Services

Improved schools, health centers, electricity, water, and roads, and greater security affect migrants’ decisions, because they want to enjoy such facilities, or their needs are currently satisfied, making them inclined to stay put.

Spatial inequality often translates into a difference between rural and urban access to public services. Many rural communities lack access to adequate education and their inhabitants have limited opportunities to increase and improve their skills, which inhibits their social well-being and mobility. Few skills and limited education may force the rural poor to remain as subsistence farmers, or engage in insecure, informal employment, perpetuating a state of rural poverty. Limited access to health care may result in the prevalence of curable diseases. Social isolation, due to inadequate roads and poor access to information, makes life difficult and possibilities for change limited.

Cities are social, economic, and political entities that have developed in response to the actions of countless individuals and relationships, with a wide array of institutions and organizations providing a range of services. Most cities reflect past decisions about construction and population density, land use, transportation, economic development, political processes and representation, as well as social planning. However, many of these assessments and actions were made decades ago and without any consideration for an often quite unexpected inflow of immigrants, with demands for services, social inclusion, and integration.

Some of the greatest problems facing migrant-receiving communities revolve around the interaction between individuals and groups in public spaces and inequalities in access to public services and goods. The enforcement of building codes, management of social housing, policing, schools, and transportation services, as well as supporting economic development for a range of social groups and communities, may put a seemingly unsurmountable stress on policy makers.

It is thus with good reason that many policy makers fear that internal migration flows into cities would put too much pressure on the range and costs of public services, at the same time as they assume that
improved urban amenities may stimulate out-migration from rural areas. Nevertheless, these are not good enough reasons for not increasing the quality and availability of services in urban and rural areas. Enhanced rural transport facilities may affect local production patterns, by bringing in produce and human resources from other areas, and hence reduce local demand for local products and labor. The facilities may also allow farmers to bring their products to markets and obtain better prices. Better communications make departure as well as return visits easier. Similarly, improved access to education may facilitate easier movement into towns, or even abroad, but all this may also bring dynamism, knowledge, remittances, and improved public services to rural areas (Lucas 2015).

Migration flows may be reversed as well, moving from big cities to smaller ones and even back to the countryside. Recent trends in China indicate that the internal migration of cheap, low-skilled rural labor that fueled the country’s transformation into the world’s workshop shows signs of coming to an end. Megacities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou are losing some of their attraction for skilled workers and college graduates, who to a higher degree are choosing to move to so-called second-tier cities, like Suzhou, Xi’an, and Chengdu, or even rural areas. There are several reasons for this, among which are improved living conditions, including a healthier environment, a calmer pace of life, greater opportunities for personal development and stable employment, better and cheaper housing, as well as more effective social services, and efforts by cities and communities to attract well-educated and highly skilled top-end talent (Wang et al. 2016).

2.3 Self-Selection and Social Networks

Self-selection is a common feature of discussions about internal migration. Self-selection indicates that individuals endowed with specific features may find it more profitable to move, compared with others who feel they lack the necessary wealth, skills, or ambition to leave their familiar setting. Accordingly, migrants do not represent a random sample of migrant-sending communities.

Self-selection arises with individual characteristics, some of which are easily observable and possible to measure, like wealth and education. If individuals can afford to leave their home to migrate to a place where they assume there are better possibilities for income-generating activities and well-being, they will move more readily if they have the means to establish themselves within a new environment without too much economic hardship. Likewise, individuals with specific skills, often acquired through education, which are coveted in another part of a country, will be more tempted to move than those who do not have such skills. This makes education a crucial factor for self-selection.

Other features of self-selection are more difficult to distinguish and measure, like ambition and ability—individuals may assume they have better possibilities to develop or acquire skills in a new milieu. They may be in search of a career in sports, entertainment, the military, politics, and so forth, or they may want to develop specific skills through education and/or within social networks that are not present in their place of origin. Local authorities may try to attract a greatly needed and/or skilled workforce by offering various forms of benefits, not only through higher wages, but also by presenting effective and affordable social services, a healthy environment, leisure, and increased security. Several local administrations in China currently offer these types of benefits, as a means to attract highly skilled workers and educated professionals (Wang et al. 2016).
Self-selection has often been connected with issues such as brain drain, indicating that enterprising and educated people move from their original homes, leaving behind less motivated and unskilled persons. Self-selection is assumed to have a strong impact on internal migration, since rural areas tend to offer fewer possibilities for change and progress than urban areas. Many testimonies quoted by researchers indicate that a majority of migrants to towns, even those living in slums and with insecure incomes, considered their choice to migrate to be a rewarding one (see, for example, Awumbila, Owusu, and Teye 2014).

Self-selection may be compared with the influence social networks have on internal migration. It is obvious that social networks are important in every person’s life and the importance networks have for the outcomes for migrants, their families, and their communities cannot be overstated. Researchers have typically defined migrant networks as interpersonal ties linking kin, friends, and community members in their places of origin and destination, although other kinds of social ties are also common.

As demonstrated by research reports on the construction sector in India, Nepal, and Bangladesh, the migrant workers who are exceptionally common in this sector are generally hired in their hometowns and villages by firms and recruiting agencies, which may even help them to migrate and provide housing close to the workplaces. However, it is generally family and friends from their home villages who help the construction workers to adjust to conditions at their destination. Furthermore, they tend to move in groups from their places of origin to their destinations (Srivastava et al. 2014).

It is also common that internal migrants are assisted in adjusting to new social environments by members of religious and/or specific cultural organizations, which are present in their places of origin as well. Such organizations may also be helpful in finding jobs and housing for internal migrants. Accordingly, a migrant’s ability to move to a particular destination, find a job and housing, open a business, and access health care can be directly impacted by, or even dependent upon, her/his social network.

It is commonly assumed that difficulty in settling in a new environment is mainly an issue affecting newcomers to an unfamiliar setting. However, migrants returning to their places of origin may face similar constraints. Returnees are not always perceived positively by those who stayed behind. This applies to those who have been forced to leave their original communities and people who left due to economic and other reasons, searching for a better life. Tensions may be worsened if returnees are perceived as having become members of a privileged group of people who have obtained wealth, contacts, and knowledge, which may have been denied those who stayed behind.

Or, vice versa, returnees may be considered as returning losers—they may not have provided enough money and support for those who stayed behind, or the cessation of the flow of remittances following migrants’ return may cause vulnerabilities in diminished access to education, health care, and housing (Fonseca, Hart, and Klink 2015).

Housing and land that formerly belonged to migrants may have ended up in the hands of those who stayed behind. And new social bonds and networks may have developed while the migrants were away. Traditions, gender roles, and culture tend to be quite different in places where returnees previously made their living, making it difficult for them to revert to their pre-migration identities. A survival strategy applied by returnees may thus be to try to form identities by “combining the best of two worlds.” If it is
accepted by society at large, this may be a very positive approach, benefitting the returnees and the receiving community. Returning migrants could be instrumental in demanding higher standards of public services from local authorities as well as initiating processes of socioeconomic transformation.

Becoming self-sufficient is a central objective for returnees, especially if their motivation for migrating was a quest for higher income. If conditions for returnees and receiving communities are to be beneficial for all stakeholders, the government, civil society, and receiving communities should make certain reintegration efforts. What facilitates an auspicious return is of course if those who have been away have been able to cultivate and maintain networks, allowing for continuous contact with their places of origin. Several governments have realized the importance of providing support to out-migrants and returning migrants, and have set up pre-departure and post-arrival counseling (Fonseca, Hart, and Klink 2015).

2.4 Environmental Degradation

Slow but persistent environmental degradation may be a reason for internal migration. This is obvious in studies from Bangladesh, a country that presents several push and pull factors akin to those of other developing countries, like a growing rural-income gap, an expanding industrial sector, and improved amenities in urban areas. However, Bangladesh is one of the countries in which natural hazards are a main cause for migration. Bangladesh’s vulnerability is mainly due to a mix of high population density and low-lying land. Water is Bangladesh’s blessing and curse. For nearly half the year, monsoon rains cause the country’s three major rivers, the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna, and their tributaries to swell. The river swelling causes riverbank erosion, but also accretion in some areas, a common and natural process that throughout history has triggered transitory migratory movements. However, erosion is increasing and over the past 20 years has caused the loss of more than 1 percent of the country’s land surface. Floods and riverbank erosion affect some one million people annually. Once every three to five years, up to two-thirds of Bangladesh is inundated by floods. Substantial damage is caused to infrastructure, housing, agriculture, and livelihoods. The 1998 flood inundated more than two-thirds of Bangladesh and resulted in damages and losses of more than US$2 billion, or 4.8 percent of GDP (World Bank 2011). In 2009, the devastating cyclone Aila struck the southwestern coastal region of Bangladesh and the eastern coast of neighboring West Bengal province. Cyclones like Aila and Sidr (in 2007) forced more than a million people to migrate from their regions. Such disasters have direct effects, such as loss of lives and property, and indirect ones, like loss of employment and income, reduced access to products and services, as well as the opportunity cost of resources that need to be diverted to relief and rehabilitation (Siddiqui et al. 2016).

My family has experienced Aila in 2009. I have never seen such kind of heavy tidal flow in my life. It has taken away everything. My house was completely destroyed and all my cash and resources were washed away. After Aila there is hardly any tree in the village, whereas in the past the village was green. Now we are observing unbearable heat. Soil and water have completely become salinized and are not conducive for cultivation.

Shumita Munda, 25, Gabura village, Satkhira (Siddiqui et al. 2016)
Considering population growth and that most parts of Bangladesh are less than 12 meters above sea level, the threat of global climate change is obvious. Presently, the water levels rise between 4 and 8 millimeters per year, which would be 8 to 16 centimeters in 20 years. However, much more dramatic changes are expected. If sea levels rise by 1 meter and no dyke enforcement measures are taken, 14,000 to 30,000 square kilometers will be permanently flooded, which means more than one-fifth of Bangladesh will be underwater (Butzengeiger and Horstmann 2004, 6). Combined with the problem of inundations, there are prolonged droughts and sinking groundwater levels (Siddiqui et al. 2016).

Most rural Bangladeshi households face a potent mix of various hazards. Some are more frequent in certain areas than others. Coastal regions suffer in particular from cyclones, riverbank and coastal erosion, salinization, reduced crop yields, waterlogging, and floods. Inland communities face drought, lack of or erratic rain, declining land fertility, reduced crop yields, river bank erosion, and seasonal flooding (Siddiqui et al. 2016).

Risk and disaster reduction initiatives are planned and carried out by various ministries and agencies, which are engaged in the construction of cyclone shelters and riverbank improvements, while polders are currently constructed in coastal areas. In cooperation with local and international nongovernmental organizations, efforts have been undertaken to render households more climate resilient. A wide range of interventions are ongoing, including dewatering ponds, raising tube wells to ensure disinfected water supply, conserving water for drinking and domestic use, re-excavating canals, distributing seeds for saline resistant crops, and implementing many programs for building awareness and disaster preparedness among the rural population (Siddiqui et al. 2016). Nevertheless, most of the programs do not sufficiently address the need for alternative income sources. Due to ever-increasing environmental threats to rural incomes, more and more households are falling into occasional or extreme poverty traps. Because of the magnitude of the problem and a growing urgency, migration remains an immediate and viable solution for securing sufficient income for households whose livelihoods have suffered from environmental hazards.

In considering migration in relation to environmental degradation, four categories may be discerned: (i) adaptive migration, (ii) survival migration, (iii) last resort migration, and (iv) trapped people. Adaptive migration is the most resilient category. It involves diversification of livelihoods, and increased access to education, health, and political participation. This kind of migration generally means that members of a household choose to migrate and support their family through remittances, at the same time as those staying behind are trying to improve their competence and abilities. Survival migration means that an entire household opts for resettlement, although this does not guarantee improvement in livelihoods, in particular considering that there are almost no examples of planned resettlement of displaced persons. Even more vulnerable are people who are forced into “last resort” migration, driven by hunger and desperation. These people are often found among the poorest of the poor and may lack access to support groups and family members already present in areas where they may be forced to resettle. Trapped populations without any opportunity to migrate constitute the most vulnerable category.

The most resilient households are those with various livelihood options, combined with social, economic, and political assets, whose children have three to five years more education than their parents, and with young family members able to migrate and send remittances back to their families. This is one reason why
the issue of migration must be included in any effort to mitigate the effects of global warming and depletion of natural resources, as well as improving the general welfare of the entire country (Siddiqui et al. 2016).

Despite its abundance of water, obtaining safe drinking water is a great problem in Bangladesh, in rural areas and the congested mega towns of Dhaka and Chittagong. In Dhaka, nearly one-third of the drinking water does not receive any kind of treatment. About 30 percent of the population served by the Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority is covered by a sewerage system, the only one in the entire country. About 30 percent of the urban population uses septic tanks and another 15 percent uses buckets and pit latrines. During the rainy season, sewage overflows are common. The groundwater level is declining by 2-3 meters per year due to continuous abstraction of water. During 1996 to 2009, Dhaka’s water table sunk by 47 meters; it is now 70 meters below ground level (Sumon and Kalam 2014, 6).

The situation appears to be worsening. It is reported that policy makers are focusing on promoting government supported development projects in Dhaka’s surrounding wetlands, which, combined with indiscriminate land filling, jeopardizes agricultural livelihoods and thus increases internal migration, while toxic waste poisons waterways and landfills (Begum 2015).

A 2013 study of Bangladeshi villages that were hit hard by various effects of environmental change found that although almost every respondent in the 1,500-household sample identified climate change as an important threat to their livelihood, only 10 percent identified climatic stress as a primary reason for migration (table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for migration</th>
<th>Satkhira</th>
<th>Khulna</th>
<th>Chapai Nawabganj</th>
<th>Metropolitan Dhaka</th>
<th>Munshiganj</th>
<th>Keraniganj (Greater Dhaka)</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural calamities</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earn an income</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family migration</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage migration</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student migration</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Siddiqui, Islam, and Bhuiyan 2014.*
It was much more common to consider migration to improve the standard of living. However, this does not mean that migrants are unaware of the formidable threat of climate change. It is estimated that from 2011 to 2050, as many as 16 million to 26 million Bangladeshi citizens would have to migrate from areas affected by riverbank erosion and rising sea levels (Siddiqui et al. 2016). The current circular movement, meaning that people move back and forth from inundated areas, makes it difficult to estimate the magnitude and severity of internal migration. The country’s Coastal Zone Development policy does not even mention migration. This increasingly threatening situation implies that adaptation programs should not set as their goal to prevent migration, but instead plan for the best way to handle it by integrating rural and urban areas into overall planning (Siddiqui, Islam, and Bhuiyan 2014).

There are several signs that such a view is gradually gaining importance. In 2015, the Government of Bangladesh drafted the National Strategy on the Management of Disaster and Climate-Induced Internal Displacement. The strategy concentrates on supporting internally displaced populations moving away from climatic hazards, and covers three phases of displacement: (i) pre-displacement, (ii) displacement, and (iii) post-displacement. This initiative may be considered as a new generation of government policies dealing with climate-induced migration from a rights perspective. However, what is still lacking is a comprehensive approach that links all aspects of migration, including people’s search for economic improvement, and creates strategies that consider urban and rural areas as a unity, where the development of one area is connected with the other and movements of people are treated in such a manner that individual migrants and the entire nation may benefit from them (Siddiqui et al. 2016).

The process of gradual breakdown of the environment may be relatively slow, as in Bangladesh, although sudden catastrophes may cause massive and unprecedented migration movements. An example is the 2010 floods in Pakistan, when 14 million people were displaced in the short term. Of those who were displaced, some 200,000 moved to displacement camps. Several returned when the floods subsided; others chose to migrate permanently (Lucas 2015).

Emergencies like the flooding in Pakistan or upsurges of mass starvation in places like Sudan and the Horn of Africa are far from being occasional and unforeseen events. They are all part of a larger, more persistent pattern characterized by a variety of phenomena, such as poor resource allocation, insufficient planning for emergencies, deficient levels of knowledge/education, lack of political will and social services, deficient communications, and much more, all combined with an ever-increasing ecological threat. To understand the mechanisms operating in the case of emergencies, disasters must be studied in detail, in the context where they have occurred or are expected to take place. The coping strategies of the afflicted households and individuals must be analyzed before, during, and after the crises, to implement effective mechanisms and measures to avoid and mitigate emergencies.

Some countries have a more vulnerable topography than others and, like in Bangladesh, people have developed a vast range of mitigating strategies. However, the mounting threat from climate change and population growth make these strategies insufficient for encountering the expected dangers of resource depletion and mass migration to already sensitive and overcrowded areas. Thus, all stakeholders—the government, private sector, and all citizens—have to make a concerted effort to stem the threat of natural disasters and environmental degradation (Siddiqui, Islam, and Bhuiyan 2014).
2.5 Armed Conflicts

Another disconcerting reason for internal migration is armed conflict. At the end of 2016, 40.3 million people worldwide were displaced within their own country due to conflict and violence. Of the 6.9 million new internal displacements caused by conflict in 2016, 2.6 million took place in Sub-Saharan Africa, which overtook the Middle East as the region most affected. Almost one million new displacements were recorded in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the country worst affected (IDMC 2017, 1). By the end of 2015, Colombia had the world’s largest internally displaced population, 6.9 million. IDPs in the Syrian Arab Republic declined from 7.6 million in 2014 to 6.6 million, mainly due to IDPs crossing international borders to seek protection outside the country. By the end of 2015, other areas that harbored huge populations of IDPs were (and still are) Iraq (4.4 million), Sudan (3.2 million), the Republic of Yemen (2.5 million), Nigeria (2.2 million), South Sudan (1.8 million), the Democratic Republic of Congo (1.6 million), Afghanistan (1.2 million), Pakistan (1.1 million), and Somalia (1.1 million) (UNHCR 2016a, 30–31). The global numbers of IDPs are constantly increasing (UNHCR 2016b).

Colombia has suffered from internal displacement for decades. Since the 1960s, the country has been agonized by an ongoing armed conflict between the government, paramilitary groups, crime syndicates, and left-wing guerrillas, fighting each other to gain control over resources and territory. Approximately 220,000 people have died in the conflict, most of them civilians, and millions of individuals have been forced from their homes. According to official figures, as of December 2016, 7,246,000 people are internally displaced in Colombia (IDMC 2017).

Despite the country’s 2016 peace agreement, the displacement process has continued. Obstacles to return and the lack of durable solutions persist, as some armed groups continue to be active, violating a wide range of human rights, and victims’ comprehensive compensation and land issues remain unresolved. Illegal drug trade trafficking, sudden-onset disasters, and large-scale land acquisitions for development projects have added to the complexity of displacement in Colombia (IDMC 2017).

There are no displacement camps in Colombia. IDPs have mostly sought shelter in towns and cities, where they have moved in with relatives, or into informal settlements on the peripheries of cities. In 2016, the majority of IDPs were living in informal settlements in the country’s 27 largest cities. About a third lived in departments along the Pacific coast, often enduring confinement due to hostilities, land mines, and other threats (IDMC 2017).

Although economic considerations might play a role in the decision to migrate during a period of threatening violence, they are seldom the main driving factor. The decision to migrate in such situations is mainly an outcome of the security situation. Some households and individuals migrate preventively, without being directly exposed to violence, although fearing the onset of a worsened conflict and thus intending to minimize the possibility of future victimization. Other households might migrate from regions already torn by violence, not only to protect themselves, but also to escape economic hardships, as well as social and political restrictions, or they might flee after direct exposure to multiple types of violence. It is mostly the poor who are hardest hit. Families have been shattered and 32 percent of the households registered as consisting of displaced individuals are headed by a woman. Livelihoods have been lost and the social fabric has been shredded. In Bogotá, the rural exodus has created new marginalized
communities, where 10 ethnic groups from all over Colombia are trying to reconstruct their existence in a new setting, or await return to their places of origin. One of the most urgent dilemmas to solve, after Colombia’s Congress on November 29, 2016 finally approved a peace deal, is the issue of “abandoned land,” with 84 percent of the officially registered internally displaced individuals demanding land restitution (Castro 2015).

An essential measure of the Colombian peace agreement is to determine effective procedures for land restitution, return, and full compensation for all the affected individuals and communities. This involves amending the Land Restitution and Victim’s Law of 2011, adapting it to international human rights principles on restitution and housing. A Special Fund for Comprehensive Reparation has been proposed, equal to at least 3 percent of GDP, with an initial term of 10 years (Government of Colombia 2016).

Elaborate domestic legal and policy frameworks have already been developed in Colombia, to address displaced persons’ remedial rights. However, without a strong backing of financial resources and decisive law enforcement, implementation remains haphazard and often dangerous for all the parties involved. Careful monitoring and rigorous evaluations are needed to maximize durable solutions. To avoid land claims triggering future conflicts, it has been emphasized that displaced persons’ claims to housing, land, and property have to be well-founded, clearly communicated, and fair.

To reduce competition and foster reconciliation, in several areas of Colombia, policy makers and practitioners are trying to promote community-based approaches to assist all the victims of the conflict, as well as introducing benefits intended to have a remedial effect. Reintegration efforts in post-conflict areas, like former Yugoslavia, Lebanon, and Rwanda, emphasize the importance of understanding and assessing the links between displacement, transitional justice, and reconciliation. These efforts require interdisciplinary analyses, which at multiple levels clarify the interacting roles of all the stakeholders. Policies, programs, and institutional efforts concentrating on specific areas and actors, generally at high levels, tend to have limited effects. Accordingly, it is necessary to synchronize peacebuilding initiatives with comprehensive social processes, such as economic reform, evolution of gender roles, urban planning, and agrarian reform (Bradley 2015).

In Colombia, it has been demonstrated that individualized assistance must be balanced with community-based efforts. The arrival of large numbers of IDPs affected those already living in the receiving areas. The influx of IDPs to the country’s largest cities initially caused increased competition with local workers, suppression of wages, and intensified difficulties in finding employment. When displaced persons were concentrated in rural areas, they often competed with agricultural workers, reducing rural wages. Aid delivery had economic repercussions as well. If displaced persons were provided with food subsidies, food prices tended to increase in the areas where they were concentrated, while food prices declined if assistance came from foreign food supplies.

Housing rental prices for existing residents often increased, especially for the poorest segments of the population, while prices fell in the high-income rental market, probably because proximity to large displaced populations reduced demand among wealthier groups. Such effects were largely ignored by policy makers, but had important implications in Colombia, where displaced families generally received housing subsidies from the government, causing tensions with those who already lived in the neighborhood and were in need of assistance as well. Efforts to alleviate poverty, social exclusion, and
insecurity should be aimed at assisting all low-income groups, regardless of their displacement status, not only to avoid envy and erosion in social cohesion, but also to facilitate the integration of the displaced people in host communities (Depetris and Santos 2017).

When migrants return after a man-made emergency, support organizations recommend that reintegration assistance should be provided beyond 12 months, since it could take longer to create a livelihood capable of supporting a returnee and her/his family (Fonseca, Hart, and Klink 2015). The Colombian peace accords recognize that the process is extremely complicated and thus cannot be limited in time. Adjustments and reforms related to victims covered by the peace agreement must be extended to guarantee the proper care and reparation of all people who have suffered from the conflict. Among other endeavors, such an effort implies that the current Victims’ Law should be amended to compensate all the victims of the conflict (Government of Colombia 2016).

3. Need for Accurate Quantitative and Qualitative Information

3.1 Statistics on Migration

Most of the discussion and interest in internal migration in developing countries focus on rural-urban migration, but so far, no systematic and global compilation of the magnitudes of these movements exists. However, in 2013, the United Nations Population Division gathered the available evidence on internal migration across administrative boundaries for a wide range of countries (Bell and Charles-Edwards 2013).

According to these estimates, some 12 percent of the global population was internal migrants. There are considerable variations, for example, in the Latin America and the Caribbean region, the estimated intensity of internal migration is some 50 percent higher than the global measure. Asia has much lower rates. In Latin America and the Caribbean, urbanized rates are reported to be on a par with those in higher-income countries. South Asia has far lower rates (Lucas 2015). Table 2 shows the global trends in internal migration.

Table 2. Estimated Number of Lifetime Internal Migrants, Migration Intensity, and Urbanization Rate: Major Developing Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2005 Migrants, millions</th>
<th>2005 Intensity %</th>
<th>2010 Urbanization rate %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>113.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>282.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Eastern Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>100.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Caribbean</td>
<td></td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World</td>
<td>762.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less developed regions</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lucas 2015, 3.
It is exceedingly difficult to compile statistics on internal migration. The concept is volatile. It is difficult to establish the limits between a district, region, or province, as well as agreeing on which is an urban or rural area, town, or village. It is also difficult to establish the time span needed to be counted as a “migrant” (five months, five years, or 10 years?), as well as the difference between seasonal and permanent migration.

Accordingly, measurement problems are significant. The growth of cities is far from being enough as an indicator of internal migration, since natural growth continually expands urban populations, without the contribution of migrants. Concepts like “city,” “town,” and “village” may also be misleading, since they vary and fluctuate from place to place and from individual to individual. The population growth of villages may in a few years turn them into urban settlements. If censuses include aspects of rural-urban migration, they furthermore tend to rely on the declarations of the respondents, whose perceptions of what a “town” is may vary considerably. It is also difficult to pinpoint seasonal and other forms of migration, and commuting is fairly uniformly omitted from assessments of migration. The fast expansion of means of communication also blurs distances and definitions of settlements (Lucas 2015).

There is thus a wide range of elements of internal migration that need to be effectively defined and assessed, which is still difficult to do, since governments tend to use different sets of data while accounting for internal migration, and so far, no international standard procedures have been established.

In other areas of the social sciences, standard, widely-accepted measures are used to define and compute data in accordance with the universally accepted standards applied by the international statistical community. However, for internal migration, the development of such classifications and measurements is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, it should be possible to agree on a few basic principles while addressing the phenomenon of internal migration.

Migration is linked to individual aspirations and constraints. Thus, it is important to approach persons in sending and receiving communities and through standardized and appropriate surveys to determine their motivations for migrating, as well as the outcome of their decisions. Migration is furthermore changing human settlements in different ways, making scale and impact, as well as the spatial distribution of migrants, important to address. It is also essential to take into consideration the various distances over which people move.

Migration may be permanent, circular, or seasonal. Thus, it is important to study these different kinds of flows, relating them to local conditions and how they connect rural and urban areas, cities, and regions, and how different types of settlements are linked through trade and commodity flows. While measuring the overall intensity of migration, it is also imperative to include the manner in which it varies by age and gender and how different age and gender groups are affected by migration, in receiving and sending communities.

It is difficult to make cross-national comparisons of internal migration, since local conditions vary. Furthermore, sets of migration data and their collection are seldom consistent. Many countries measure migration as a change of address or transition between preset points in time (from birth, 10 years, one year, five years, and so forth); others collect information based on several migration events (economic, forced, educational, seasonal, and so forth); and some governments simply record the duration of
residence in the current location. Statistics also depend on the zones in which a country is divided, which, for example, may be based on geographical/topographic conditions, and/or administrative subdivisions.

The most common tools for recording and assessing internal migration are censuses, population registers, administrative data, and national surveys. Some of these may be missing in some countries, although censuses represent the primary and most common data source for internal migration.

On a global level, it is becoming common to measure the effects of internal migration by comparing it with GDP per capita during certain intervals, to identify a link between mobility and economic development. To trace social change, comparisons are often being made between the Human Development Index (HDI) and migration intensity, measured over five-year and one-year intervals. The HDI encompasses GDP per capita, education, and life expectancy, and reinforces the suggestion of a close link between mobility and development measured across a broad spectrum.

Bell and Charles-Edwards (2014, 25) suggest several recommendations to the international statistical community, designed specifically to facilitate cross-national comparisons of internal migration, although these recommendations may also be viable for data collection within specific countries. Key among them are the following:

- Internal migration should be measured over a fixed interval, ideally over one or five years, with a lower priority accorded to place of birth within a country.
- Data on place of residence should be coded to the smallest geographical zones feasible.
- Priority should be given to collecting data on all changes of usual address, to facilitate comparisons of overall migration intensity.
- Data on duration of residence, if collected, should be recorded as length of residence rather than year of arrival, and indicate explicitly the spatial unit to which it refers.
- Statistical agencies should disseminate a range of standard outputs on internal migration, including detailed origin-destination flow matrixes.

All development policies are affected by internal migration and it is thus of utmost importance to improve and refine the various measurement methods. Researchers and policy makers must be able to quantify the relative effects of different economic policies on the nature, character, and magnitude of internal migration, as well as ascertain what factors influence a person's decision to move. It is important to identify what has been empirically tested and where, building on this background to identify the major priority questions in migration research, and suggest appropriate policy measures for dealing with these issues (Bell and Charles-Edwards 2014).

3.2 Migration Trends

The current debate on population movements within and across countries seems to assume that all forms of migration are accelerating rapidly. However, according to Bell and Charles-Edwards (2014, 10), there is mounting evidence that international migration rates have been remarkably stable over recent decades and internal migration has been falling in some developed countries. “New world” countries have some of the highest levels of mobility, for example, New Zealand, the United States, and Canada.
The lowest intensities are found in Southeast Asia and Central America. Countries in Africa display more moderate intensities and Latin America demonstrates a mixture of high mobility (Chile) and more moderate mobility (Brazil and Argentina). Migration intensities are lowest in Asia. China presents an exception to the continent’s general pattern of decline, with interprovincial migration intensities increasing by almost 150 percent between the 1990 and 2000 census rounds. This was probably due to a partial relaxation of restrictions on movement to the nation’s major coastal cities (Bell and Charles-Edwards 2014).

By the beginning of this century, some countries were experiencing sharp declines in internal migration. For example, internal migration declined in Argentina by 43.5 percent between 1997 and 2002; in Malaysia, by 33.3 percent; and in Indonesia, by 27.3 percent, coinciding with the depression and financial crisis. In Argentina, the economy shrank by 28 percent from 1998 to 2002. In Malaysia, GDP plunged 6.2 percent in 1998 and started to recuperate during the first years of this century. Indonesia lost 13.5 percent of its GDP in 1998 and began to recuperate at about the same pace as Malaysia. As soon as the crisis was overcome, internal migration took off again. The aging population is another significant factor in decreased mobility, especially in developed countries. A positive factor connected with decreased internal migration might be if wealth and innovations are increasing, causing regional economic differentials to diminish and thus affecting interregional migration flows (Bell and Charles-Edwards 2014).

4. Similarities, Differences, and Connections between Internal and International Migration

Just like the reasons for internal migration differ widely, so do the reasons for international migration. Nevertheless, there is growing evidence of commonalities between countries and the two categories of migration. Globally, the motives behind migration seem to be quite similar across migration types. This may be exemplified through a comprehensive study of rural areas in Bangladesh (six districts and 1,205 households), which finds that the quest for work or improved working conditions (remuneration and so forth) was the main motive for migration. Its relative importance ranged between 97 percent for international migration and 70 percent for regional migration (Mahmood and Siddiqui 2014, 12).3

A difference between international and internal migration is that the latter tends to be less “permanent” than international migration, meaning that internal migrants move more often than international ones. In some countries, people change their place of residence 10 or more times during their lives, whereas elsewhere mobility is less common (Bell and Charles-Edwards 2014).

4.1 Age and Gender

Mahmood and Siddiqui (2014) conclude that in Bangladesh female migrants tend to be more prominent among regional migrants than among international ones. Furthermore, women do not migrate internally to the same extent as men do. Men often migrate to urban areas while leaving their spouses behind with their families. As shown in table 3, spouses play a more important role in decision making about regional

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3 Mahmood and Siddiqui distinguish between international and “regional” migration, defining a regional migrant as “anyone who used to live in the household and left to go away in the past 10 years to another country within the region.” In this context, “region” can be defined as South Asia, consisting of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. In its geographical classification, the United Nations includes Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran as parts of South Asia.
migration compared with other migration types. Migrants are generally older than age 25 years, probably because younger family members are dependent on the support of and contact with their family. The propensity to migrate, in particular regionally, appears to increase with age, probably due to the costs involved with such a move and because such migrants often move with their families.

Table 3. Sociodemographic Characteristics of Migrants in Bangladesh (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant characteristic</th>
<th>Migration type</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≤ 25</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26–40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40+</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest level of education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th level or less</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th to Secondary School Certificate</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above Secondary School Certificate</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of migration (years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≤ 3</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4–8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8+</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of migration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3+</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for migration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job related/work/better work</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study/ training</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision maker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant self</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse/partner</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mahmood and Siddiqui 2014, 10.
In Bangladesh, as in several other countries, the average age of migrants tends to be relatively lower for internal and regional migrants than for international migrants. The motives behind migration are similar across migration types. The quest for work or better work is the main motive for migration; its relative importance ranges between 97 percent for international migration and 70 percent for regional migration. Access to education and training is an important factor among internal migrants but not for others (Mahmood and Siddiqui 2014).

Globally, the most common age for internal migration seems to be between 20 and 28 years; in some countries, there is a second peak at retirement age (Bell and Charles-Edwards 2014). In general, South Asia, and East Asia and West Africa are characterized by young profiles with high migration peaks; developed countries display older profiles with generally lower peaks (Bell and Charles-Edwards 2014).

The most common occupation for migrant women, globally and internally, is domestic work. There are more than 53 million domestic workers worldwide, of whom more than 21 million are in Asia and the Pacific, of which 80 percent are women (ILO 2017). According to estimates by the International Labour Organization (ILO), dating from 2013, there are about four million domestic workers in Northern, Southern, and Western Europe, of which 2.8 million are women and 2.2 million are migrants (Magalhães 2017). In 2010, it is estimated that 7.6 million people were employed as domestic workers in urban areas in Latin America, constituting on average 5.5 percent of total urban employment (Tokman 2010). Domestic workers are mainly women from lower income households and the majority originally come from rural areas.

Official figures probably underestimate the size of the phenomenon, since they generally exclude domestic work performed in the informal sector. This is a common challenge in research on employment and migration issues. Migrant women in the domestic work sector are among the most vulnerable workers. Their vulnerability is characterized by lack of official migratory status or precarious temporary residence permits. Their vulnerability is magnified by employment in private households, where workers are less protected from abuse, due to the invisibility of their work. Moreover, intimate contacts between employers and employees may lead to blurred working relationships (Magalhães 2017).

To a high degree, research on domestic work has been based on feminist thought, emphasizing the need to question gender roles and specifically the hierarchical division between productive and reproductive work. The latter is considered as being devalued and banished to the secluded, private women’s sphere. Traditionally, productive work has been associated with masculine aptitudes, and reproductive work has been understood as a feminine domain, suffering from lack of recognition (Magalhães 2017).

The most recent addition to domestic workers’ struggles is the mobilization for approval of ILO Convention 189 on domestic workers. So far, only 24 states have ratified the convention (as of June 2017), but many nations, such as Brazil and Spain, are drafting legislation to prepare for its ratification. However, the binding text rarely mentions documented migrant domestic workers (articles 8 and 15) and there is no mention of those who are undocumented (Magalhães 2017).

Some studies on the gender aspects of domestic work and its relation to international and internal migration highlight that it appears that women generally are more able than men to gather information and find opportunities to acquire regular migratory status. The studies highlight that more migrant
women than men are working in the care-providing sphere, in hospitals, nursing homes, and private homes. These activities have made it easier for women to come into contact with children’s schools and other social institutions, often due to ties developed through their close contacts with employers who have been willing to help them. Migrant men mainly work in the construction sector and similar endeavors, and thus interact with fellow workers in the same or a similar situation as themselves, thus limiting their interactions with the surrounding communities. Furthermore, migrant men’s contacts with employers and/or their agents tend to be formal and limited. Networking appears to be gendered in a similar fashion, where women, more than men, tend to have wider connections in workplaces, public transport, churches, and informal community gatherings. These are places where information is disseminated on work and regularization opportunities, as well as working conditions in other areas (Magalhães 2017).

A patriarchal view of women and their work appears in several instances to have influenced official efforts to protect women’s welfare, often based on a traditional view that has limited women’s choices and mobility. It has been, and still is, an ingrained notion that women have the main responsibility for the well-being, upbringing, and education of children, as well as the caring for the sick and elderly. Many women domestic workers who have migrated internationally and internally, due to their working conditions, must leave their children behind in the care of others. This situation has motivated several authorities to limit women’s mobility, confining them to their family homes. In several countries, such efforts have limited the buildup of communal childcare and preventive health services for women, children, and the elderly, since it is thought that these areas are women’s responsibility within the family sphere.

Among several attempts by the Sri Lankan government to regulate women’s migration and protect their rights and security, the Family Background Report requirement intends to restrict the migration of mothers. Sri Lanka has a large out-migration of women, mainly destined for domestic work. In 2014, domestic workers accounted for 80 percent of female departures from Sri Lanka. Despite a long-term declining trend in this share, in absolute terms, women still account for more than 100,000 departures per year. The Family Background Report policy, which was introduced in 2013, stipulates that women with children younger than age five years are restricted from migrating for domestic work abroad; women with children older than age five years will only be recommended for migration if satisfactory alternative care arrangements are in place to ensure the protection of their children. So far, these rules apply only to international migrants, although the underlying opinion may be applied to internal migrants as well, as it reflects a view that women have the main, if not the sole, responsibility for childcare (Weeraratne 2017).

Bangladesh has a long history of banning women from migrating for employment. In 1981, Bangladesh banned all semi-skilled and unskilled women workers from overseas employment on the grounds of protecting their dignity abroad. This policy was revised in 1988 by replacing the ban with restrictions to limit the migration of unskilled and semi-skilled women. In 1997, an almost complete ban was imposed on migration of all categories of women, except highly qualified professionals, such as doctors, engineers, and teachers. However, this move was viewed by critics as unconstitutional and discriminatory, claiming that it would contribute to trafficking of women. Eventually, the ban was abolished and all categories of
women are now allowed to migrate (Weeraratne 2017). Despite that laws erecting barriers for women’s migration have disappeared, there is still resistance to women’s participation in the labor market.

The recent movement toward women's emancipation in Bangladesh may partly be traced to the development of the county’s garment industry. The garment industry is, and has historically been, one of the most female-dominated industries in the world. Today, more than 70 percent of garment workers in China are women; in Bangladesh, the share is 85 percent; and in Cambodia the share is as high as 90 percent. In Bangladesh, which, after China, is the world’s largest exporter of garments, in 2015, the minimum wage for garment workers was Tk 5,300 (US$65) per month, which is far from the Tk 8,900 (US$110) needed to cover a worker’s basic needs. Many garment workers work between 60 and 140 hours of overtime per month (Alam et al. 2011, 4). Accommodation is costly. A single room may cost Tk 4,000 (US$50) to Tk 6,000 (US$74) a month, and it is generally shared by several people. Daycare is hard to come by and, if it can be found, it is often deficient and unhealthy. Violence against women is widespread. Although far from all abuse directed against women is reported, rape continues to be the crime that is most reported to the police. Women are vulnerable on their route to and from work and often walk in groups for protection; some stay overnight at the garment factories (Kakuli and Risberg 2012). Nevertheless, the entry of large numbers of women into the Bangladeshi garment industry has meant a change in traditional roles within families and communities.

When migration is a calculated family decision, adjusted gender roles are more readily accepted by men and women. The greater income earned by migrating women empowers them in areas such as family decision making and how income is distributed between expenses and savings. Women’s newfound power to make decisions, resulting from greater financial freedom and new authority, often induces a sense of self-worth and independence. Many workers, especially women, had not experienced this before, having lived sheltered lives under the authority of their fathers, brothers, and husbands.

Kabeer (1999) defines empowerment as the ability to make choices. To be disempowered is to be denied choice; empowerment entails change. According to Kabeer, people’s ability to exercise choice involves three interdependent dimensions: (i) resources (materials, such as wages or land, and social or human skills and knowledge); (ii) agency (collective as well as individual reflection and action, such as bargaining, negotiating, and protesting); and (iii) realized achievements, or the failure to do so.

Kabeer (1999) notes that women garment workers in Bangladesh often demand that labor unions represent women’s rights and acknowledge their special needs. Despite its often dreadful working conditions, the industry brings women together in unprecedented large numbers. These women are exposed to harassment, abuse, and health hazards, but several of them nevertheless claim they have been empowered through their experience as industrial workers (Kakuli and Risberg 2012).

More research is needed to gain a better understanding of men’s conceptions of and the gains from women’s empowerment and their economic contributions to family and society. In many societies, men have traditionally been conceived as responsible breadwinners and guardians of women. Marriage and having children have been considered as proof of a man’s worth. Men were assumed to be an integrated part of the public sphere, working and socializing, while women were supposed to spend their time at home.
However, when women are engaged in remunerated work outside the family sphere, traditional qualms tend to subside as soon as the well-being and economy of the family improves. Once a couple migrates from a rural environment, relatives and neighbors tend to exempt them from their traditional gender roles, pointing out that they will be better off if the wife is also working and adapting herself to urban ways.

That women’s agency can be improved by migration highlights an aspect of international and internal migration that has not been sufficiently emphasized so far. Women may migrate because of gender-based structural inequalities and discrimination at home. Migration may thus not only be a means to try to escape from poverty, but also from other forms of limitations, like discrimination and various forms of coercion and constraint. Women may migrate to escape stifling traditions and pressure from peers and relatives. Adolescent girls may migrate to avoid early or other forms of unwanted marriage arrangements or relationships. Some women may also want to escape from various forms of gender-based restrictions and limitations, gendered social stigmas, or the potential for gender-based violence. At a certain threshold, discrimination may be so high that it hinders female migration. Migration can only occur if the woman has agency, can make the decision to migrate, and has the means to do so (Fleury 2016). However, in their new environment, migrating women may find themselves circumscribed by traditional gender roles affecting the labor market where women are generally inserted in the global care chain.

Migration is nevertheless an empowering experience for women, allowing them to access employment and education, improve gender equality, change norms, and strengthen agency, that is, the ability to make independent decisions to achieve desired outcomes. Understanding the intricacies of gender and migration may result in better programs and policies to enhance the benefits and decrease the costs for female migrants. For this understanding to emerge, reliable and accurate data are urgently needed, along with in-depth gender analysis in migration studies.

Migration can also be an empowering experience for men. They may also perceive migration as a means to improve their personal freedom, escape stifling social norms and expectations, and seek possibilities to develop their skills, as well as their specific talents and aspirations. Like all other examples of push and pull factors for migration presented in this report, individual initiatives are not enough for attaining socioeconomic changes. Individual initiatives must be complemented and supported by a commitment from governments to address the issue of internal migration in a constructive and supportive manner, by implementing adequate policies and offering the social services and infrastructure needed for achieving inclusive and sustainable development.

4.2 Remittances

Remittances from internal migrants are generally not quantified. But, given the large number of people working in different locations than that of their families, it is safe to assume that internal remittances are significant and have positive effects on migrant-sending families and communities.

Remittances from citizens working abroad have increasingly been emphasized as having beneficial effects for source countries. In 2016, the volume of remittances from abroad amounted to US$575 billion. Although net remittances as a percentage of GDP remains low in most countries, they may in others constitute more than 20 percent (for example, 32.2 percent in Nepal, 31.2 percent in Liberia, 28.8 percent
in Tajikistan, 25.7 in the Kyrgyz Republic, and 24.5 percent in Haiti). In these countries, remittances constitute the largest source of foreign exchange. Globally, remittances exceed the volume of official aid flows to developing countries (KNOMAD 2017).

International and internal remittances continue to be used mainly for immediate consumption needs, repayment of debts, housing and other asset building, purchase of transport equipment and consumer durables, as well as the welfare and education of children. To a lesser extent, remittances are used to finance small enterprises and agricultural investments. The volume of international remittances tends to be considerably larger than domestic ones, but the latter generally benefit more households. The most deprived households depend on remittances for food; more affluent households use remittances for education and health (Mahapatro 2015).

The importance of remittances from international migrants for alleviating poverty and fostering general development has caught the attention of policy makers to a much higher degree than remittances sent by internal migrants. However, some research findings indicate that remittances sent by internal migrants also have a significant impact on the well-being of the receivers, because of their larger spread among poor sections of society and their consistency over time. Even minor amounts of remittances help to stabilize or improve the living conditions of those left behind and affect intra- and inter-household relations, fomenting patterns of growth and development (Srivastava et al. 2014).

India is the world’s largest recipient of international remittances. World Bank data indicate that India received approximately US$69 billion in 2016 (KNOMAD 2017) and for several years the country has maintained its position as the largest recipient of remittances. In absolute terms, India has one of the largest populations of poor people in the world. The proportion of the population living on less than US$1.25 a day is 32.7 percent and the incidence of rural households with at least one out-migrant ranges from 30 to 80 percent (Srivastava et al. 2014, 3).

Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state in India, has experienced the largest interstate out-migration, contributing more than one-fourth of the total interstate urban out-migrants. Much of the state’s population continues to depend on agriculture and its associated activities, or on migration to other states in India. As figure 1 shows, migration of the male population has resulted in an increasing flow of remittances. Although international migrant send a higher amount of remittances compared with inter-district and intra-district migrants, the impact of the latter is very significant, since it reaches the poorest section of the population (Ahmad 2014). About 85 percent of male interstate migrants send remittances ranging from less than Re 10,000 (39.2 percent of migrants) to between Re 30,000 and Re 40,000 (10.2 percent of migrants) (Ahmad 2014, 23).
The amount of international and internal remittances sent can be affected by factors such as education, occupation, skills and type of sector (formal or informal), economic conditions of remittance-receiving households, type of migration, and so forth. International out-migrants send greater remittances because international out-migrants can earn more money due to higher wages (Ahmad 2014, 17).

So far, few studies have examined the remittances of forced IDPs. This void is partially explained by the difficulties of collecting data in regions affected by violence and armed conflict. Nevertheless, some studies suggest that remittance dynamics in the context of forced migration are not entirely different from those in the context of traditional migration, although this kind of migration process has some distinct patterns.

A recent study in Colombia (Ibáñez, Moya, and Arteaga 2017) finds that refugees’ remittances are almost entirely motivated by altruism and intended to help those who have stayed behind to cope with the hardships of violence, or to finance their migration journey and allow them to escape from the hostile environment. It comes as no surprise that when the intensity of a conflict increases, forced migrants are more compelled to send resources and goods to their relatives and friends back home. Furthermore, forced migrants are generally different from traditional migrants, who often are relatively skilled young adults able to take advantage of economic opportunities in host communities. Forced migrants might be less qualified and face greater challenges in reception sites. Moreover, forced migration is often accompanied by a significant loss of productive, social, and human capital, which lowers the ability to generate income in reception sites.

When entire households are displaced, forced migrants have greater obligations in reception sites and fewer contacts in origin sites, which lowers their incentives to send money back home. However, it is common that IDPs send remittances to help sustain local economies and household livelihoods during times of widespread violence, as well as in the context of financial crises and natural disasters. Several studies indicate that it is quite common that IDPs receive remittances from kin who have remained in...
conflict areas. In 2006, more than 40 percent of Iraqi refugees residing in Jordan received remittances from Iraq, and in 2013, 10 percent of Sudanese refugees living in the Arab Republic of Egypt received remittances from war-torn Sudan (Ibáñez, Moya, and Arteaga 2017, 7).

A potential explanation for this bidirectional flow lies in the strategies adopted by IDPs during the migration process and their vulnerable conditions in destination areas. Studies indicate that some portion of internally displaced households split up to mitigate asset losses in conflict regions and send income to family members who have migrated to save their lives. Some households that split up for strategic reasons are often more effectively mitigating the negative impacts of conflict and forced migration than those who decided to escape together. Research indicates that split-up households generally are more likely to send transfers and in larger amounts, and more likely to receive transfers (Ibáñez, Moya, and Arteaga 2017).

4.3 Evolving Views of Migration

Historically, governments’ attitudes toward international and internal migration have fluctuated. Although the benefits of internal migration continue to be underestimated, views of international migration have shifted from considering it to be a threat to national development, to an accepted escape valve for labor-abundant economies where out-migration may result in decreased unemployment and a rise in real wages. Previously there was a great fear that “brain drain” and decreased human capital availability would harm the growth capability of nations. An extreme example of such fears was nurtured by the fascist regime in Italy. With 9.2 million Italians living outside Italy in 1927, Mussolini annulled all passports and government permission was required to leave the country. Frontier guards were ordered to shoot anyone attempting to leave without such permission (Sassen 1999, 91). In some countries, such views still exist. Migration is generally considered to be a loss of human capital, or a failure of the government to provide for its citizens. It has been less common to consider out-migration as contributing to national development, despite that, for example, the waves of migration from Italy contributed to investments by returning migrants and a flow of remittances directed to often poor and especially rural areas, particularly in southern Italy.

Other earlier examples of fears of draining skills due to emigration can be found in Scandinavia. For example, by the beginning of the 20th century, Norway had the highest out-migration per capita in Europe, closely followed by Sweden, with one in five Swedes living abroad (almost one million). However, in Sweden, fears of a brain drain turned out to have quite opposite effects than those of Fascist Italy. Inspired by influential lobby groups like the National Organization against Emigration (Nationalföreningen mot emigrationen), in 1907, the Swedish government established an Emigration Committee, which a year later proposed that Sweden had to “accept and digest the real, good advantages that could be found in America.” At that time, the United States was the main destination for Swedish migrants. The recommendations of the Emigration Committee were the foremost reason for the establishment of general suffrage in 1909 (women’s suffrage had to wait until 1921) as well as comprehensive reforms in education and housing. Thus, emigration resulted in a win-win situation where migrants experienced a beneficial integration process in their new country, and those who were left behind saw their situation improved through socioeconomic reforms encouraged by the emigration process. As a result, for example,
support was provided to farmers and manufacturers opting for expanding and improving their production inside Sweden, as well as establishing closer contacts with international markets (Barton 1994).

The Swedish Emigration Committee’s report, which in 1913 published its results and recommendations in 20 volumes, is an early example of the realization that out-migration may be a gain, instead of a loss. If large groups of former citizens maintain economic links to their place of origin, a nation’s diaspora can be a major source of investment, technology, business contacts, and development assistance. Some of the Swedish areas with the largest out-migration, like the district of Småland, turned into hubs of small-scale industrial development. Such hubs stimulated an internal migrant flow that resulted in the growth of several medium-size towns, while an exodus to bigger cities was avoided. In Sweden, it became apparent that international and internal migration were interlinked. International migration created savings and income abroad, which were invested in Sweden, initiating and supporting development in formerly poor regions, which eventually resulted in more balanced interregional economic and social development.

The Swedish example may also be used to put the so-called “brain drain” argument in question. The result of a massive out-migration may of course be that when trained and experienced professionals migrate to more developed nations there is a loss of desperately needed skills. However, emigration might just as well act as an incentive for human capital improvement in the source country. The same analogy could be made for internal migrants who acquire new skills and attitudes in the new environment. Following their example, more people may volunteer to acquire education and skills, and the overall stock of human capital increases. Unfortunately, historical examples of increased prosperity for migrant-sending and -receiving countries and communities seem to be largely ignored in the current migration debate.

4.4 Brain Drain

Brain drain is still hotly debated in relation to migration and development. In more than 20 developing countries, more than half of their tertiary-educated citizens are abroad (UNESCO 2017). This situation generally has been deemed as detrimental to the health care systems of many poor countries. Despite significant efforts made to improve health and health care systems in the developing world, the salaries of health care workers are not attractive enough; thus, many health care workers tend to migrate. Health care systems in developing countries may receive financial aid to deal with significant diseases and health issues such as child mortality, AIDS, and malaria. However, investments are often ineffective due to lack of sufficient numbers of medical and health care professionals who are willing and able to do the required work. Several other factors, like insufficient infrastructure, inadequate training and education, lack of preventive health efforts, huge distances, high medical costs, insecurity, outbreaks of epidemics, and other emergencies, also affect the efficiency of the health care systems in these countries.

The concept of “brain drain” should be studied more in depth. The term was coined to describe the emigration of scientists and technicians from post-war Europe to North America. Although the term originally referred to skilled technicians leaving a nation, the meaning has broadened to the departure of educated or professional people from one country, economic sector, or field to another, usually for better pay or living conditions. This concept may be equally applied to local conditions and internal migration, since, in many countries, rural areas and entire districts are often left without skilled workers, who prefer to move to more prosperous and auspicious areas.
Recent research calls for a reconsideration of the impact of drain brain on sending countries. For example, almost half of the African-born doctors practicing in the United States were not trained in Africa, but in various other parts of the world, including South Asia and the Caribbean. These patterns imply that many existing studies might be overestimating the level of brain drain and its effects, such as the fiscal burden on countries of birth. And 15 percent of the African-trained doctors came from countries outside Africa, challenging the widely shared belief that skilled migration is a one-way drain from poorer to wealthier countries. Many African doctors spend quite a few years between their graduation at home and migration to the United States, implying that countries of education do not immediately and fully lose the human capital generated within their borders. There is substantial heterogeneity across African countries in these results, which should caution policy makers against generalizing based on evidence from a single country (Özden and Phillips 2015). Nevertheless, it is evident that governments should make efforts to encourage and attract health care workers not only to stay within and move back to developing countries, but also to be active in less attractive, often rural areas.

Another fear, especially from the perspective of areas of destination, has been that rising incomes among inhabitants of initially poorer areas may increase citizens’ ability to finance their migration. It is well-established that it is those who can afford it who are able to move, in particular abroad, while the most destitute stay behind, or migrate internally. One theory is that countries, and certain districts, may be “drained” due to increased migration, which brings increased wealth to those left behind, inciting them to leave as well. This theory might be contradicted by reality, since if this theory is valid, it would mean that beyond some turning point emigration rates would decline, as people would have less need to move due to increasing wealth (Lucas 2015).

Furthermore, the skills that have been acquired to facilitate migration may benefit sending communities as well. For example, if the health care sector of an urbanized area needs additional workers, this could cause increased local interest in health care and nursing, which may benefit not only receiving areas, but dispatching areas as well. Likewise, production initiatives that initially may not be successful locally might be adopted later due to improved links with other areas. For example, fish breeding to supply the protein requirements of local communities often has not been successful due to the customary diet, until exporting fish to other areas generates interest among local entrepreneurs. When production and income have increased due to exports, locals eventually have become interested and several have become fish consumers as well.

The perspective of recipient countries and/or communities might of course be quite different. Migrants may be considered as competitors to workers already established in migrant-receiving areas, draining resources destined for general well-being and affecting local identities. However, most indications imply that international migration promotes global and local development, and internal migration benefits national progress. From the opinions of internal migrants, it appears that, despite living in persistent poverty, they consider their move to be beneficial. Such views should to be included in general assessments of the benefits and shortcomings of internal migration, as observed by Robert E. B. Lucas:

Indeed, in general terms it is probably fair to say that economists have been largely preoccupied with the migration of labor. Movements of families or parts of families to gain access to (better) schooling, health facilities, or other publicly provided services
has therefore often been of peripheral concern. The growing literature on family strategies and migration has more recently widened this circle of reference for economists. The interactions between migration, fertility, marriage, and family structure have begun to be explored. Within other disciplines similar issues were raised at a much earlier stage. Thus far, the contributions by economists in these spheres seem promising. Still, our tests of any resultant hypotheses have normally been conducted in one context at best. Replication or refutation of these ideas in other spheres must be high on our agenda. (Lucas 1997, 786)

5. Why Has Internal Migration Been Underresearched and Generally Treated Differently from International Migration?

Although international migration has received more attention in recent debates on migration, internal migration is more significant in numbers of people involved and probably in significance for poverty reduction. However, although internal migration generally leads to an accumulation of household wealth and triggers positive changes in sending and receiving areas, several policy makers, bureaucrats, and scholars continue to view the phenomenon as an economically, socially, and politically destabilizing process.

Research and various interventions directed at mitigating and/or benefitting from the effects of internal and international migration have often been developed without reference to each other and described according to different conceptual, theoretical, and methodological standpoints. This dichotomy may be due to several factors, including conflicting data sources, different disciplinary backgrounds of researchers, different analytical techniques, and research agendas reflecting the specific interests of various policy concerns and funding sources.

While distinguishing between internal and international migration, distance may seldom be considered as a defining criterion. For example, a 10-kilometer transnational move from Geneva across the border into France may be contrasted with a 4,000-kilometer internal relocation from New York to California, or from the interior of China to the nation’s eastern, coastal metropolitan areas.

Time and distance may also influence the concepts of international and internal migration. The current definitions of states and territories may, due to political reasons, change from one day to another. For example, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia transformed erstwhile internal migrants into “international” migrants.

It may be argued that passports, visas, and border controls denote what is internal and international migration, although this argument is contradicted by the frontier-free “Shengenland” of the European Union, an arrangement that also may change in upcoming years. An argument evoking “cultural unity” based on language and traditions is not valid either. In Africa, demarcations first by colonial territories and then by new nation state boundaries have cut through areas where there was once free movement based on ethnic or tribal affiliations or nomadic circuits.

Internal and international mobility creates an integrated system, which can be observed at a range of scales—family/household, community, national, and the constellation of countries linked by migration flows. To consider one form of migration without the other, as has so often happened in the past, is to
look at only one part of the story, and results in a partial and unbalanced interpretation (King, Skeldon, and Vullnetari 2008).

During the 1960s, internal migration in general, and rural-urban migration in particular, were still viewed overwhelmingly favorably in the development literature. Rapid internal migration was considered a desirable process by which surplus rural labor was withdrawn from traditional agriculture, to provide cheap labor to fuel the growing industrial complex. Human resources were shifted from locations where their marginal social products were assumed to be almost zero, to places where these marginal products were not only positive, but growing because of capital accumulation and technological progress (Todaro 1976).

However, it was eventually reported that throughout the developing world rates of rural-urban migration exceeded rates of urban job creation and surpassed the capacity of industry and urban social services to absorb the constant inflow of former rural residents. Internal migration increasingly came to be considered as an administrative and legislative nightmare. It crossed physical and departmental boundaries, causing administrative problems for institutions that were not used to cooperating with each other and incapable of providing efficient planning to meet the expected needs. The situation was aggravated by the inability of official statistics to capture fully the various migratory patterns. National censuses and other occupational surveys tended to be more concerned with full-time and formal occupations, than finding the means to record part-time and seasonal occupations especially in the informal sector. However, a growing number of multidisciplinary studies demonstrated that temporary migration and commuting are increasing and most work opportunities are created outside the formal sector (Bell and Charles-Edwards 2014; Lucas 2015).

Negative government attitudes, combined with ignorance fueled by inadequate data sets, have led to widespread neglect of internal migration as an important force in economic development. Concerns have instead focused on the negative effects of uncontrolled urban growth, such as the external costs associated with overcrowding, pressure on infrastructure such as roads and schools, pollution, and inadequate waste disposal. It has been emphasized that overcrowded cities breed poverty and crime, problems deemed to be particularly severe in huge cities where vast areas characterized by poverty and desolation are apparent to everyone.

Furthermore, several researchers and nongovernmental organizations continue to take an old-fashioned position by considering that rural-urban migration cannot be anything but exploitative and impoverishing, thus perpetuating myths about the causes and effects of migration. Such opinions are combined with a reluctance from some governments to consider the positive aspects of internal migration.

The agendas of authorities requesting data on migration might be influenced by a vested interest in their use, which might affect data collecting, processing, presentation, and in particular the application of the conclusions. This is generally frustrating for policy-oriented academic researchers, who may discover that the quality of their data has little impact on policy and practice. Landau (2014) pinpoints several shortcomings of migration statistics from Southern Africa, for tracing changing migratory patterns and the interest of certain authorities in hiding and manipulating data for political reasons. Accordingly, he stresses the importance of careful assessments of data and thorough education for researchers (Landau 2014).
Lack or disregard of substantiated research and policy recommendations has induced several nations to implement restrictions on population movement and employment. Consequently, migrants might end up without access to civic amenities or government poverty reduction programs, and they may become vulnerable to various forms of harassment and exploitation. A particularly vulnerable group are girls and women, who may be exposed to the danger of sexual abuse and violence.

5.1 Internal Migration and Development

In the current debate on the implications of internal migration for poverty alleviation and development, there is a lack of adequate acknowledgement by several governments of the benefits gained from internal migration. The Dual Sector Model, which was introduced by Sir Arthur Lewis in 1954, is generally considered to be the foundation for development economics. Unlike many other fields of economics, development economics incorporates migration and other social and political factors in devising plans for development.

The Dual Sector Model, which was developed further by Todaro (1976), includes internal migration as part of a long-term process of structural change, specifically from an agrarian to an industrial society. A widening productivity differential drives higher wages and opportunities in the modern, urban-based sector and hence opportunities for earning a better income for an originally rural labor force, causing rapid mass migration. Accordingly, the flow of people stimulates the process of structural change and economic expansion. This continues until rural productivity and wages begin to tighten. Lewis considered this cycle to be inherently positive and central to national economic development (Lewis 2003). As predicted by Lewis and Todaro, internal migration is an integral part of development; thus, it is surprising that some policy makers continue to perceive the migration phenomenon as negative for development.

A contributing factor to the reluctance to deal with the challenges, as well as realizing the benefits, of internal migration may also be that they affect internal policies in a more evident manner than international migration. International migration may be considered as less of a problem in source countries because it does not cause congestion and additional pressure in growing cities, and the influx of remittances and entrepreneurial initiatives is more apparent than in the case of internal migration (Mahmood and Siddiqui 2014).

However, the tide of internal migration continues unabated. Globally, agricultural sectors rarely exhibit rapid growth. There is a sectoral shift out of agriculture into industry and various services, causing further movement of labor from rural to urban areas. In most areas, a large wage gap persists between the rural and urban regions, making migration an ongoing phenomenon (Lucas 2015). Where manufacturing sectors have proved to be labor intensive, often due to export potential, urban expansion and diminished dependence on agriculture have accelerated at a staggering pace, as in the transformation that currently is taking place in China (Gong and Glinskaya 2014). New patterns of urbanization and manufacturing are developing all over Asia. In response to macroeconomic reforms, occupational diversification and mobility are increasing in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, several Latin American nations are experiencing an intense circulation between urban areas (Lucas 2015).

5.2 Migrants’ Mobility and Development
Migrating internally within certain countries can be as risky and arduous an enterprise as migrating from one country to another. Within India, migrating to Kochi in Kerala from Kolkata in West Bengal implies traveling about 2,360 kilometers. People from Assam must travel about 3,500 kilometers to reach Kerala. This is almost equal to the distance a migrant from Kerala travels to work in Dubai (2,787 kilometers) or Abu Dhabi (2,817 kilometers). The linguistic and cultural differences between Kerala and the states of origin of its internal immigrants are also significant. Most people in Kerala speak a Dravidian language, which is completely different from the Indo-Aryan languages spoken by the majority of its regional immigrants. Accordingly, the physical, linguistic, cultural, and social distances between the states of origin and Kerala make the interstate migration to Kerala more similar to international migration than intrastate migration (Kumar 2016). As table 4 shows, the disparities between selected indicators in Kerala and the states of origin of migrant workers are significant. The prospect of enjoying better living conditions may be one of the reasons why migrants are willing to travel such long distances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Selected Indicators for Kerala and the States of Origin of Its Migrant Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index rank among Indian states (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex ratio (2011) (females per 1,000 males)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (2011) (deaths per 1,000 live births)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth (2011) (years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with access to toilet facility (2011) (%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kumar 2014, 9.
In the cases of India and China, national legislation and initiatives to regulate migration and improve general well-being have proved to have a strong impact on internal migration flows and often caused demographic and socioeconomic distortions. India’s economic reforms were combined with labor regulations and resulted in relatively little job creation in manufacturing; hence, rural-urban migration was limited. It is mainly the rural, nonfarm sector that has absorbed much of the expanding internal migration. Rural-urban migration continues to be comparatively small, and rural-rural migration is on the rise, particularly among men (Mahapatro 2015). India’s structural transformation has been much slower than China’s. While the latter focused on building infrastructure, investments, and manufacturing, India focused more on developing digital infrastructure. In 2015, India invested about 32 percent of GDP, compared with about 46 percent in China. Manufacturing constituted about 17 percent of the Indian economy, compared with China’s 36 percent (Mohaan and Kapur 2015; World Bank 2015a).

China’s investment has fueled an unprecedented rural-urban migration flow. However, certain policies on the mobility of migrants have limited the full potential of migration. The Chinese hukou system, a household registry that from 1953 to 1976 tied citizens’ rights to their domicile, deprived migrants of basic services. Urban citizens enjoyed a range of social, economic, and cultural benefits that rural citizens did not receive. During China’s transition from state to market socialism, migrants, the majority of them women, worked in newly created export-processing zones in cities. The impact of the hukou system became more and more troubling in the 1980s, when an estimated 200 million Chinese lived outside their officially registered areas and were not eligible for education and government services. Reforming the hukou system has become an important political issue, but progress has been slow and complicated (Gong and Glinskaya 2014).

A few countries, including China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, have tried to control internal migration through direct intervention. In several other countries, state policies have worsened the prospects of free movement of people (Lucas 2015). Like several other states in transition from one political system to another, Ukraine’s outdated bureaucracy is still struggling to adapt to change. The population registry and labor, education, and social protection systems are currently underperforming. People circumvent government institutions by relying on informal social networks. Official planning has resulted in a distorted economy that favors certain areas at the expense of others. Like in China, administrative procedures require that people are registered at their original place of residence, making it difficult to access services if they migrate, and creating underdeveloped credit markets, deficient education and skills acquirement, informal work arrangements, and lack of information about job openings and labor market conditions (Koettl et al. 2014).

6. Impact of International Migration on Selected Countries and Sectors

6.1 Kazakhstan: Migration within a Transition Economy

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 disrupted and even destroyed economic chains that had connected the former Soviet republics. In the centralized planned economy of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan mainly played a role as supplier of raw materials. At its emancipation, the country had not developed sufficient industries and market channels. During 1991–96, the government struggled with a catastrophic production decline in virtually all major industries, as well as hyperinflation and economic recession (Muldabayeva 2016, 2–3). The share of agriculture in Kazakhstan’s economy shrank
significantly. Agriculture represented 39 percent of GDP in 1991, dropped to 8.5 percent in 2002, and is now only around 5 percent of GDP (Muldabayeva 2016, 19).

The decrease in production led to mass unemployment and drastic cuts in budget spending on infrastructure maintenance and development, including social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and childcare facilities. It is estimated that population loss due to emigration during 1991–2004 comprised two million people, or nearly 13 percent of the total population.

Since 2000, the country has entered a stage of economic development, characterized by economic growth and improvement in social well-being. During the years of economic prosperity until the world economic crisis of 2008, annual GDP growth was at 8-10 percent. In 2011, GDP per capita surpassed US$9,000, 12 times higher than it had been in 1994. Kazakhstan is now an upper-middle-income country with a GDP per capita of nearly US$10,500 (Muldabayeva 2016, 3). However, economic development has not been consistent throughout the country. Imbalances in regional investments and wage gaps across regions contribute to increasing discrepancies in regional development.

Internal migration has been increasing steadily, and it is estimated that an average of 300,000 persons annually are migrating within the country (Muldabayeva 2016). Like Ukraine, Kazakhstan suffers from an antiquated system of citizen registration, preventing internal migrants from seeking legal employment, receiving social assistance, and accessing public health care and childcare facilities. A major problem for internal migrants is affordable housing, and migrants are forced to put up with illegal housing. In 2013, it was estimated that in the city of Almaty, with a population of 1.5 million, there were more than one million unregistered migrants. Gaps in social security and well-being must be addressed through meticulous mapping of the prevailing situation and the establishment of a migration policy that may transform the benefits and shortcomings of the previous system in accordance with the new and rapidly changing reality (Muldabayeva 2016, 12).

In Kazakhstan, freedom of movement is guaranteed by the Constitution; however, the country’s migration laws require all internal migrants to register at their place of residence. Many studies have found that lack of registration in their new areas of destination prevents migrants from seeking legal employment, as well as receiving targeted social assistance and benefits. Such restrictions hinder overall economic development, since migrants cannot exercise basic citizenship activities such as obtaining legal documents, opening a business, or accessing financial services, social protection, and benefits.

Property costs in city peripheries are lower, and most internal migrants settle on the outskirts of cities where they rent apartments/houses or build temporary shelters. Over the years, such self-built constructions have formed entire neighborhoods, called micro-regions. In the city of Almaty, there are more than 20 such micro-regions.

Historically, a main characteristic of urban development in Kazakhstan has been the establishment of predominantly one-industry towns or mono-cities. Mono-cities were built across the Soviet Union, focusing on narrow objectives and specific tasks, often more connected with the needs of other republics in the former Soviet Union than with the local economy. This led to serious imbalances in the spatial development of Kazakhstan and hindered mono-cities from adapting to the new conditions that emerged after the breakup of the centrally planned economic system. During the first decade of the country’s
independence, mono-cities suffered significantly from socioeconomic decline due to decreased production.

Currently, there are 27 mono-cities scattered across the country. The mono-cities continue to play an important role in the country’s economy, as much of Kazakhstan’s industrial capacity is concentrated in them. In 2012, the population of mono-cities comprised 1.53 million people or 16.8 percent of the urban population. Twenty-four mono-cities had populations of less than 50,000 people, and only four mono-cities had more than 100,000 inhabitants. During the past 10 years, the population in mono-cities has decreased by an average of 11.8 percent. In some of the mono-cities, the decline in population has been more than 30 percent (Muldabayeva 2016, 18). Nevertheless, the system of mono-cities may be considered a means to support a more equal distribution of job opportunities and well-being across the country, while the nation is gradually working on bringing order to the registration system and developing production clusters across the country.

The level of education and employment status have a significant impact on migrants’ ability to integrate into an urban setting. Some migrants are successfully adapted in their new place of residence and benefit from their relocation; others are not able to adapt fully to the new conditions. This especially applies to rural migrants, who do not have the same educational and language skills as city migrants.

Like in other nations facing internal migration, some Kazakhstan government officials tend to emphasize that unregulated internal migrants put pressure on receiving cities, which often do not have the infrastructural capacity to accommodate them. Nevertheless, the rapid growth of the Kazakhstan economy and subsequent rise in the well-being of most Kazakhstan citizens have benefitted from a mobile workforce. Accordingly, it is important to measure and evaluate the benefits and shortcomings of internal migration and, by doing so, acknowledge that the mobility of the internal workforce benefits development and prosperity.

6.2 Nigeria: Need for Social and Spatial Inclusion

With approximately 186 million inhabitants, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country (World Bank 2017). The country is a political federation constituted by culturally diverse communities inhabited by more than 500 ethnic groups speaking more than 500 languages. Nigeria has an abundance of natural resources and is Africa’s biggest oil exporter, and is endowed with the continent’s largest natural gas reserves. It is the world’s 20th largest economy, worth more than US$500 billion in nominal GDP and US$1 trillion in purchasing power parity. Nigeria’s economy is expected to grow by about 2.5 percent in 2018, based on an expected increase in oil output, as well as an accelerated implementation of public and social investment projects. Although the private sector is the main driver of the economy, its potential has not been fully exploited, as it faces a poor regulatory environment and a lack of access to finance (World Bank 2017). With a growing young population, there is a need to promote job creation and achieve inclusive growth. At the base of Nigeria’s population pyramid, 45 percent of the citizens are ages 14 to 35 years, constituting a critical mass of the country’s unemployed population (Oyeniyi 2013).

Nigeria became a country in 1914, when the British rulers unified the so-called Southern Nigeria Protectorate with Northern Nigeria, establishing administrative and legal structures that remained when Nigeria became an independent federation in 1960. From 1967 to 1970, the recently founded nation was
plunged into a civil war and, until 1999, power alternated between democratically elected governments and military dictatorships.

For centuries, human mobility has been an integral part of the socioeconomic structure of the area that makes up the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Several of the country’s 36 states and 774 local government areas are characterized by a specific linguistic/cultural identity, although several of these communities are comprised of considerable minorities, which maintain their ethnic specificities and are in close contact with their areas of origin. Accordingly, many Hausa-Fulani, who have roots in the North, live in Southern Nigeria, where they preserve their cultural identity within communities with entirely different languages and religions. Just as many Southern Nigerians live under similar circumstances in Northern Nigeria. Yoruba and Igbo, originating from the South, are spread within different cities in Northern and Central Nigeria. Deregulation and privatization are currently causing movements of skilled workers across Nigeria, in urban and rural areas, many of them attracted by the rapid buildup of communication and banking systems (Oyeniyi 2013).

Pre-colonial Nigeria lacked fixed geographical boundaries, although there were cultural borders, like languages, customs, and ethno-national identities. However, these cultural borders were generally shared. Intergroup marriages, intercommunicable languages, trade relations, and religions served as effective means for migration and cohabitation. However, like several other areas in Africa, Nigeria became “balkanized” by the erstwhile colonizers, who divided heterogeneous geographical regions, joined together through intricate webs of trade and kinship, with strictly delimited administrative areas, which often were established without any respect for the pre-colonial sociocultural traditions, which earlier had served as natural demarcations.

Throughout the 20th century, various migrant movements took place in the country. When the British rulers united the country in 1914, central towns and markets like Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan, and several other cities began to grow from the influx of migrants. The development stimulated inter- and intra-group migration in the same way as the introduction of export crops such as cocoa, coffee, cotton, and rubber stimulated increased trade relations between ethnic groups. For example, tin mining in Jos stimulated the movement of young men from Eastern and Western Nigeria, in the same way that coal mining in Enugu stimulated movement from Northern to Eastern Nigeria. At the same time, roads, railways, harbors, and vital telecommunication networks were built, opening communities to commerce and colonial administration.

Through their administrative authorities, Islam and Christianity posted preachers, teachers, imams, and pastors from one location to another, initiatives that in most cases were directed from urban to rural areas. In this way, Muslims and Christians, while trying to find converts for their beliefs and education for their disciples, inadvertently introduced a migration trajectory that oscillated between urban-rural and rural-urban. Although religions fostered urban-rural movements, Western education systems created movements from rural to urban centers, where the earliest educational institutions were seated.

The emergence of the Islamic extremist group Boko Haram, which originated in the northeastern part of Nigeria, may be explained not only in religious terms, but also as a result of deficient spatial and social inclusion. In its propaganda, Boko Haram maintains that the “Westernization of Nigerian society” has concentrated the country’s wealth among members of a small political elite, mainly in the “Christian”
south of the country. Before its annexation into the British Empire, the Bornu Sultanate ruled the territory where Boko Haram is currently active. Politically and militarily influential groups in this area for centuries have based their authority on their version of Islam. After being suppressed under dictatorial military rule, they became more vociferous under democratic regimes. Although the relative marginalization and poverty of the states in Northern Nigeria may have originated among a wide variety of socioeconomic reasons, religious extremism has emerged to the forefront and terror exercised in its name has forced people to choose sides and/or flee.

The outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009 has steadily become the single greatest cause of displacement in the Lake Chad Basin region, with more than 2.3 million people becoming refugees or IDPs. In Nigeria, the number of IDPs has more than doubled in the span of three years, from some 868,000 people identified by the Nigerian government in the northeastern regions by the end of 2014, to 1.7 million people by June 2017 (UNHCR 2017).

Internal displacement and migration are continuing unabated in Nigeria. Currently, the country’s oil sector remains the nation’s primary engine of growth and a magnet for migrant workers. Other sectors of the economy, most notably the telecommunications and wholesale and retail sectors, have grown exponentially and are drawing skilled migrants from various parts of Nigeria and its West African neighbors to urban and rural areas (Oyeniyi 2013).

It is obvious that Nigeria is experiencing one of the fastest urbanization processes in Africa. About half of the country’s total population now lives in cities, compared with 35 percent in 1990, generating 60 percent of the country’s GDP. Rapid urbanization, which is largely unplanned and uncoordinated, has deepened the deficit of services in many Nigerian cities, including access to land and housing, basic services, and solid waste and waste water management, among others. Such pressuring trends, coupled with weak institutional settings, especially at the local level, are limiting Nigeria’s potential to reap positive benefits from urbanization (Oyeniyi 2013).

Forty years after independence, in Nigeria, migration, whether internal or international, is still primarily considered to be a development failure, rather than a constituent part of broader social and economic transformation processes. Lack of a comprehensive overview and reliable statistics have limited migration research to specific themes. Human trafficking, forced child labor, and prostitution are neglected. Internal trafficking is on the raise and generally controlled by well-organized crime syndicates. Victims of trafficking end up as agricultural workers, beggars, and prostitutes. Child work and begging are especially widespread in Northern Nigeria, where the majority of such child laborers have been discovered to be victims of trafficking (Oyeniyi 2013).

Internal migration in Nigeria is not only due to the search for better incomes and improved social services, it is also triggered by armed conflict, as well as religious and ethnic tensions. In some areas, environmental degradation also causes internal migration. Particularly Northern Nigeria has been suffering from erratic weather patterns, flooding, and declining rainfall (Oyeniyi 2013).

Nigeria lacks reliable data on internal mobility. The heterogeneity and complex dynamics of Nigerian society make data collection on internal migration particularly complicated. The data on IDPs are the only available statistics on internal migration in the country, except for the mapping of remittances. In 2008,
Enhancing Financial Innovation & Access (EFIn) launched a series of nationwide surveys on access to financial services. EFInA, which is funded by the U.K. government’s Department for International Development and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, documents the usage of financial products across the formal and informal sectors, from an urban and rural perspective. EFInA (2014) finds that 26.3 million adults (28 percent of all adults) received money from family/friends within Nigeria. Among senders, 18 percent stated that they sent remittances to cover school fees (Oyeniyi 2013). The concern for the education of their dependents is also reflected in a survey of more than 7,500 respondents, which found that: “A large majority of internal migrants interviewed across the twelve states claimed to be sending remittances home to fund dependents’ education” (Oyeniyi 2013, 55).

In all its heterogeneity and various push and pull factors, in Nigeria, internal migration underscores people’s determination to improve their socioeconomic situation. A revealing proof of this is the great importance internal migrants give to their children’s education and health. Given the tangible contribution migrants make to human capital formation and poverty alleviation, efforts should be made to study internal migration in all its aspects, detrimental and beneficial, and consider migration as an integral part of the initiatives undertaken to promote social inclusion and economic development.

6.3 China: Migration and Urbanization in the World’s Fastest-Developing Economy

Current aspects of internal migration in China accentuate how important adequate policies are for mitigating the negative effects and maximizing the benefits of internal migration and urbanization. China’s urbanization over the past three decades has been unprecedented in scale: 260 million migrants have moved to cities from rural areas, supporting the country’s rapid economic growth and development progress. It is one of the largest migration flows in the world and, as table 5 shows, the urban fraction of the population has changed from 19.4 percent in 1980 (after comprehensive economic reforms were introduced in 1978) to 55.6 percent in 2015.

**Table 5. Percentage of the Population Residing in Urban China, 1950–2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Guilmoto and Jones 2016, 223, based on UN DESA 2012.*

39
In the process, 500 million people were lifted out of poverty and China achieved unprecedented growth, which for three consecutive decades averaged 10 percent per year (Gong and Glinskaya 2014). China’s cities, where abundant labor, cheap land, good infrastructure, and competition among local governments fomented industry and investment, have created an environment that has been highly conducive to growth. But strains have begun to emerge in the form of mounting inequalities, environmental degradation, and an ever-increasing depletion of natural resources.

China currently accounts for about a quarter of the global carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuel. The effects of average annual particulate matter of PM$_{10}$ concentration are increasing. Two hundred million more urban residents were exposed to high air pollution in 2010, compared with the beginning of the decade. Between 2001 and 2010, estimated annual premature mortality from air pollution increased from 418,000 to 514,000. In 2013, it was reported that 57 percent of the groundwater in 198 cities was “bad” or “extremely bad,” and more than 30 percent of the country’s major rivers were “polluted” or “extremely polluted,” making their waters unfit for drinking or even “direct human contact.” Between 2003 and 2010, municipal and industrial solid waste generation increased from about 1.2 billion to 2.6 billion tonnes, with 80 percent of the total waste amount generated by the urban population (Gong and Glinskaya 2014).

Urbanization is one of the Chinese government’s top priorities, including tackling the rigidity of the hukou system where families are entitled to particular services only in their place of registration. A result of the hukou system is that migrant workers in urban China may not be entitled to education for their children. The hukou registration system restricts migration and distorts demography, creating a “left-behind system” that forces 58 million children, 47 million women, and 20 million elderly people to stay behind in rural areas (Glinskaya 2014). To improve inclusive development, it is critical to make policies integration-based, instead of residence-based, and more uniform by integrating rural, urban, and migrant residents (Gong and Glinskaya 2014).

Deregulation and improved market instruments that were introduced in 2014 will probably favor even higher densities in cities, which in turn may drive economic growth. However, it is essential to avoid fragmented urban growth, which would exacerbate congestion and environmental degradation. It is critical that urban growth and general land use are coordinated with infrastructure provisions that can meet current needs as well as projected future demand.

As China is currently experiencing one of the most profound and comprehensive socioeconomic transitions in the world, education and internal migration have become intimately interlinked. Education is a major concern for the Chinese government, but if policies are to be effective, they need to be adapted to the rapid and profound social change most Chinese communities are currently undergoing. Since 2000, budget expenditures on education have increased seven-fold in real terms. A 2006 new Compulsory Education Law stipulates that obligatory education would be “implemented free of tuition and fees.” However, effective education and integration will require the removal of lingering structural rigidities, in particular abolishment of the hukou requirements (Gong and Glinskaya 2014).

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4 Particulate matter (PM) or particulates are microscopic solid or liquid matter suspended in the Earth’s atmosphere. Inhalable PM is particles with a diameter between 2.5 and 10 micrometers, designated as PM$_{10}$.
Like in most other countries, an important push factor for migrants is their desire to guarantee a good education for their children. However, there are several discrepancies in migrants’ use of remittances for their children’s education. China’s 2010 Census estimated that the number of left-behind children in rural areas was more than 61 million, accounting for 21.88 percent of the total children in China (Zhu 2016, 3). Recent research generally finds a global, positive relationship between remittances and educational investment. Nevertheless, there are some indications that households’ willingness to spend remittances on education depends on the perceived quality of schooling. According to rural household data from the China Household Income Project 2013, over 92 percent of children from households without migrants or remittances attended school, and in remittance-receiving households, the proportion of children at school was almost 10 percent lower. This finding may be an indication that the returns from a rural education among remittance senders and receivers are considered to be lower than the importance of purchasing food and/or items for investment (Zhu 2016).

In urban areas, disparities are becoming evident between local and migrant children. This can be seen in the differential in enrollment rates of local, migrant, and poorer children in higher-quality “key schools” and regular schools. The increased importance of family connections and placement fees to get children into elite, urban schools may reinforce existing social disparities. Chinese internal migrants enlist their children in privately operated schools, several of which do not have qualified teachers, adequate facilities, or governmental accreditation. As of 2007, almost 80 percent of the private migrant schools in Beijing were unlicensed. As the migrant population in urban centers continues to grow, unequal access to public education between migrant and urban children will continue to be an acute issue (Zhu 2016). However, despite these shortcomings, social services and facilities tend to be more developed and accessible in urban areas, and will continue to attract migrants in search of better education for their children.

Several Chinese cities are investing in efforts to attract skilled workers and professionals. For example, the Chengdu municipal government has actively sought to lure talent to live and work in the city. In 2011, the city instituted the Chengdu Talent Program, to attract well-educated and highly skilled top-end talent to Chengdu. The program targets professionals with advanced degrees from highly ranked Chinese or foreign universities, mainly in scientific and technical fields, and with entrepreneurial and managerial skills (Wang et al. 2016). In 2013, the Shanghai government launched a so-called “point system,” which is based on migrants’ financial qualifications, profession, and education. Migrants who have been able to collect enough points are assigned Shanghai residence permits, allowing them to enjoy various social services. Those who fail to pass the point test may be granted temporary residence permits, with much less access to social welfare than otherwise. However, even with temporary residence permits, only migrants with stable employment and housing contracts for at least six months can apply (Zhang 2016).

Several big cities have introduced Shanghai’s point system, including Beijing, Tianjin, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou. Through the point system, city governments demonstrate their preference for talent and capital. The wealthier the city is, the stricter are the controls it imposes to limit access for poor, rural migrants (Zhang 2016). The point system may promote economic development in urban centers, but it also works as a deterrent for poor migrants’ efforts to improve their children’s future, functioning contrary to the central government’s expressed intention to raise the well-being and level of education for all Chinese citizens.
6.4 Bangladesh: Intensified Rural-Urban Migration

During the past decade, Bangladesh’s economy has experienced spectacular growth. Although the country is the 32nd largest in the world judged by purchasing power parity, it has been classified among what has been called the "next 11 emerging market economies."\(^5\)

Internal migration has been intense in Bangladesh. The rural population decreased from 80.2 percent of the country’s total population in 1990 to 66.5 percent in 2014 (table 6). By contrast, the urban population grew at a yearly average rate of 6 percent during 1970–2011. Before the 1961 census, the population of Dhaka increased by approximately one million per decade; but after the 1961 census, Dhaka’s population has increased at a rate of around six million per decade (BBS and SID 2015, xxvi and 15). In 2003, 66 percent of Bangladesh’s rural migration was directed toward urban centers; 10 percent was rural-rural migration; and 24 percent was overseas migration. Interestingly, accelerated rural-urban migration seems not to have resulted in increased urban slums. During 1991 to 2009, the share of the urban population living in slums decreased from 87 to 71 percent. However, over the same period, the proportion of the urban population using improved drinking water declined from 88 to 85 percent, and the share of the population with access to improved sanitation facilities declined from 56 to 48 percent (Herrmann and Svarin 2009, 12–13).

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural population (% of total population)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural population growth (annual %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population in Dhaka (% of urban population)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population in urban agglomerations of more than 1 million (% of total population)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population growth (annual %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Trading Economics 2016, based on World Bank data.

One reason for the high number of internal migrants is Bangladesh’s population growth rate, which in the 1960s and 1970s was among the highest in the world, growing from 65 million to 110 million. Currently, Bangladesh has approximately 164 million inhabitants, making it the most densely populated country in the world. The fast-growing population, combined with a deteriorating environmental situation, constitutes an important push factor for migration. Migrants have been attracted by a growing industrial sector, as the country witnessed a dramatic shift from agricultural to industrial production—with the

\(^5\) In 2012, Goldman Sachs Investment Bank identified 11 countries as having the potential to end be among the world’s largest economies: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, the Republic of Korea, and Vietnam.
former down from 32 to 19 percent and the latter up from 21 to 28 percent as a share of GDP between 1980 and 2010 (Marshall and Rahman 2013, 6).

Population movements have also been influenced by Bangladesh’s difficult situation after the country’s secession from Pakistan in 1971. Pakistan’s brutal efforts to maintain control over the country caused around 10 million East Bengali refugees to enter India during the early months of the war, of whom 1.5 million may have remained after Bangladesh became independent. The five-year plan released in 1973 focused on state investments in agriculture and rural infrastructure, and industries were nationalized. In 1974, Bangladesh experienced its deadliest famine ever, in which around 1.5 million people died from starvation. The famine indicated a failure of government policies and produced an aftermath of recurrent military coups and political unrest.

In the early 1990s, free markets were restored; the private sector was promoted; and several economic reforms fomented a rapidly growing economy. The Bangladeshi private sector has since expanded at a fast pace, with many conglomerates currently driving the economy (Guhathakurta and van Schendel 2013). According to the International Monetary Fund, Bangladesh’s economy was the second fastest growing major economy in 2016, with a rate of growth of 6.8 percent (IMF 2016). In Bangladesh, like in most other countries, internal and international migration and the remittances it generates have been an important engine for development. Remittances have been one of the three most important contributors to the country’s growth rate during the past decades. The other two contributors are the ready-made garment and services sectors (Mahmood and Siddiqui 2014, 3).

The poverty rate among migrant households in Bangladesh has been estimated at 39 percent, compared with 68 percent for non-migrants. Compared with their economic situation prior to migration—where more than 70 percent of the households lived on the margin—their current situation has improved significantly. However, there are differences in how various types of migration affect poverty. Among international migrant households, the poverty rate is estimated at 20 percent; for internal migrants, it is 53 percent (Mahmood and Siddiqui 2014, 15).
Table 7. Poverty Incidence among Migrant and Non-Migrant Households in Bangladesh (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per capita household monthly income group (taka)</th>
<th>Migration type</th>
<th>Migrant households</th>
<th>Non-Migrant households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal migrant</td>
<td>International migrant</td>
<td>Regional migrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≤ 1,500</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,501 – 2,250</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,251 – 2,999</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(&lt; 3,000)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000 – 3,600</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,601 – 4,200</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,201 – 4,500</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,501+</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of households</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 7 displays how various forms of migration mitigate poverty. For instance, 68 percent of non-migrant Bangladeshi households have a per capita household income that is 50 percent below the poverty line, that is, around Tk 3,000, which is approximately US$30 per capita per month. The figure for migrant households is 39 percent. The depth of poverty is much lower among international migrants compared with other types of migrants. However, it is relatively lower among internal migrants compared with regional migrants.6

Increased income due to remittances is not enough to counteract the growing pressure on resources in the context of Bangladesh’s threatened natural environment. The growing number of people moving from rural areas to Dhaka and other rapidly growing towns will not be able to deal with the already alarming situation by themselves. Difficulties for the poor, and the entire country, will persist despite the assumptions of some policy makers that the informal sector might function like an “invisible hand,” that is, that individual, economically motivated actions will eventually result in social benefits for all. Begum (2015) contends that the assumption that “urban informality” could function as a self-organizing urban logic only serves to confirm the continuation of economic activities on an ad hoc basis. Imagining that initiatives set in motion by poor people would be enough to address the increasing health problems of congested cities like Dhaka, which are threatened by environmental hazards, is not only irresponsible, but

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6 For a definition of “regional migrants,” see footnote 3.
puts the entire urban environment in danger. To avoid the unabated depletion of Bangladesh’s limited natural resources, it is critical to implement inclusive policies that promote economic growth as well as broader, popular participation in decision making. Improved political will is needed to support a multidimensional approach to render city functions in a much more effective manner. The goal must be the creation of a sustainable urbanization process (Begum 2015).

6.5 Internal Migration and the Informal Sector

Internal migration is intimately connected to the informal sector. However, so far, limited attention has been paid to the role of this sector in fostering growth and creating jobs. One reason may be that informal employment is extremely difficult to measure, although the ILO has tried to measure it globally for several years. In 2014, the ILO estimated that informal employment comprised more than 50 percent of nonagricultural employment in most regions of the developing world—82 percent in South Asia, 66 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 65 percent in East Asia and Southeast Asia, and 51 percent in Latin America. In the Middle East and North Africa, informal employment is 45 percent of nonagricultural employment (Vanek et al. 2014, 7).

However, regional estimates hide the high degree of diversity within regions. For example, informal employment accounts for an estimated 51 percent of all nonagricultural employment in Latin America, but the share varies across countries, from 40 percent in Uruguay to 75 percent in Bolivia. Similarly, in East Asia and Southeast Asia, the regional average is 65 percent, with informal employment accounting for 42 percent of nonagricultural employment in Thailand and 73 percent in Indonesia. The relative size of informal employment also varies across subregions. In Sub-Saharan Africa, informal employment tends to account for a smaller share of nonagricultural employment in southern Africa, for example, 33 percent in South Africa and 44 percent in Namibia, relative to countries in other subregions, for example, 82 percent in Mali and 76 percent in Tanzania (Vanek et al. 2014, 8–9).

The prominence of the informal sector in most developing economies stems from the opportunities it offers to the most vulnerable populations. Although the informal sector provides an opportunity for generating incomes for many people, most informal workers do not have secure income, employment benefits, and social protection. This explains why informality often overlaps with poverty. For instance, in countries where informality is decreasing, the number of working poor is also decreasing and vice versa.

In most rapidly growing cities in developing countries, residential growth has principally been supported by the informal rental sector. Due to inner city housing limitations, the overwhelming majority of migrants do not own their own residence, and rental costs are generally much higher for migrants than for those who have been urban residents for a long time. Living standards are also generally poorer among newcomers.

The prevalence of informal activities is closely related to an environment characterized by weaknesses in institutional areas, like taxation, regulation, and private property rights. High taxes and complicated fiscal processes may prevent informal sector operators from formalizing their activities. Long requirements for registration, as well as licensing and inspection requirements, are also barriers faced by the informal sector. Organizing the informal sector and recognizing its role as a profitable activity may contribute to economic development and improve the capacity of informal migrant workers to meet their basic needs,
by increasing their incomes and strengthening their legal status. This could be achieved by raising government awareness, allowing better access to financing, and fostering the availability of information on the sector.

There are several theories about a beneficial symbiosis between the formal and informal sectors. Some argue that nations with a high rate of poverty may adopt an approach of “weak governance” to bypass labor and industrial laws, thus allowing a thriving informal sector to function to alleviate poverty. This would permit the formal sector to subcontract services and activities in the informal sector and minimize wage costs. However, such a strategy may act as a binding condition of the productivity improvement of formal workers, since the greater the difference in wages becomes between the two segments, the more common subcontracting to the informal sector will become. Nevertheless, supporters of this strategy argue that a relatively prosperous informal workforce raises the amount of output produced by the formal sector. This may lead to an expansion of labor-saving research and development operations, resulting in higher productivity of formal workers. A policy message drawn from this connection might be that increasing informal wages through open and unhindered competition will not only promote the welfare of workers in the informal sector, but also that of those in the formal sector (Guha-Khasnobis and Kanbur 2006). However, such a situation may be quite complicated and removed from reality. Strengthening the potential benefits of formalization in the informal sector may increase security and create new economic opportunities.

Migrants working in the informal sector generally lack written employment contracts, records of employment, and insurance. In the first instance, governments, in collaboration with trade union and civil society institutions, should launch awareness campaigns for migrant workers. Implementation of existing labor laws should be ensured and, if need be, complemented in accordance with international laws. This would require a better system of inspection and monitoring by the relevant departments and/or civil society organizations. The capacity of labor departments to undertake such monitoring should be enhanced through adequate training of staff and reliable data collection.

The potential of migrants engaged in the informal sector and their contribution to growth and poverty alleviation should not be underestimated. For example, in a comprehensive study of the slums in Accra in 2014, 75 percent of the men and women stated that they had savings, and only 7.4 percent of the respondents claimed that the overall life of their households had deteriorated after their move to Ghana’s capital. The researchers concluded that policies curbing rural-urban migration are bound to fail, unless spatial inequalities in development are addressed. Upgrading slums would prove to be much more effective and beneficial for overcoming poverty than clearing them, and support to the informal sector is far better than trying to limit it. These strategies do not mean that promoting rural and broad based regional development should be ignored (Awumbila, Owusu, and Teye 2014). On the contrary, investing in rural development and addressing rural poverty would also contribute to more sustainable urban development. The findings from the slums of Ghana indicate that even a modest increase in incomes has a beneficial impact on the well-being and development of individuals and their families, improving their possibilities for upward social mobility, better housing, health and nutrition, quality of life, and not the least education.
6.6 Internal Migration and Construction Workers

In many developing countries, a large share of migrant workers find employment in the construction sector. As case studies from India, Nepal, and Bangladesh indicate, many of these workers come from very poor areas. For example, in India, the average landholding of skilled and unskilled migrant workers was around one acre, which is not large enough to support a family throughout the year.

In India, Bangladesh, and Nepal, expanding large cities are attracting an ever-increasing pool of labor. In India, construction is the main occupation for short-duration migrants (36 percent), followed by agriculture (20 percent) and manufacturing (16 percent). A similar pattern is found in Nepal and Bangladesh. Most of the construction workers are unskilled young men recruited by contractors. A significant percentage of them migrate in a cohort, with their family members and other kinfolk, or with someone from their village, often as protection against the harsh environment in which they travel and work. Most construction workers are recruited for a specific duration and go back to their places of origin at the end of this period; others stay on, rotating between sites, and return occasionally to their places of origin (Srivastava et al. 2014, 36).

The majority of these construction workers maintain a very low standard of living. At all construction sites, membership in labor unions is conspicuous by its absence. Health hazards and accidents are common, and an overwhelming majority of workers complain about low wages, long working hours, and strenuous work. Nevertheless, most of them can save, remit, and use their remittances to improve the housing conditions in their native areas, purchase durables, repay loans, and invest in their children’s education and health.

In India, of a sample of 150 workers, 147 sent remittances in the past year, with the amount varying depending on income and skill level. The figures were similar in Bangladesh and Nepal. Tracer surveys\(^7\) from all three countries indicated that households receiving remittances from internally migrating construction workers were better off than non-migrant households. The difference in illiteracy rates between non-migrant and migrant households was approximately 10 percent. More than half of the migrant households considered that their health situation had improved, compared with 84.6 percent of the non-migrant households who considered their health and sanitation situation to be poor. In India, 52.4 percent of internal migrants’ households considered that their bargaining power had improved through better connections with village leaders. This compares with only 17.7 percent of non-migrants’ households. The migration of men to construction sites also seems to have had an impact in empowering women. Migration by a male member of the household caused women to take a more active part in the village economy (Srivastava et al. 2014, 17).

6.7 Construction Workers and Education

For many migrants, investing in the education of their children is a priority. However, in the case when construction workers bring their families with them, education may suffer, because the children are forced to move with their parents from site to site. Furthermore, across all categories of firms in India,

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\(^7\) The tracer study methodology was first developed by the ILO in 2003–04. The methodology is to take a retrospective look at the evolution of the situation of a specific sample of people already exposed to a specific intervention.
Nepal, and Bangladesh, worksites are conspicuous by the absence of any provision for childcare facilities. Children accompanying immigrant workers seldom have access to education, which means they will be confined to the status of unskilled laborers, much like their parents. However, migrants’ children who remain in source areas appear to benefit from a better education than those whose parents have stayed behind. Since a significant number of workers spend an important part of their remittances on their children’s education and health (Srivastava et al. 2014), and considering the difficult access to schooling for children at construction sites, many opt to leave their children and families behind.

The percentage of school attendees, in the three countries, among children ages 5 to 14, is higher in source villages among internal migrant households than among non-migrant households. In Bangladesh, the education status reported by the sample households indicates that the incidence of not attending and dropping out is higher among children of non-migrant households compared with those from migrant households. Twelve percent of the children from internal migrant households dropped out of school, compared with 19 percent of the children from non-migrant households. Only 2 percent of the children from migrant households reported that they never attended schools, compared with 9 percent of the children from non-migrant households. In all three countries, households with internal migrants appeared to choose private schools for the education of their children. Table 8 indicates a conspicuous difference between migrants’ and non-migrants’ expenditures on their children’s education.

Table 8. Expenditure on Children’s Education, by Migrant Status of Households in India, Nepal, and Bangladesh (local currency)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Tuition fees</th>
<th>Uniforms</th>
<th>Books/stationary</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant (Re)</td>
<td>2,491.69</td>
<td>134.65</td>
<td>996.02</td>
<td>656.90</td>
<td>4,279.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migrant (Re)</td>
<td>710.18</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>533.65</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1,243.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant (NPR)</td>
<td>4,722.60</td>
<td>1,407.60</td>
<td>1,734.80</td>
<td>171.00</td>
<td>8,137.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migrant (NPR)</td>
<td>596.00</td>
<td>546.00</td>
<td>249.00</td>
<td>467.00</td>
<td>1,858.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant (Tk)</td>
<td>1,096.32</td>
<td>1,821.79</td>
<td>1,855.84</td>
<td>2,108.45</td>
<td>6,882.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migrant (Tk)</td>
<td>804.88</td>
<td>1,380.49</td>
<td>1,634.88</td>
<td>2,409.7</td>
<td>6,229.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6.8 Internal Migration and Well-Being

In general, it appears that migrant households perceive migration in a positive way. Table 9 indicates that migrant households in Bangladesh, irrespective of being affected by internal, international, or regional migration, consider that migration has supported them in their efforts to improve their well-being.
Table 9. Bangladeshi Households’ Perceptions about Changes Experienced Due to Migration (% of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues having bearing on poverty and well-being</th>
<th>Migration type</th>
<th>All migrants</th>
<th>Non-migrant households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much easier or easier</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household living conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better or much better</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial situation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate or more</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to more land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household daily life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easier or much easier</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall daily life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easier or much easier</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>905</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Similar findings come from Ghana, where the informants in a study of the situation of internal migrants in Accra expressed general satisfaction with their move. Although most migrants in poor neighborhoods lack basic services, the majority of them are actively working and contributing to the country’s economy. Because much of the population has moved from poorer, rural regions to Accra, the proportion of poor people in Ghana declined from 51.7 percent in 1992 to 28.5 percent in 2006. In the urban sector, men generally work in the construction sector, operate motorbike taxis, work as truck pushers, or are engaged in waste handling. Women work as petty traders, food vendors, bar and shop assistants, hairdressers, head porters, and domestic workers. Most of these internal migrants are able to save money (Awumbila, Owusu, and Teye 2014). Table 10 summarizes the potential impacts that internal and international migration can have on general well-being.
### Table 10. Links between Migration and Poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration Type</th>
<th>Impact of Migration</th>
<th>Indicators of Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Internal migration</td>
<td>• Inflow of remittances</td>
<td>• Absolute poverty, headcount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Regional migration</td>
<td>• Use of remittances</td>
<td>• Human development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contract international migration</td>
<td>• Income, expenditure, and savings</td>
<td>• Women’s empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Employment opportunity</td>
<td>• Coping with vulnerability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Education and training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Health and hygiene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Asset accumulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Housing and sanitation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Debt repayment and savings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Diversified income sources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Income smoothing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Attitude and expectations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Relationships between genders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Mahmood and Siddiqui 2014, 9.

As a driver of change, migration can be a powerful means to overcome the “culture of poverty.” In his book *Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty* (1959), the anthropologist Oscar Lewis introduced the term “subculture of poverty.” He developed it further in *La Vida; A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty* (1967). The context of Lewis’s approach to poverty in the later book is quite similar to the approach adopted in some migration studies, that is, a combination of statistical sampling and in-depth interviews. During three years, Lewis and his co-workers assembled data on 100 representative families in four slums of San Juan, Puerto Rico, and 50 families of their relatives in New York. The researchers combined traditional techniques from sociology, anthropology, and psychology. Based on questionnaires and personal visits, the researchers spent a minimum of 12 hours with every informant. Lewis interpreted “culture of poverty” as a kind of trap that kept people within thought patterns and behaviors that were capable of hindering a radical change of their customary way of life, but that just as well could inspire strategies for escaping from such a dire existence:

> It is a culture in the traditional sense in that it provides human beings with a design for living with a ready-made set of solutions for human problems, and so serves a significant adaptive function. This style of life transcends national boundaries and regional and rural-urban differences within nations. Wherever it occurs, its practitioners exhibit
remarkable similarity in the structure of their families, in interpersonal relations, in spending habits, in their value systems and in their orientation in time. (Lewis 1966, 19)

Lewis’s views came to influence social policies around the world. His views eventually came under harsh criticism by social researchers, who considered them to support fatalistic views of the rich and powerful, serving political interests to maintain low wages for the poor. They criticized the assumption that the poor are enclosed by a “culture” they cannot change, and that funneling great sums of money on their well-being would be equivalent to throwing them away into a bottomless, self-destructing pit. In sociology and anthropology, the concept of a culture of poverty created a backlash. Several scholars came to consider it as a way to “blame the victims” (Bourgois 2001). However, Lewis explicitly states that a way out of poverty is made possible through a combination of the agency of the poor themselves and governmental policies. Similarly, the benefits of internal migration must be harnessed by the realization of its inevitability and the implementation of policies that mitigate its negative effects, while allowing the active participation of migrants in shaping those policies. Lewis described the barriers to the transformation of a perpetuated culture of poverty as follows:

The setting is a cash economy, with wage labor and production for profit and with a persistently high rate of unemployment at low wages for unskilled labor. The society fails to provide social, political and economic organization, on either a voluntary basis or by governmental imposition, for the low-income population. [...] The dominant class asserts a set of values that prizes thrift and the accumulation of wealth and property, stresses the possibility of upward mobility and explains low economic status as the result of individual personal inadequacy. (Lewis 1966, 21)

There is little doubt that the poor themselves consider internal migration as a viable escape from the poverty trap, comprising possibilities to achieve well-being for themselves and their families. However, Lewis’s findings demonstrate that if measures are not taken to support poor migrants, by offering them possibilities to escape from the “culture of poverty,” they may remain in this sphere, despite higher income. Among the services that governments and municipalities may provide to change the prospects for the general well-being of migrants, integrating them into a context where they can maximize their capacity for change and progress, are education, financial services, affordable health care, decent housing, infrastructure, security, and a healthy and stimulating environment. All over the world, migrants are contributing and some governments are beginning to realize that, in the absence of adequate policies, the threat remains that migrants will continue to be trapped by limiting prospects, unable to achieve radical change that would benefit themselves, their children, and the entire society.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Migration is an element of human existence that always will be with us. The phenomenon adapts to changing realities, such as globalization and the buildup of economic clusters. Despite fears of a growing impact of migration on destination communities—urban congestion, mounting pressure on social services, squalor, criminality, environmental degradation, changes in values, and so forth—the misgivings about and benefits from migration should be assessed in a dispassionate manner, considering the wider human and economic development perspective.
Although humans are a migratory species, restrictions on travel have been commonplace. In particular, freedom of movement has been limited for women and/or members of some racial and social groups. However, erecting barriers to mobility and creating difficulties for migrants in accessing public services do not mitigate the negative aspects of migration. Instead, such actions might result in marginalizing individuals and entire groups of people, increasing inequality, and creating risks of criminality and environmental degradation, while reducing the process of improving personal well-being and overall human and economic development.

Labor migration is a response to spatial inequalities of economic opportunities. Instead of erecting barriers to movement, integrated regional, rural, and urban development strategies should be promoted.

Traditionally, researchers and politicians have acknowledged a divide between international and internal migration. This division often has had a political origin, affecting the preconditions for objective research and policies. Global similarities must be examined, but also the specific implications for the areas affected by migration. Such an approach is essential for specific action-oriented research, which hopefully will contribute to support policy makers and stakeholders to better understand the process of internal migration and find effective measures for addressing its challenges and capitalizing on its benefits. This involves raising awareness and effectiveness at various levels of government, engaging employer organizations and labor unions, as well as civil society organizations. To monitor, mitigate, and evaluate the impacts of internal migration on human well-being, more data are needed. The methods that are currently used to collect and apply these data must be honed in a much more effective manner. Accordingly, there is a great need for impartial and accurate examinations of the benefits and shortcomings related to internal migration, particularly its importance for poverty alleviation and development (Bell and Charles-Edwards 2014).

For accurate measurements of internal migration, it is recommended to adhere to some essential, standardized criteria, like computing information over fixed intervals, ideally over one or five years, and coding data on place of residence to the smallest geographical zones feasible, recording the duration as length of residence rather than year of arrival. Furthermore, statistical agencies should disseminate a range of standard outputs on internal migration, including detailed origin-destination flow matrices. A more comprehensive implementation of such recommendations would contribute significantly to progress in internal migration research.

Well-founded statistics are essential for effective urban planning, to address the needs of incoming migrants and harmonize their integration into an already existing social web. Drivers of internal migration are not only the prospect of earning a better income—people may also have been forced to escape from conflicts and environmental degradation. Some migrants who have been affected by such calamities may return to their places of origin after the situation has improved. In general, returnees come back with skills and experiences that could be capitalized, so they may have better prospects to adapt to their changed situation, as well as benefit the entire community. The experience and know-how brought back by international and internal migrants has put into question the concept of “brain drain.” Their financial and sociopolitical contributions are visible through the better education of their children and overall improvements in migrants’ communities of origin.
Internal migration constitutes an unavoidable phenomenon and merits consideration as a means for generating income and thus benefiting general well-being. The prevalence of an informal sector, where most rural-urban migrants end up, is closely related to institutional weaknesses. Informal workers often lack secure income, employment benefits, and social protection; thus, informality tends to overlap with poverty. Recognizing the potential of the informal sector to generate employment and contribute to economic development may be a first step to increase the effectiveness of the sector and stimulate appropriate policies to create decent work.\(^8\)

Policies curbing rural-urban migration are bound to fail, unless spatial inequalities in development are addressed. Upgrading slums would prove to be much more effective and beneficial for overcoming poverty than clearing them, and support to the informal sector is far better than trying to limit it. These actions do not mean that promoting rural and broad-based regional development should be ignored. A holistic view of development needs to be fostered, where the needs of migrants, particularly women and youth, are taken into account. Such policies would contribute to lowering the risk of marginalization, criminality, and environmental hazards, and at the same time benefit the nation’s general economy and living standards.

Almost everywhere, migrants are the big winners in the migration process and the estimated gains are large. Yet, for various reasons, governments are reluctant to admit its beneficial effects and worry about the perils of urbanization and internal migration, particularly in their manifestations in the form of overcrowding and pressure on social services. Nevertheless, a more holistic approach, which takes into consideration all the factors related to internal migration and urbanization, is critical for pursuing constructive solutions based on research and consultation.

Finally, remittances are an important tool for poverty alleviation. Even if remittances from international migrants have received much more attention than internal remittances, the latter are just as important for poverty alleviation.

Accordingly, governments and other stakeholders should recognize the impact of remittances from internal migrants and, just as in the case of remittances from international migrants, support remittances sent by internal migrants. Such support would involve measures like securing better data and monitoring to attach concrete figures to the volume of internal remittances and their impact on poverty alleviation. Likewise, policy makers should be instrumental in reducing the cost of sending money internally and improving the remittances market. Affordable and secure flows of remittances are crucial to enable migrants and their families to improve their well-being. For some migrants, the act of sending money home may be the first step in accessing financial services. Facilitating their access to a transaction account is a step forward in promoting financial inclusion and development.

The evidence presented in the research reports that form the basis of this synthesis indicates that, if adequately analyzed, internal migration is far from being a threat to human society and coexistence. If its

\(^8\) Decent work implies opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income; security in the workplace and social protection for families; better prospects for personal development and social integration; freedom for people to express their concerns, organize, and participate in the decisions that affect their lives; and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men (ILO 2015).
shortcomings, such as overcrowding, unemployment, and environmental degradation, are amended through well-informed and constructive measures by governments and citizens alike, internal migration can be an effective tool for poverty alleviation and inclusive human and economic development.

Behind the statistics and political attempts to harness the benefits from internal migration and efforts to address the stress that expanding cities put on natural resources and human cohabitation, individuals are striving for an improved existence for themselves and their children. This synthesis report indicates that it is among the personal initiatives and aspirations of millions of internal migrants that migration can be discerned as one of the most viable means humanity has for combatting poverty. An important aspect of migration is that it contributes to human capital formation, by doing away with the barriers to the socioeconomic participation of women, youth, and marginalized ethnic groups. Through their robust and often hidden commitment to improve the education and health of their children, migrants are actively contributing to improved well-being and human development.

References


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